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THE DIGNITY OF MAN IN WILLIAM OF CONCHES AND THE SCHOOL OF CHARTRES IN THE TWELFTH CENTURY

by

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Date: June 16, 1978

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A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of History in the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences of Duke University

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ABSTRACT

(History - Medieval)

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Despite considerable research over the last fifty years devoted to the delineation of medieval attributes of the Italian Renaissance and of Renaissance attributes in the Middle Ages, the identification of the Middle Ages with the contempt of the world and the Italian Renaissance with the dignity of man persists. This dissertation examines the writings of one influential group of scholars in the twelfth century to determine whether and to what extent they can be considered to have a concept of the dignity of man. Centering on the writings of William of Conches, the dissertation also examines the works of Thierry of Chartres, Gilbert Porreta, Clarembald of Arras, John of Salisbury, Bernard Silvestris, and some anonymous Chartrians. The dissertation is based on an examination of all the printed works of these Chartrians as well as considerable manuscript work with the writings of William of Conches. An appendix includes a tentative edition of selected passages from William's Glosae super Boetium, Glosae super Macrobium, and Philosophia mundi.

After placing the twelfth-century School of Chartres in its historical perspective, the dissertation examines four areas as crucial for indicating the Chartrians' concept of man: their attitudes toward pagan writings, reason, nature and man, and personal responsibility for one's actions. Thoroughly imbued with the classical works, the Chartrians viewed the ancient writings

much differently than their monastic predecessors and contemporaries. They saw the pagan writings not as Egyptians to be despoiled, but as giants to be used as a basis of support for their own inquiries. By means of an allegorical reading, William and his fellow Chartrians greatly expanded the value of the ancients as authorities of eloquence and wisdom. They raised Plato and Boethius to the level of authorities second only to the Bible.

By their use of allegory, the Chartrians made themselves the arbiters of the true meanings and intentions of their authorities rather than their slavish followers. Believing firmly in man's rational capabilities, William and his fellow Chartrians insisted that reasons should be sought for everything. By a rational examination of their authorities, both sacred and profane, they sought to comprehend both the material and the immaterial worlds and were convinced of the compatibility of faith and reason. Since William insisted that all knowledge derived from sense perception, the logical object of his rational inquiries was the natural world.

The Chartrians saw the natural world and man as inherently good because of their status as the creations of God. The natural world was a proper object of man's attention because nature, as the creation of God, was naturally good and, for the same reason, could lead man to know better both himself and God. The physical and social aspects of man's life, while inferior to the intellectual, were also good since nothing natural could be bad.

William and the other Chartrians emphasized man's responsibility for and control over what he does and what he becomes.

Rejecting the effect of any extraneous influences on man's moral development, the Chartrians insisted that man by his attainment or lack of knowledge and virtue determined his own fate, raising himself to the level of a god or lowering himself to the level of a beast.

The dissertation thus finds that William and his fellow Chartrians possessed a strong sense of the dignity of man two hundred years before the Italian Renaissance. Pressures from the more conservative monastic writers, from the growing needs of the papal and secular courts, and from the need to absorb the newly available Aristotelian works made it impossible to maintain the Chartrian synthesis intact through the twelfth century. The Chartrian writings, nonetheless, influenced directly and indirectly Latin and vernacular writers for more than two hundred years and were among the medieval writings retained in the libraries of the Renaissance humanists.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I acknowledge with pleasure the crucial help I have received from many sources in the writing of this dissertation. My research was aided by a Fulbright-Hayes grant which made possible a year of manuscript research in Munich.

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Dot Sapp deserves a special word of thanks for taking on the job of typing this dissertation at the last minute. She has done much more than should reasonably be expected of a typist. And finally my greatest debt is to my wife, Sally, without whose help and support I could never have finished.

J.H.N.

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ABBREVIATIONS

AGP	Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie
AHDLMA	Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge
BGPTM	Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters
CM	Classica et mediaevalia
CCM	Cahiers de civilization médiévale
DTC	Dictionnaire de théologie catholique. 15 vols. 1930-50
GCFI	Giornale critico della filosofia italiana
MRS	Mediaeval and Renaissance Studies
MS	Mediaeval Studies
PL	J. P. Migne, editor. Patrologiae cursus completus, series latina. 221 vol. and supps. Paris, 1844-.
RMAL	Revue du moyen âge latin
RNSP	Revue neo-scholastique de philosophie
RTAM	Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale
SAGM	Sudhoffs Archiv für Geschichte der Medizin
SM	Studi medievali

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The concept of the dignity of man is a theme traditionally associated with the Italian Renaissance. For over one hundred years it has been used by scholars as a focal point for any consideration of the culture of the Renaissance and especially as the theme which distinguished the Renaissance from the Middle Ages.[1] Scholars have assiduously investigated the development of this concept in the Italian and Northern Renaissance and have

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[1]The importance of the theme of the dignity of man for the thought of the Italian Renaissance was, of course, first signaled in 1860 by Jacob Burckhardt, The Civilization of the Renaissance in Italy, trans. S. G. C. Middlemore (New York, 1958), esp. pp. 143-74, 211-17, and 279-323. The scholarly literature which examines this theme either exclusively or as a major aspect of the Renaissance is enormous. The works to which I am most indebted are Giovanni Gentile, "Il concetto dell'uomo nel Rinascimento," in Il pensiero italiano del Rinascimento, 3rd ed. (Florence, 1940), esp. pp. 73-81 and 90-113; Ernst Cassirer, The Individual and the Cosmos in Renaissance Philosophy, trans. Mario Domandi (London, 1963), esp. pp. 74-120; idem, "Giovanni Pico della Mirandola: A Study in the History of Renaissance Ideas," in Renaissance Essays: From the Journal of the History of Ideas, ed. Paul Oskar Kristeller and Philip P. Wiener (New York, 1964), esp. pp. 11-47; Eugenio Garin, Italian Humanism, trans. Peter Munz (Oxford, 1965), esp. pp. 21-33, 56-60, and 88-106; Paul Oskar Kristeller, "The Renaissance Concepts of Man," in Renaissance Concepts of Man and Other Essays (New York, 1972), esp. pp. 1-42; idem, "The Philosophy of Man in the Italian Renaissance," in Renaissance Thought: The Classic, Scholastic, and Humanistic Strains (New York, 1955), pp. 120-39; and Charles Trinkaus, In Our Image and Likeness: Humanity and Divinity in Italian Humanist Thought, 2 vols. (Chicago, 1970), esp. 1:173-270 and 2:461-551.

offered detailed discussions of some of the more significant forms which it assumed. Despite occasional attempts by Renaissance scholars to trace the theme of the dignity of man back through the Middle Ages, however, the general emphasis of their works has strongly stressed the novelty and uniqueness of the theme for the Renaissance.[2]

Scholars have found the basis of a concept of the dignity of man in various aspects of Renaissance thought, and different scholars have emphasized different elements as the most essential for such a concept. Four broad areas contain the most important features which scholars have identified as contributing to the Renaissance view of man. First is the Renaissance writers' knowledge and use of pagan literature: their willingness to find truths gained by men without the aid of revelation. Second is their rationalism: their belief in man's ability to analyze and comprehend, at least partially, his beliefs, his surroundings, and himself. Third is their positive view of the world and man: their interest in human activities and the natural world. Fourth is their ethics: their emphasis on individual autonomy and personal responsibility. Throughout this paper, I shall utilize

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[2]Two of the most useful attempts by Renaissance scholars to trace the theme back to the Middle Ages are Eugenio Garin, "La 'Dignitas hominis' e la letteratura patristica," Rinascita 1 (1938):102-46; and Trinkaus, Image, 1:179-90. But even the most conscientious historians of the Renaissance all too often resort to categorizing the Middle Ages with the contempt of the world when comparing a Renaissance writer with his medieval predecessors. See for example Kristeller, "Renaissance Concepts of Man," pp. 5-6; Trinkaus, 1:192-99; and Donald J. Wilcox, In Search of God and Self: Renaissance and Reformation Thought (Boston, 1975), pp. 57-65.

these four themes as the key components of a concept of the dignity of man.

In contrast to this view of the Renaissance as reflecting belief in the dignity of man, many scholars have described the Middle Ages as dominated by a contempt of the world.[3] The major evidence adduced for identifying medieval thought with the theme of the contempt of the world comes from the patristic and monastic writers, and it is indeed in these writers that the best case for such a view can be made. Writing at a time when paganism was a very active contender for the hearts of the people, the Church Fathers saw pagan literature as a very real stumbling block to Christians. Jerome trembled under the accusation that he was a Ciceronian rather than a Christian, and Pope Gregory the Great reproved a bishop for teaching grammar by declaring that "there is not room in a single mouth for the praise of Christ and the praise of Jupiter."[4] Even in authorizing the utilization of the

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[3]The predominance of this interpretation in high school and college textbooks and in popular literature is too pervasive to allow references. The theme has also been the subject of several recent works which have restated the dominance of the concept of the contempt of the world in the Middle Ages. For examples of this modern scholarship and for references to earlier treatments see especially Robert Bultot, La doctrine du mépris du monde, en Occident, de S. Ambroise à Innocent III, tome 4, vols. 1 and 2: Le XIe siècle (Louvain, 1963-64); idem, "La 'dignité de l'homme' selon S. Pierre Damien," SM, 3rd. ser., 13 (1972): esp. 951-60; idem, "La dignité de l'homme selon S. Anselme de Cantorbéry," in La Normandie bénédictine au temps de Guillaume le Conquérant, ed. Louis Gaillard and Joseph Daoust (Lille, 1967), pp. 549-68; Francesco Lazzari, "Le 'mépris du monde' chez Saint Bernard," trans. into French by H. de Gensac, in Le mépris du monde: la notion de mépris du monde dans la tradition spirituelle occidentale, Problemes de vie religieuse, vol. 22 (Paris, 1965), pp. 59-72; and Réginald Grégoire, "'Se rendre étranger aux moeurs du siècle': le 'mépris du monde' dans la littérature médiévale," in ibid., pp. 19-55.

[4]Jerome, Epistola 22.30, PL 22, 416; Gregory the Great,

classics in the support of the church, Augustine emphasized that the classics should not be revered but treated as Egyptians to be despoiled.[5]

Writing after paganism had disappeared as an active force, the monastic writers, nevertheless, retained a strong distrust of pagan literature. Peter Damian condemned any study of profane culture which did not have the better comprehension of the scriptures as its immediate end.[6] It was apparently the rule in many monasteries that in the Scriptorium, where silence was required, a monk would ask for a pagan author by first opening his hands, palm up, then touching his finger to his ear. The former was the sign for a book; the latter imitated a dog scratching his ear because "a pagan may rightly be compared to a dog."[7] Hugh of St.

Epistola 11.54, PL 77, 1171C.

[5]Augustine, De doctrina christiana 2.40.60, Corpus christianorum, series latina, vol. 32 (Turnhout, 1962), pp. 73-74. On the Church Fathers' antagonism to pagan writings see A. H. M. Jones, "The Social Background of the Struggle Between Paganism and Christianity," in The Conflict Between Paganism and Christianity in the Fourth Century, ed. Arnaldo Momigliano (Oxford, 1963), esp. pp. 20-21 and 32-33; Pierre Courcelle, "Anti-Christian Arguments and Christian Platonism," in ibid., esp. pp. 151-66; and Herbert Bloch, "The Pagan Revival in the West at the End of the Fourth Century," in ibid., pp. 139-217.

[6]Peter Damian, De quadragesima, PL 145, 560C. On Damian's attack on pagan culture see especially Bultot, Mépris, 4.1:87-93; and J. Gonsette, Pierre Damien et la culture profane, Essais philosophiques, no. 7 (Louvain, 1956), esp. pp. 5-61.

[7]Ordo cluniacensis per Bernardum 1.27, ed. M. Herrgott, in Vetus disciplina monastica (Paris, 1926), p. 172. For other examples and discussion see Jean Leclercq, The Love of Learning and the Desire for God, trans. Catharine Misrahi (New York, 1961), pp. 129-30; and G. van Rijnberk, Le langage par signes chez les moines (Amsterdam, 1954), p. 84.

Victor encouraged his students to learn everything, but he made it clear that all learning should be directed at an understanding of the scripture. And he described the writings of ancient philosophers as "a whitewashed wall of error . . . which conceals the clay of error, as it were, under an over-spread coat of color."[8]

The patristic and monastic emphasis on the superiority of faith to reason led to statements depreciating the value of rational inquiry. Tertullian made the classic attack on man's rational capabilities in his credo, "that the Son died may be believed because it is absurd; that he rose from the dead is certain because it is impossible."[9] The theme became common in later monastic writings. Bernard of Clairvaux described

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[8]Hugh of St. Victor, Didascalicon 4.1, ed. Charles H. Buttimer, Studies in Medieval and Renaissance Latin, vol. 10 (Washington, 1939), p. 70. Cf. Didascalicon 6.3, pp. 113-17; and De arca Noe morali, PL 176, 674B-C. On Hugh's attitude toward pagan literature see especially Roger Baron, Science et sagesse chez Hugues de Saint-Victor (Paris, 1957), pp. 3-16; and Jerome Taylor, Introduction to The Didascalicon of Hugh of St. Victor: A Medieval Guide to the Arts, Records of Civilization: Sources and Studies, no. 64 (New York, 1961), pp. 6-8 and 15-22. For other examples see Bernard of Clairvaux, Tractatus de erroribus Abaelardi, PL 182, esp. 1062-64; idem, Epistolae 191 and 192, PL 182, 357B-59A; and Gerhoh of Reichersberg, De gloria et honore Filii hominis, PL 194, 1074-5. On the monastic distrust of pagan texts see especially Leclercq, Love of Learning, pp. 116-51; François Vandenbroucke, Pour l'histoire de la théologie morale: la morale monastique de XIe au XVIe siècle, Analecta mediaevalia namurcensia, vol. 20 (Louvain, 1966), pp. 54-102 and 119-55; and Marie-Dominique Chenu, "Platon à Citeaux," AHDLMA 21 (1954):99-106.

[9]Tertullian, De carne Christi 5.4, Corpus christianorum, series latina, vol. 2 (Turnhout, 1954), p. 881.

philosophers as "the slaves of curiosity and pride," and William of St. Thierry condemned the writing of "new things" derived through philosphy and physics.[10] Otto of Freising attacked Peter Abelard for striving "to make vain the merit of Christian faith, since he believes he can comprehend by human reason all that is God."[11] Hugh of St. Victor condemned natural philosophy as "the disputes of men, who out of vain curiosity, pry into the hidden things of God's works."[12]

The Church Fathers often spoke of the need for the Christian to withdraw from earthly cares and pleasures. This withdrawal from the world soon became institutionalized in the spread of monasticism throughout the medieval world. Many believed with

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[10]Bernard of Clairvaux, Sermo 3 In die Pentecostes, in Sancti Bernardi Opera, ed. Jean Leclercq, C. H. Talbot, and H. M. Rochais, 7 vols. to date (Rome, 1957-) 5:173; and William of St. Thierry, De erroribus Guillelmi de Conchis, PL 180, 333.

[11]Otto of Freising, Gesta Friderici Imperatoris 1.48, ed. Rogerus Wilmani, MGH, vol. 20, p. 377.

[12]Hugh of St. Victor, In ecclesiasten homiliae, PL 175, 239D. For further examples of monastic attacks on the use of reason see Peter Damian, De sancta simplicitate, PL 145, 697B-C; Manegold of Lautenbach, Opusculum contra Wolfelmum Coloniensem, PL 155, 153C-163A; and Bernard of Clairvaux, De consideratione 2.3.6, in Opera, 3:414-15. For a discussion of the anti-rational element in patristic and monastic writings see especially Étienne Gilson, Reason and Revelation in the Middle Ages (New York, 1938), esp. pp. 5-33; idem, History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages (New York, 1955), pp. 44-49; Baron, Science et sagesse, pp. 2-31 and 91-96; E. Baudin, "Les rapports de la raison et de la foi du moyen âge à nos jours," Revue des sciences réligieuses 3 (1923):237-38; Ermengildo Bertola, "Ragione e fede nel XII secolo," Sophia 20 (1952):55-71; Erich Kleineidam, "Wissen, Wissenschaft, Theologie bei Bernhard von Clairvaux," in Bernhard von Clairvaux: Mönch und Mystiker, ed. Joseph Lortz, Internationaler Bernhard-Kongress, Mainz, 1953 (Wiesbaden, 1955), pp. 128-67; and Herschel Clay Baker, The Dignity of Man: Studies in the Persistence of an Idea (Cambridge, Mass., 1947), p. 162.

Anselm of Canterbury that few would be saved and most of those would be monks; so in rejecting the world, the monks sought to grasp more securely eternal rewards.[13] Whether writing to praise the monastic life or to justify their withdrawl, the medieval monks repeatedly condemned earthly goods and pleasures and belittled the life and powers of man. This criticism took such forms as denunciation of human sexuality, emphasis on the destructive effects of the Fall, and insistence on the depravity of man's will.[14]

But even in those patristic and monastic writers whose works abound with virulent attacks on the classics, the world, and man, there are elements which cannot be characterized as reflecting contempt of the world. Many scholars find a positive

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[13]Anselm of Canterbury, Epistola 2, ed. F. S. Schmitt, Sancti Anselmi opera omnia, 6 vols. (Rome and Edinburgh, 1938-61), 3:100. On Anselm's flight from the world see R. W. Southern, Saint Anselm and His Biographer (Cambridge, Eng., 1963), esp. pp. 97-102; and Bultot, Mépris, 4.2.84-102.

[14]For examples see Gerhoh of Reichersberg, Liber de aedificio Dei, PL 194, 1302C-D; Anselm of Canterbury, Cur Deus homo 2.5 in Opera, 2:99-100; and Peter Damian, Apologeticus de contemptu saeculi, PL 145, 276A-277A. On the patristic and monastic writer's disparagement of the earth and man see Bultot, Mépris, 4.1:63-84 and 100-115, and 4.2:80-84 and 90-130; idem, "Pierre Damien," pp. 948-50; Vandenbroucke, Morale monastique, pp. 78-82 and 124-50; and Lazzari, "Mépris du monde," pp. 59-72. One of the important aspects of the attack on man's will and power is the emphasis placed on the doctrine of predestination. On Augustine, probably the major medieval theorist on predestination, see Étienne Gilson, The Christian Philosophy of Saint Augustine, trans. L. E. M. Lynch (New York, 1960), pp. 148-64; R. A. Markus, "Marius Victorinus and Augustine," in The Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy, ed. A. H. Armstrong (Cambridge, Eng., 1967), pp. 380-94; and John M. Rist, "Augustine on Free Will and Predestination," Journal of Theological Studies, n.s., 20 (1969):420-27.

view of man and the world spread throughout the Middle Ages from the Christian philosophy of Augustine to the mystical theology of Bernard.[15] The patristic and monastic writers, despite their criticism of the classics and human reason, continued to read the ancient works of the pagans and to apply their human reason to an investigation of philosophical and theological questions. Their writings frequently reveal considerable concern with human society and real compassion for the pain and sorrows of their fellow men. Thus, while large segments of these writings may legitimately be described as professing a contempt of the world, it seems an exaggeration to use this concept to designate all

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[15]See for example Gilson, Saint Augustine, esp. pp. 66-111 and 185-224; idem, Reason and Revelation, pp. 16-33; Robert Javelet, Image et ressemblance au douzième siècle de St. Anselme à Alain de Lille, 2 vols. (Paris, 1967), esp. 1:169-245; François Vandenbroucke, The Spirituality of the Middle Ages, trans. the Benedictines of Holmes Eden Abbey, A History of Christian Spirituality, ed. Louis Bouyer et al., 3 vols. (London, 1963-69), 2: 230-33; Bernard McGinn, The Golden Chain: A Study in the Theological Anthropology of Isaac of Stella, Cistercian Studies Series, vol. 15 (Washington, 1972), pp. 103-96; Leclercq, Love of Learning, esp. pp. 116-231; idem, "Postface," in Le mépris du monde, pp. 55-58; and Robert Javelet, "L'amour spirituel face à l'amour courtois," in Entretiens sur la renaissance du 12e siècle, ed. Maurice de Gandillac and Édouard Jeauneau (Paris, 1968), pp. 344-45. Leclercq is one of the strongest opponents of describing monastic thought as dominated by the theme of the contempt of the world. He, Javelet, and others have strongly criticized Bultot's methods, thesis, and intellectual honesty. While I agree with Leclercq and his supporters that Bultot has adapted an excessively narrow concept of the dignity of man, I also believe that in denying the dominance of the theme of the contempt of the world in the monastic writers, Leclercq and others have overemphasized the positive elements in monastic thought as much as Bultot has overemphasized the negative. By ignoring the kinds of monastic statements which Bultot has utilized to show the monastic contempt of the world, these defenders of monastic humanism have tended to blur the very real differences between the monastic writers and the cathedral school writers like the Chartrians.

patristic and monastic culture.

It is an even greater exaggeration to use the term to describe the Middle Ages as a whole because medieval civilization was multi-faceted and varied. While the monastic schools thoroughly dominated intellectual life in the early Middle Ages, in the late eleventh and early twelfth centuries the cathedral schools arose as a viable alternative to monastic education. The cathedral schools of the secular clergy had, of course, existed alongside the monastic schools throughout the Middle Ages, but until the eleventh century they were generally characterized by their impoverished libraries and their lack of order and discipline. But in the late eleventh century, partly because of their freedom from a firm tradition and from a clearly defined routine of study, these cathedral schools rose to the forefront of intellectual life. Their increased importance was made possible by the growth of towns, the rising population, the increased prosperity, and the relative peace of the late eleventh and early twelfth centuries. The new centers of study functioned in a more urban, more secular, and less tradition-oriented domain than the monastic schools, and this gave their philosophical outlook a decided difference.[16] Learning for the monk had always

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[16]On the development of the cathedral schools and a corresponding new intellectual climate in the eleventh and twelfth centuries see especially Charles Homer Haskins, The Renaissance of the Twelfth Century (Cambridge, Mass., 1927), pp. 32-91; G. Paré, A. Brunet, and P. Tremblay, La renaissance du XIIe siècle: les écoles et l'enseignement, Publications de l'Institut d'études médiévales d'Ottawa, vol. 3 (Paris, 1933), esp. pp. 50-72; Aimé Forest, "Les doctrines dans les écoles urbaines de XIIe siècle," in Le mouvement doctrinal du IXe au XIVe siècle, Histoire de l'Église, ed. Augustin Fliche and Victor Martin, 21 vols. to date (Paris, 1934-), 13:69-146; Philippe Delhaye, "L'organisation

been a function secondary to his religious devotion; but for the schoolmen, learning was primary. Not as removed from the world as their monastic contemporaries and predecessors, the schoolmen did not feel the same need to condemn the classics, the world, and man.

Various cathedral schools gained prominence during this period, but the School of Chartres attained a unique position both among the twelfth-century schools and in the history of medieval thought. A part of the reason for that position lies in the early and sustained interest at Chartres in medicine on the one hand and in grammar and rhetoric on the other. In one of the earliest references to Chartres, Richer of Reims, a student of Gerbert of Aurillac, reported that he traveled to Chartres in order to study the medical works of Galen and Hippocrates.[17] Other rare scientific manuscripts in the fields

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scolaire au XIIe siècle," Traditio 5 (1947):211-68; R. W. Southern, The Making of the Middle Ages (New Haven, 1953), pp. 193-204; Jacques Le Goff, Les intellectuels au moyen âge (Paris, 1957), pp. 9-28; David Knowles, "The Humanism of the Twelfth Century," in The Historian and Character and Other Essays (Cambridge, Eng., 1963), pp. 16-30; Urban T. Holmes, Jr., "Transitions in European Education," in Twelfth-Century Europe and the Foundations of Modern Society, ed. Marshall Clagett, Gaines Post, and Robert Reynolds (Madison, 1961), pp. 15-38; Marie-Dominique Chenu, "The Masters of the Theological 'Science'," in Nature, Man, and Society in the Twelfth Century, ed. and trans. Jerome Taylor and Lester K. Little (Chicago, 1968), pp. 270-309; R. W Southern, "Medieval Humanism," in Medieval Humanism and Other Studies (New York, 1970), pp. 29-60; and Philippe Wolff, The Awakening of Europe, trans. Anne Carter, The Pelican History of European Thought, 2 vols. to date (Baltimore, 1968--), 1:197-201 and 240-46.

[17]Richer, Historiae 4.50, PL 138, 145-47. On the school of Chartres before the twelfth century see Loren C. MacKinney, Early Medieval Medicine with Special Reference to France and Chartres (Baltimore, 1937), esp. pp. 112-22; idem, Bishop Fulbert and Education at the School of Chartres (Notre Dame, 1957), esp. pp. 12-36; Giorgio Rialdi, Il "De philosophia mundi," l'autore,

of medicine, mathematics, and astrology, are known to have existed at Chartres.[18] At the same time there was a strong emphasis on grammar and rhetoric exemplified by the eleventh-century chancellor and later bishop of Chartres, Fulbert, who wrote poetry as well as studied medicine, and by his numerous students, who were prominent in medicine and grammar.[19] In the eleventh century there was already at Chartres an unusually strong library and a firm tradition of uniting the trivium and quadrivium.

Another reason for Chartres' unique position was its fortune in possessing as chancellor in the early twelfth century Bernard of Chartres, whose works are known only through those of his students.[20] Apparently possessing a love for and thorough knowledge of the ancient classics available to him, Bernard strove diligently and successfully to lead his students to the same love and knowledge. He encouraged his students to study

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la storia, il contenuto medico (Geneva, 1965), pp. 50-58; M. Carol Sullivan, "The Concept of Man in the Twelfth-Century Humanism of Chartres" (Ph.D. dissertation, Loyola University of Chicago, 1967), pp. 21-42; Peter Dronke, "New Approaches to the School of Chartres," Anuario de estudios medievales 6 (1969): 117-40; Southern, Making of the Middle Ages, pp. 197-204; and Jules Alexandre Clerval, Les écoles de Chartres au moyen âge du Ve siècle au XVIe siècle, Mémoires de la Société archéologique d'Eure-et-Loir, tome 11 (Chartres, 1895), pp. 14-142.

[18]MacKinney, Fulbert, pp. 56-57 and 29-34; and Dronke, "New Approaches," pp. 123-28.

[19]See especially MacKinney, Fulbert; and Clerval, Écoles, pp. 31-43.

[20]On Bernard see Étienne Gilson, "Le platonisme de Bernard de Chartres," RNSP 25 (1923):5-19; idem, History, pp. 619-20; and Clerval, Écoles, pp. 158-63 and 180-85.

carefully the works of antiquity so that they might themselves become as worthy of imitation as the ancients.[21] Although first of all a grammarian, Bernard was concerned not only with the style and meaning of an ancient text but also with its philosophical implications. Considered the best Platonist of his day, he espoused an exaggerated realism. He also sought, like Boethius, to reconcile the doctrines of Plato and Aristotle.[22] Bernard guided his students to the most thorough knowledge of the classics since Boethius, and he taught them to look at all ancient writings through the framework of Chartrian Platonism.

This Chartrian Platonism which Bernard taught his students was drawn mainly from Middle Platonic and Neoplatonic sources rather than from Plato himself. As Étienne Gilson has said, "Plato himself does not appear at all, but Platonism is everywhere; let us say rather that there are Platonisms everywhere."[23] The Chartrians knew Plato directly only through

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[21]Édouard Jeauneau,"'Nani gigantum humeris insidentes.' Essai d'interprétation de Bernard de Chartres," Vivarium 5 (1967):79-99.

[22]The evidence about Bernard comes mainly from John of Salisbury, Metalogicon 1.24 and 3.2, ed. Clement C. J. Webb (Oxford, 1929), pp. 53-59 and 124-27.

[23]Gilson, History, p. 144. Cf. Raymond Klibansky, The Continuity of the Platonic Tradition During the Middle Ages (London, 1939), p. 36; and Marie-Dominique Chenu, "The Platonisms of the Twelfth Century," in Nature, Man, and Society, p. 49. The basic intellectual framework at the School of Chartres, which I shall refer to throughout this dissertation as Chartrian Platonism, was formed from a wide range of sources, but the most important strain of thought in these sources was clearly Neoplatonism. In early Christian authorities, like Boethius and Augustine, they found an interpretation of Plato that was strongly Neoplatonic. Likewise most of their favorite ancient authorities, like Macrobius and Chalcidius, also viewed Plato from a

Chalcidius' Latin translations of the first part of the Timaeus, sections 17-53. By possessing only this fragment of Plato's writings, the Chartrians had of necessity a distorted view of Plato's thought, but at the same time a view free from the complications and contradictions which the modern critic finds in Plato. By reading only the first part of the Timaeus, the Chartrians were led to view Plato as primarily a natural philosopher concerned with explaining the origins and order of the world. They found in him a belief in the uncompromised goodness of the sensible world and in the soul's presence on earth as part of a divine mission. The Timaeus was thus able to serve as the starting point and guide for the Chartrians' efforts to formulate a natural philosophy.[24]

Neoplatonic perspective.

On the way in which Neoplatonism differs from Platonism, especially its location of the Ideas in the Nous and its doctrine of participation, see among others Émile Bréhier, "Platonisme et neoplatonisme," Revue des études grecques, 51 (1938): 489-98; Endre von Ivánka, "Die neuplatonische Synthese," Scholastik, 19-24 (1949):30-38; Philip Merlan, From Platonism to Neoplatonism (The Hague, 1953), esp. pp. 1-7; and R. T. Wallis, Neoplatonism (New York, 1972), esp. pp. 1-36. On Plotinus, probably the major force in the development of Neoplatonism, see Émile Bréhier, The Philosophy of Plotinus, trans. Joseph Thomas (Chicago, 1958); and for the influence of Plotinus on early medieval thought see Paul Henry, Plotin et l'occident, Spicilegium sacrum lovaniense, Études et documents, vol. 15 (Louvain, 1934).

[24]On the role of the Timaeus in Chartrian thought see especialy Chenu, "Platonisms," esp. pp. 65-72; Klibansky, Continuity, pp. 22-29; Tullio Gregory, Platonismo medievale: studi e richerche (Rome, 1958), esp. pp. 52-58; and Margaret T. Gibson, "The Study of the Timaeus in the Eleventh and Twelfth Centuries," Pensamiento 25 (1969):183-94. For an introduction to the Platonic thought of the Timaeus see Francis Macdonald Cornford, Plato's Cosmology: The "Timaeus" of Plato Translated with a Running Commentary (London, 1937); and Gregory Vlastos, Plato's Universe (Seattle, 1975). There is a good general discussion of Plato's later views on the physical world in Friedrich Solmsen, Aristotle's System of the Physical World: A Comparison with his

The other most important sources for the Chartrians were Chalcidius, Macrobius, Boethius, and Martianus Capella. Chartrian Platonism was filtered through the eyes of these late Latin writers; consequently, Neoplatonism exerted a very heavy influence on their thought. Macrobius was their main source for the ideas of Plotinus and Porphyry, but Boethius and Martianus also transmitted Neoplatonic ideas. Chalcidius provided a link to the Middle Platonic school as well as possible Neoplatonic influence.[25] These four writers were seen as authorities in all areas but were especially valued in those areas viewed as their specialties. Chalcidius' commentary on the Timaeus was the main source for the doctrine of primal matter and for the interpretation of the Timaeus as a treatise on the creation of the world. Macrobius' commentary on the Somnium Scipionis was especially valued for its astrology, cosmology

Predecessors, Cornell Studies in Classical Philology, vol. 33 (Ithaca, 1960), pp. 40-66. On medieval Platonism and Neoplatonism see also Clemens Baeumker, Der Platonismus im Mittelalter, BGPTM, Band 25 (Munich, 1928), pp. 139-79; Eugenio Garin, Studi sul platonismo medievale (Florence, 1958), pp. 13-87; Maurice de Gandillac, "Le platonisme au XII^{e} et au XIII^{e} siècles," in Association Guillaume Budé, Congrès de Tours et Poitiers, Act du congrès (Paris, 1954), pp. 266-85; and Hans Liebschütz, "Western Christian Thought from Boethius to Anselm," in Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy, ed. A. H. Armstrong (Cambridge, Eng., 1967), pp. 538-639.

[25] On the unique nature of the influence of Chalcidius see Klibansky, Continuity, p. 27; Wallis, Neoplatonism, pp. 166-68; and Jan Fransiszek Sulowski, "Studies on Chalcidius: Anthropology, Influence and Importance," in Homme et son destin, pp. 153-61. For a general discussion of the medieval tradition of these four writers see Chenu, "Platonisms," esp. pp. 23-46; Gilson, History, pp. 97-106 and 586-87; and Édouard Jeauneau, "Note sur l'École de Chartres," SM, 3rd ser., 5 (1964):821-52.

and theory of myth. Together with his Saturnalia it provided information about the Stoics, the Epicureans, and other ancient philosophical groups.[26] Martianus was honored as the authority on the need to join the trivium and quadrivium and as a key source for the use of allegory.[27] Along with the Timaeus, the works of Boethius were the most important sources of Chartrian thought. His Consolatio philosophiae provided the cornerstone for their theory of knowledge and their view of freedom of choice, his De musica and De arithmetica their mathematical conceptions, his De Trinitate their theological views, and his translation of and commentary on the Isagoge of Porphyry their dialectic.[28]

Two Greek works which in Latin translations were

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[26]For the thought and influence of Macrobius see William Harris Stahl, Introduction to Macrobius' Commentary on the Dream of Scipio, Records of Civilization: Sources and Studies, no. 48 (New York, 1952), pp. 42-55; M. Schedler, Die Philosophie des Macrobius und ihr Einfluss auf die Wissenschaft des christlichen Mittelalters, BGPTM, Band 13 (Münster, 1916), esp. pp. 103-40; Édouard Jeauneau, "Macrobe, source du platonisme chartrain," SM, 3rd ser., 1 (1960):3-24; Hubert Silvestre, "Note sur la survie de Macrobe au moyen âge," CM 24 (1963):170-80; and Pierre Courcelle, Late Latin Writers and Their Greek Sources, trans. Harry E. Wedeck (Cambridge, Mass., 1969), pp. 13-37; and Henry, pp. 146-92.

[27]On Martianus see William Harris Stahl and Richard Johnson, Martianus Capella and the Seven Liberal Arts, Records of Civilization: Sources and Texts, no. 84, 2 vols. (New York, 1971), 1:55-70; Gabriel Nuchelmans, "Philologie et son mariage avec Mercure jusqu'à la fin du XIIe siècle," Latomus 16 (1957): 84-107; and Courcelle, Latin Writers, pp. 211-19.

[28]On Boethius in the Middle Ages see Howard R. Patch, The Tradition of Boethius: A Study of His Importance in Mediaeval Culture (New York, 1935), pp. 20-45; Pierre Courcelle, "Étude critique sur les commentaires de la Consolation de Boèce (IXe-XVe siècles," AHDLMA 12 (1939):12-94; idem, La consolation de philosophie dans la tradition littéraire (Paris, 1967), esp. pp. 301-13; idem, Latin Writers, pp. 273-330; and Liebschütz, "Boethius to Anselm," pp. 538-64.

influential in forming Chartrian Platonism were Nemesius of Emessa's Premnon physicon and the Hermetic Asclepius. The Asclepius, with its blending of Neoplatonic and Stoic thought, was influential in the development of the theme of man as mircocosm and the doctrine of creation from natural causes. It also gave support to the theme, common in Boethius, that man, by the attainment of knowledge and virtue, can make himself like a god.[29] Nemesius, who provided another example of Christian Platonism, gave a crucial impetus to Chartrian speculation through his emphasis on the study of man. The themes of man as microcosm and man as an intermediate being between the world of the spirit and the world of the body exerted wide influence. Nemesius was also an important source for the Chartrians' discussion of the powers of the soul and for their treatment of the distinction between voluntary and involuntary acts.[30]

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[29]On the influence of the Hermetic Asclepius see Robert B. Woolsey, "Bernard Silvester and the Hermetic Asclepius," Traditio 6 (1948):340-44; Dronke, "New Approaches," p. 124 and 133-38; Brian Stock, Myth and Science in the Twelfth Century: A Study of Bernard Silvester (Princeton, 1972), pp. 102-12 and 150-62; and Winthrop Wetherbee, Introduction to The Cosmographia of Bernardus Silvestris, Records of Civilization: Sources and Studies, no. 89 (New York; 1973), pp. 31-32.

[30]On the medieval tradition of Nemesius and the use of him by the Chartrians see Gilson, History, pp. 60-64; É. Amann, "Némésius d'Émèse," DTC, 11:62-67; Theodore Silverstein, "Guillaume de Conches and Nemesius of Emessa: On the Sources of the 'New Science' of the Twelfth Century," in Harry Austryn Wolfson Jubilee Volume, 3 vols. (Jerusalem, 1965), 2:719-34; Édouard Jeauneau, ed., Glosae super Platonem, Textes philosophiques du moyen âge, vol. 13 (Paris, 1965), pp. 129-30, 141, and 241; Ynez Violé O'Neill, "William of Conches and the Cerebral Membranes," Clio medica 2 (1967), esp. 15-17; Dronke, "New Approaches," p. 124; Paul Oskar Kristeller, "The School of Salerno: Its Development and Its Contribution to the History of Learning," in Studies in Renaissance Thought and Letters (Rome, 1956), pp. 495-551; and Brian Lawn, The Salernitan Questions: An Introduction to

With these predominantly philosophical sources, the Chartrians combined several from a more scientific or medical tradition. They obtained much of their natural philosophy from the works already listed, especially Macrobius and Nemesius of Emessa, but they supplemented this with treatises of Greek medical thought transmitted through Arabic works. They knew the Pantegni of Ali Ibn al Abbas in the translation of Constantine the African, the Galenic Liber de oculis translated by Constantine, the Isagoge of Johannitius, and the De urinis by a ninth-century Byzantine writer.[31] From these works the Chartrians drew much of their Galenic medical theory and saw medicine as a development from general physical doctrines which connected man with the universe. The Pantegni exerted the greatest influence of any of these medical treatises and was very influential in

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the History of Medieval and Renaissance Problem Literature (Oxford, 1963), esp. pp. 22-33.

[31]On the influence of these Greek-Arabic medical works on the Chartrians see Heinrich Schipperges, "Die Schulen von Chartres unter dem Einfluss des Arabismus," SAGM, os., 40 (1956): 193-210; idem, "Die frühen Übersetzer der arabischen Medizin in chronologischer Sicht," SAGM, o.s., 39 (1955):53-93; idem, Die Assimilation der arabischen Medizin durch das lateinische Mittelalter, SAGM, Beiheft 3 (Wiesbaden, 1964), esp. pp. 111-23; Richard McKeon, "Medicine and Philosophy in the Eleventh and Twelfth Centuries: The Problem of Elements," The Thomist 24 (1961): esp. 221-31; Lawn, esp. pp. 50-56; Ynez Violé O'Neill, "William of Conches' Descriptions of the Brain," Clio medica 3 (1968): esp. 205-15; Dronke, "New Approaches," pp. 124-25; and Richard Lemay, Abu Ma'shar and Latin Aristotelianism in the Twelfth Century (Beirut, 1962), esp. pp. 2-8. Lemay, pp. 157-95 and 285-311, argues that John of Seville's translation of Abu Ma'shar's Introductorium was very influential in transmitting Aristotelianism to the Chartrians, but I follow Dronke, "New Approaches," p. 124, in having serious doubts about this influence.

the descriptions of the physiology of the brain.

The more purely literary classical writers also made their presence felt at Chartres. For the Chartrians, the most important poets were Virgil, Horace, and Ovid; the most important prose writers Cicero and Seneca. Cicero was especially known for his De inventione rhetorica, De oratore, De officiis, De natura deorum, and De amicitia; Seneca for his Epistolae, De beneficiis, and Quaestiones naturales. Other classical writers to whom the Chartrians refer frequently include Juvenal, Persius, Lucan, Priscian, Terence, and Quintilian. Besides affording the Chartrians contact with the classical use of grammar and rhetoric, these classical writings, particularly Cicero and Seneca, offered additional avenues for Platonic and Stoic influences.[32]

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[32]On the knowledge and influence of classical writers in the twelfth century see Haskins, The Renaissance of the Twelfth Century, pp. 93-126; John Holmberg, ed., Das Moralium dogma philosophorum (Uppsala, 1929), pp. 9-11; Simone Viarre, "Le commentaire ordonné du monde dans quelques sommes scientifiques des XIIe et XIIIe siècles," in Classical Influence on European Culture, AD 500-1500, ed. R. R. Bolgar (Cambridge, Eng., 1971), p. 208-9; Bernard Bischoff, "Living with the Satirists," in ibid, pp. 83-94; Édouard Jeauneau, "La lecture des auteurs classiques à l'École de Chartres durant la première moitié du XIIe siècle," in ibid, pp. 95-102; and idem, "Deux rédactions des gloses de Guillaume de Conches sur Priscien," RTAM 27 (1960): 212-47. On the influence of Cicero see N. E. Nelson, "Cicero's De officiis in Christian Thought 300-1300," in Essays and Studies in English and Comparative Liberature, University of Michigan Publications in Language and Literature, vol. 10 (Ann Arbor, 1933), pp. 91-98; Theodore Silverstein, "Adelard, Aristotle, and the De natura deorum," Classical Philology 47 (1952):82-85; and J. O. Ward, "The Date of the Commentary on Cicero's De inventione by Thierry of Chartres (ca. 1905-1160) and the Cornificians' Attack on the Liberal Arts," Viator 3 (1972): 219-73. On Seneca see Klaus-Dieter Nothdurft, Studien zum Einfluss Senecas auf die Philosophie und Theologie des Zwölften Jahrhunderts, Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters, Band 7 (Leyden, 1963), pp. 94-118, 161-77, and 182-91. On Ovid see Franco Munari, Ovid in Mittelalter (Zurich, 1960), pp. 9-29; and Simone Viarre, La survie d'Ovide dans la littérature scientifique des XIIe et

Other sources for Chartrian speculation were the Christian medieval writers, many of whose writings also contained elements of Neoplatonism. Augustine is the only Church Father whom the Chartrians regularly cite as an authority, with the largest number of references to his De Genesi ad litteram, De Trinitate, De doctrina Christiana, and the Confessiones. But he does not seem to have had a major influence on their thought. Ambrose, Jerome, and Gregory are also cited, but much less frequently.[33] The pseudo-Dionysius, through the translations of John Scotus Eriugena, made available to the Chartrians the concepts of negative theology and of Pythagorean number speculation, which perhaps exerted influence in some of their writings.[34]

XIIIe siècles (Poitiers, 1966), pp. 45-77 and 97-98.

[33]For example in William of Conches' Glosae super Platonem there are six references to Augustine, one to Ambrose, and two to Jerome, compared with more than twenty-five each for Boethius, Chalcidius, and Macrobius. I agree with Jeauneau, Glosae, p. 26, and Stock, Myth, pp. 250-51, that the Chartrians, especially William of Conches and Bernard Silverstris, cite Augustine as a revered authority but that one cannot find evidence that he exercised substantial influence on their thought. For a contrary view see Chenu, "Platonisms," pp. 60-64. For some consideration of the Neoplatonic influence on Augustine see Henry, pp. 63-145; Josef Koch, "Augustinischer und Dionysischer Neuplatonismus und das Mittelalter," in Kleine Schriften, 2 vols., Storia e letteratura, vol. 27 (Rome, 1973), 1:3-25; and Robert J. O'Connell, St. Augustine's Early Theory of Man, A.D. 386-391 (Cambridge, Mass., 1968).

[34]Helen E. Rodnite [Lemay], "The Doctrine of the Trinity in Guillaume de Conches' Glosses on Macrobius: Texts and Studies" (Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1973), pp. 35-59. Cf. Chenu, "Platonisms," pp. 79-88. On the Neoplatonic elements in the Pseudo-Dionysius see Koch, 1:3-25; and Jean Pépin, "Univers dionysien et univers augustinien," in Aspects de la dialectique, Recherches de philosophie, vol. 2 (Paris, 1956), pp. 179-224. For an analysis of the thought of the Psuedo-Dionysius see the standard work: René Rocques, L'univers dionysien: Structure hiérarchique du monde selon le pseudo-Denys, Theologie, vol. 29 (Paris, 1954).

Isidore of Seville's Etymologiae, Bede's De natura rerum, the mythological works of Fulgentius, the commentaries of Remigius of Auxerre, and John Scotus Eriugena's Periphyseon and commentaries provided scientific information, etymologies, and mythological interpretations which the Chartrians assimilated into their own speculations.[35] From all those writers they also drew various strains of a Christian Platonism already somewhat Neoplatonic in its orientation, which they combined with other sources of Neoplatonism. The Chartrians used their sources freely, and practically all of their ideas were drawn in one form or another from one or more of their authorities. The Chartrians were not, however, slavish imitators. They revealed their originality in their selection of concepts, interpretations, and themes from their sources and in their expansion of ideas beyond what they found in their sources.

The special position which Chartres attained among cathedral schools of the twelfth-century because of its unique blend of the trivium and the quadrivium and its thorough knowledge of the classics led to its claim to a pre-eminent role in the history of medieval thought. By interpreting John of Salisbury's Metalogicon to read that the three years John was away from the Mt. St. Genevieve were spent at the School of Chartres studying under William of Conches, Thierry of Chartres, and

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[35]See Édouard Jeauneau, "Gloses de Guillaume de Conches sur Macrobe. Note sur les manuscrits," AHDLMA 27 (1960):24-28; idem, Glosae, p. 26; Courcelle, "Étude critique," pp. 77-91; and Gilson, History, pp. 113-28.

Gilbert Porreta, Schaarschmidt laid the foundation for considering Chartres the most important cathedral school of the twelfth century.[36] Poole, basing his analysis on Schaarschmidt's reading of the Metalogicon, described Chartres as an example of premature humanism whose major masters were Bernard Silvestris (whom he identified with Bernard of Chartres), Thierry of Chartres, William of Conches, and Gilbert Porreta.[37] Clerval filled in the details of Poole's sketch and corrected such errors as the identification of Bernard Silvestris and Bernard of Chartres. He emphasized the quality and reputation of the chancellors and masters of Chartres and the influence they exerted on the students.[38] Poole revised his work but still vigorously supported the thesis that William, Thierry, and Gilbert were chancellors and/or masters at Chartres.[39] The association of these twelfth-

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[36]C. Schaarschmidt, Johannes Saresberiensis nach Leben und Studien, Schriften und Philosophie (Leipzig, 1862), pp. 14-23. The crucial passage occurs in John of Salisbury, Metalogicon 1.5 and 2.10, pp. 16-20 and 77-83.

[37]Reginald Lane Poole, Illustrations of the History of Medieval Thought (Oxford, 1884), pp. 109-35.

[38]Jules Alexandre Clerval, "L'enseignement des arts libéraux à Chartres et à Paris dans la première moitié du XIIe siècle, d'apres l'Heptateuchon de Thierry de Chartres," in Congrès scientifique international des catholiques tenu à Paris en 1888, 3 vols. (Paris, 1889), 2:276-96; and Clerval, Écoles, esp. pp. 144-272. Also important as an early proponent of the importance of Chartres was Barthélémy Hauréau, Histoire de la philosophie scholastique, 2 pts. in 3 vols. (Paris, 1872), 1:390-419. It should be noted that although Clerval advocated the importance of Chartres, he did not follow Schaarschmidt's reading of the Metalogicon. He describes William of Conches as a master, not at Chartres, but at Paris in Écoles, p. 181.

[39]Reginald Lane Poole, "The Masters of the Schools at Paris and Chartres, in John of Salisbury's Time," in Studies in Chronology and History, col. and ed. Austin Lane Poole (Oxford, 1934), pp. 223-47. Cf. idem, Illustrations of the History of Medieval Thought and Learning, 2nd rev. ed. (London, 1920), pp. 98-115.

century thinkers with Chartres and the pre-eminence of Chartres were thus established, and the details were no longer stated conjecturally but with certainty. Practically every book on twelfth-century thought gave a brief summary of the importance of Chartres as drawn by Poole and Clerval.[40]

In attacking this interpretation, Southern argued against Schaarschmidt's reading of John of Salisbury and accused medieval historians of accepting as fact a debatable conjecture. He claimed there was no proof that William of Conches was at Chartres at all or that such chancellors as Thierry of Chartres and Gilbert Porreta ever taught at Chartres, since we have no evidence that the chancellor of a cathedral school taught. He concluded that the pre-eminence of Chartres and the importance of the masters called Chartrians had been greatly exaggerated.[41] Several Chartrian specialists quickly answered Southern's charges. Häring and Giacone showed clearly that William, Thierry, and Gilbert were all students of Bernard at Chartres and that Gilbert and Thierry both served later as chancellor at Chartres. They both argued that Schaarschmidt's reading of the Metalogicon was correct and that a chancellor frequently also served as

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[40]See for example Henry Osborn Taylor, The Medieval Mind, 3rd ed., 2 vols. (New York, 1919), 1:298-302; Forest, Doctrina, pp. 74-93; Friedrich Heer, The Medieval World, trans. Janet Sondheimer (Cleveland, 1961), pp. 87-92; Maurice de Wulf, History of Mediaeval Philosophy, trans. E. C. Messenger, 3 vols. (New York, 1952), 1:173-88; and Gordon Leff, Medieval Thought: St. Augustine to Ockham (Harmondsworth, 1958), pp. 116-26.

[41]R. W. Southern, "Humanism and the School of Chartres," in Medieval Humanism, pp. 61-65.

master.[42] Dronke argued that a chancellor would exert considerable influence on a cathedral school whether or not he taught and concluded that, while we certainly do not know all we would like about the School of Chartres, the Poole-Clerval thesis fits the few certain facts we have better than any other suggested. He emphasized the originality of the Chartrians and the importance of their contribution in the history of ideas.[43] Southern's attack served the useful purpose of reminding medieval historians that their pictures of the past are frequently based on a little evidence and a lot of interpretation. But Southern's article has done little to change the position of the School of Chartres, which remains the pre-eminent example of humanism in the twelfth century.

Since the appearance of Haskins's The Renaissance of the Twelfth Century almost fifty years ago, medieval historians have pointed to the intellectual activity at Chartres and the other cathedral schools of the twelfth century as evidence against the traditional dichotomy of the medieval contempt of the world and the Renaissance dignity of man.[44] In recent years scholars have

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[42]Nikolaus M. Häring, "Chartres and Paris Revisited," in Essays in Honor of Anton Charles Pegis, ed. J. Reginald O'Donnell (Toronto, 1974), pp. 268-329; and Roberto Giacone, "Masters, Books, and Library at Chartres According to the Cartularies of Notre-Dame and Saint-Pere," Vivarium 12 (1974): 30-51.

[43]Dronke, "New Approaches," pp. 117-40. He advances further arguments on the originality of the Chartrian thinkers in Fabula: Explorations into the Uses of Myth in Medieval Platonism, Mittellateinische Studien und Texte, Band 9 (Leyden, 1974), esp. pp. 13-67 and 100-143.

[44]See above n. 16.

strongly insisted on the importance for twelfth-century writers of some of the themes traditionally associated with the Renaissance.[45] No studies as yet have examined in detail the works of a medieval writer or group of writers with the aim of determining to what extent they exhibit the attitudes appropriate to a concept of the dignity of man. Only by such a study can we grasp the true significance of twelfth-century culture and its relation to the later Italian Renaissance. Because of its preeminent position among cathedral schools of the twelfth century, Chartres seemed to offer a propitious area for the search for a medieval concept of the dignity of man. Further examination of the Chartrian writers has revealed considerable interest in several themes related to this idea, with the fullest development of a theory of man in the writings of William of Conches.

William of Conches was born in Normandy toward the end of the eleventh century. After studying at Chartres under Bernard of Chartres, who greatly influenced his future career, William taught there from about 1120 to 1145.[46] He was renowned

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[45]See especially Marie-Dominique Chenu, "Nature and Man: The Renaissance of the Twelfth Century," in Nature, Man, and Society, pp. 1-48; Colin Morris, The Discovery of the Individual, 1050-1200 (New York, 1972), esp. pp. 64-138; Ethel Cardwell Higonnet, "Spiritual Ideas in the Letters of Peter of Blois," Speculum 50 (1975):238-44; Joseph M. McCarthy, Humanistic Emphases in the Educational Thought of Vincent of Beauvais, Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters, Band 10 (Leyden, 1976); Richard C. Dales, "A Medieval View of Human Dignity," Journal of the History of Ideas 38 (1977):557-72; and Southern, "Medieval Humanism," pp. 29-60.

[46]Clerval, Écoles, pp. 181-82; Southern, "Chartres," pp. 71-73; Heinrich Flatten, Die Philosophie des Wilhelm von Conches (Coblenz, 1929), p. 9; and Gilson, History, p. 622, argue that William taught at Paris rather than Chartres, but I follow the more common position, originated by Schaarschmidt, pp. 14-23, with his interpretation of John of Salisbury's Metalogicon, that

as a grammarian and a natural philosopher, and during his teaching career he composed works in both fields. He wrote glosses on all the major sources of Chartrian Platonism: Plato's Timaeus as translated by Chalcidius, Boethius' Consolatio philosophiae, Macrobius' commentary on the Somnium Scipionis, and Martianus Capella's De nuptiis Mercurii et Philologiae.[47] He perhaps

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William centered his teaching career at Chartres. For this view see Tullio Gregory, Anima mundi: la filosofia di Guglielmo di Conches e la scuola di Chartres (Florence, 1955), pp. 1-4; Jeauneau, Glosae, pp. 9-14; Poole, Thought and Learning, pp. 106-12 and 294-314; J. M. Parent, La doctrine de la création dans l'école de Chartres, Publications de l'Institut d'études médiévales d'Ottawa, vol. 8 (Paris, 1938), pp. 48-54 and 99-106; Martin Grabmann, Handschriftliche Forschungen und Mitteilungen zum Schrifttum des Wilhelm von Conches und zu Bearbeitungen seiner naturwissenschaftlichen Werke, Sitzungsberichte der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Heft 10 (Munich, 1935), pp. 4-26; Jeauneau, "Note," pp. 839-52; Lemay, "Doctrine of the Trinity," pp. 1-14; and Häring, "Chartres and Paris," pp. 294-95.

[47]All references to William's Glosae super Platonem will be to the excellent edition by Édouard Jeauneau. I agree with Jeauneau's rejection of William's authorship of the gloss on the Timaeus edited by Toni Schmid, "Ein Timaioskommentar in Sigtuna," CM 10 (1949):220-66. See on the Glosae super Platonem, in addition to the works listed above in n. 46, Jeauneau, Glosae, pp. 12-48; Eugenio Garin, "Platonismo," pp. 68-80; Gregory, Anima, pp. 16-19; A. Tiné, "Les Glosae super Platonem de Guillaume de Conches," Sophia 34 (1966):336-43; and Gibson, "Study," pp. 183-94.

For the construction of a tentative edition of William's Glosae super Boetium I have utilized four of the seven manuscripts which scholars have judged to be the most reliable: Troyes, Bibl. mun. 1101, fols. 1r-19v; Troyes, Bibl. mun. 1381, fols. 34v-95v; Leipzig, Univ. Bibl. cod. lat. 1253, fols. 40v-82v; and Munich, Bayer. Staatsbib. Clm 4603, fols. 156r-176v. In addition to these manuscripts, I have also consulted portions of some other manuscripts: Orleans, Bibl. mun. 274, fols. 1r-44r; and Vienna, Nat. Bibl. 1082, fols. 216r-246r. William's Glosae super Boetium has not been edited except for brief excerpts by Parent, in Doctrine, pp. 124-36; and Charles Jourdain, in Excursions historiques et philosophiques à travers le moyen âge (Paris, 1888), pp. 31-68. On William's Glosae super Boetium see Pierre Courcelle, "Étude critique," pp. 5-140; idem, Consolation, pp. 301-13; and Gregory, Anima, pp. 10-12.

There are two redactions of William's Glosae super Macrobium; for the references to the work in this dissertaion,

composed additional commentaries on Priscian and Juvenal.[48] In the field of natural philosophy he wrote his Philosophia mundi, an encyclopedic compendium of all the scientific and medical knowledge of his day.[49] Under the pressure from more conservative

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I have consulted both manuscripts of the longer redaction: Munich, Staatsbibl. Clm 14557, fols. 100r-150v; and Vatican, Urb. lat. 1140, fols 2r-153v. Helen Lemay has prepared a partial edition of both redactions of William's gloss on Macrobius in "Doctrine of the Trinity," pp. 125-291, to which references will be made throughout the dissertation. On the Glosae super Macrobium see Jeauneau, "Macrobe," pp. 3-24; idem, "Note sur les manuscrits," pp. 17-28; idem, "Lecture," pp. 95-102; Lemay, "Doctrine of the Trinity," pp. 1-124; and Dronke, Fabula, pp. 13-78.

William's commentary on Martianus Capella is no longer extant, or at least not yet recovered, but Dronke, Fabula, pp. 167-83, believes he has found a commentary on Martianus whose author utilized and at times copied from William's now lost commentary.

[48]For analysis of William's Glosae super Priscianum, a list of the manuscripts, and several brief excerpts see Jeauneau, "Deux redactions," pp. 212-47. See also Karin Margareta Fredborg, "The Dependence of Petrus Helias' Summa super Priscianum on William of Conches' Glose super Priscianum," Université de Copenhague: Cahiers de l'Institut du moyen âge grec et latin 11 (1973):1-57.

I have consulted the gloss on Juvenal which may be by William in the single manuscript, Baltimore, Walters Art Gallery, 448, fols. 1r-5v. For comments on this manuscript and some extracts see Eva M. Sanford, in Catalogus translationum et commentariorum, ed. Paul Oskar Kristeller, 3 vols. (Washington, 1960-76), 1:192-95.

[49]The Philosophia mundi was published twice in the Patrologiae cursus completus, series latina, in PL 172, 39-102 attributed to Honorius of Autun, and in PL 90, 1127-78, attributed to Bede. References to books two-four of the Philosophia, except where otherwise noted, will be to PL 172 and PL 90, with the version being followed listed first. Due to some problems in the texts published in PL 172 and PL 90, a few references will be based on a tentative edition of various passages obtained by comparing these two versions in the PL with several manuscripts from Munich, Bayer. Staatsbibl. Clm 18918, fols. 1r-35r; Clm 16103, fols. 68r-83v; Clm 16103, fols. 84r-99v; Clm 22292, fols. 40r-54v; Clm 2594, fols. 24v-42r; and Clm 2655, fols 106r-120v. All references to book 1 of the Philosophia will be to the critical edition by Gregor Maurach, Philosophia mundi: Ausgabe des erstes Buchs von Wilhelm von Conches' "Philosophia" mit Anhang, Übersetzung und Anmerkungen (Pretoria, 1974), pp. 8-33. On the

monastic writers such as William of St. Thierry, William left his teaching position at Chartres in the early 1140's to become tutor at the court of Geoffrey of Anjou.[50] There, in addition to tutoring the future King Henry II of England, he compiled the Moralium dogma philosophorum, a guide to princely behavior drawn from Cicero and Seneca, and revised his Philosophia in the form of a dialogue entitled the Dragmaticon.[51] William died sometime

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Philosophia see André Vernet, "Un remaniement de la Philosophia de Guillaume de Conches," Scriptorium 1 (1947):243-59; Maurach, ed., Philosophia, pp. 4-7 and 54-65; and idem, "Guilelmi a Conchis Philosophiae Liber Tertius," Acta classica 17 (1974):121-37.

[50]For the text of the attack on William of Conches see William of St. Thierry, De erroribus Guillelmi de Conchis, PL 180, 333-40. For discussion see references listed above in n. 34 and below, chap. 3.

[51]All references to the Moralium dogma are to the edition by John Holmberg. The ascription of the work to William is not certain, but I agree with Holmberg, pp. 1-4; Philippe Delhaye, "Une adaptation du De officiis au XIIe siècle; Le Moralium dogma philosophorum," RTAM 16 (1949):227-58 and 17 (1950):5-28; idem, Gauthier de Châtillon est-il l'auteur du Moralium dogma?, Analecta mediaevalia namurcensia, hors serie, vol. 3 (Namur, 1953); and Gregory, Anima, pp. 19-26, that the attribution is probable. For other opinions on the author see P. Glorieux, "Le Moralium dogma philosophorum et son auteur," RTAM 15 (1948):360-66; R. A. Gauthier, "Pour l'attribution à Gauthier de Châtillon du Moralium dogma philosophorum," RMAL 7 (1951):19-64; idem, "Les deux recensions du Moralium dogma philosophorum," RMAL 9 (1953):171-260; and J. R. Williams, "The Quest for the Author of the Moralium dogma philosophorum, 1931-56," Speculum 32 (1957):736-47.

All references to William's Dragmaticon are to the edition by Guilielmus Gratarolus, Dialogus de substantiis physicis (Strasbourg, 1567). I have also compared this text with two manuscripts: Munich, Bayer. Staatsbibl. Clm 564, fols. 32r-126r; and Clm 2595, fols. 1r-43v. On the Dragmaticon see Vernet, "Remaniement," pp. 243-59; Lynn Thorndike, "More Manuscripts of the Dragmaticon and Philosophia of William of Conches," Speculum 20 (1945):252-59; Clotilde Picard-Parra, "Une utilisation des Quaestiones naturales de Sénèque au milieu du XIIe siècle," RMAL 5 (1949):115-26; Gregory, Anima, pp. 7-10; and Gregor Maurach and Sira Onetti, "De Dragmatici operis Guilelmi a Conchis codicibus," Acta classica 16 (1973):117-28.

after Henry II's accession to the throne in 1154.

William's two most prominent colleagues at Chartres were Thierry of Chartres and Gilbert Porreta. Thierry, the brother of Bernard of Chartres, was born in Brittany toward the end of the eleventh century. He probably studied at Chartres under Bernard and began his teaching career in the 1120's. Around 1134 he moved to Paris, and taught there until 1142 when he became chancellor of the cathedral School of Chartres. In the early 1150's Thierry apparently left his post as chancellor in order to retire to a monastery, probably Cistercian, where he died before 1155.[52] Thierry shows a cosmological interest similar to William's in his De sex dierum operibus, an

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[52]On the life and works of Thierry of Chartres see Clerval, Écoles, pp. 169-73 and 254-59; Poole, Thought and Learning, pp. 315-17; idem, "Masters," pp. 321-41; Parent, Doctrine, pp. 82-90; Gilson, History, pp. 145-48; André Vernet, "Une épitaphe inédite de Thierry de Chartres," Recueil des travaux offert à M. Clovis Brunel, 2 vols. (Paris, 1955), 2:660-70; Édouard Jeauneau, "Quelques aspects du platonisme de Thierry de Chartres," in Association Guillaume Budé, Congrès de Tours et Poitiers (Paris, 1954), pp. 289-92; idem, "Un représentant du platonisme au XIIe siècle: Maître Thierry de Chartres," Mémoires de la Société archéologique d'Eure-et-Loir 20 (1954):1-10; idem, "Simples notes sur la cosmogonie de Thierry de Chartres," Sophia 23 (1955): 172-83; idem, "Mathématiques et Trinité chez Thierry de Chartres," Die Metaphysik im Mittelalter, ihr Ursprung und ihre Bedeutung, Miscellanea medieavalia, Band 2 (Berlin, 1963), pp. 289-95; idem, "Note," pp. 821-39; Nikolaus M. Häring, "The Creation and Creator of the World According to Thierry of Chartres and Clarenbaldus of Arras," AHDLMA 22 (1955):137-82; idem, Life and Works of Clarembald of Arras, Pontifical Institute of Medieavel Studies, Studies and Texts, vol. 20 (Toronto, 1965), pp. 23-28; idem, "Thierry of Chartres and Dominicus Gundissalinus," MS 26 (1964): 271-86; idem, "Chartres and Paris," pp. 279-94; and Anneliese Stollenwerk, Der Genesiskommentar Thierrys von Chartres und die Thierry von Chartres zugeschriebenen Kommentare zu Boethius 'De Trinitate' (Cologne, 1971), pp. 3-22.

interpretation of the first chapter of Genesis in terms of Platonic natural philosophy.[53] Thierry also wrote the Heptateuchon, a teacher's manual of the seven liberal arts compiled from classical and early medieval writers, and a commentary on Cicero's De inventione rhetorica.[54] Though Thierry seems generally to have been described as a rhetorician and teacher of the liberal arts, he also pursued an interest in theology with commentaries on Boethius' theological works. Several surviving commentaries are generally agreed to belong to either Thierry or one of his students, but there is little agreement as to which,

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[53]Thierry's De sex dierum operibus was edited by Barthélemy Hauréau, Notices et extraits de quelques manuscrits latins de la Bibliothèque nationale, 6 vols. (Paris, 1890), 1:45-70; Wilhelm Jansen, Der Kommentar des Clarenbaldus von Arras zu Boethius 'De Trinitate' (Breslau, 1926), pp. 106-112; and more recently by Nikolaus M. Häring, "Creation and Creator," pp. 184-200; and reprinted in idem, Commentaries on Boethius by Thierry of Chartres and His School, Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, Studies and Texts, vol. 20 (Toronto, 1970), pp. 555-75. All my quotations will be to this last edition. In addition to the works listed above in n. 52 see Häring, Commentaries on Boethius, pp. 45-52; and Stollenwerk, pp. 23-27.

[54]The prologue to Thierry's Heptateuchon is edited by Jeauneau, in "Note," pp. 853-55. The importance of the work was first described by Clerval, "Enseignement des arts libéraux," pp. 277-96; and idem, Écoles, pp. 220-23. The work still awaits a full-scale analysis.

Thierry's commentary on Cicero's De inventione has been edited in part by W. H. D. Suringar, in Historia critica scholiastarum latinorum, 2 vols. (Leyden, 1834), 1:213-53. On this work see Richard McKeon, "Rhetoric in the Middle Ages," Speculum 17 (1942):17-18; R. W. Hunt, "The Introductions to the 'Artes' in the Twelfth Century," in Studia mediaevalia in honorem admodum Reverendi Patris Raymundi Josephi Martin (Bruges, 1948), pp. 86-982; Philippe Delhaye, "L'enseignement de la philosophie morale au XIIe siècle," MS 11 (1949):77-99; Karin Margareta Fredborg, "The Commentary of Thierry of Chartres on Cicero's De inventione," Université de Copenhague: Cahiers de l'Institut du moyen âge grec et latin 7 (1971):1-36; and Ward, "Date," pp. 219-73.

if any, were written by Thierry himself. In view of this general uncertainty, I treat these commentaries as belonging to the School of Thierry of Chartres.[55]

Gilbert Porreta, born at Poitiers about 1076, studied under Hilary of Poitiers, Bernard of Chartres, and Anselm of Laon before becoming a teacher at Chartres. He served as chancellor at Chartres from 1126 until around 1140 and then taught briefly at Paris before his appointment as Bishop of Poitiers in 1142. He successfully defended himself against the charges of heresy brought against him by Bernard of Clairvaux in 1144 and

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[55]Jansen, in Kommentar, pp. 3-25, published portions of the Librum hunc (Commentum), a commentary on Boethius' De Trinitate, and attributed it to Thierry. Nikolaus M. Häring attacked this attribution in "A Hitherto Unknown Commentary on Boethius' De Hebdomadibus Written by Clarenbaldus of Arras," MS 15 (1953):212-21. Häring later reversed his position and attributed to Thierry not only the Librum hunc (Commentum) but also the Quae sit (Lectiones) and the Aggreditur propositum (Glosa) in "A Commentary on Boethius' De Trinitate by Thierry of Chartres," AHDLMA 23 (1956:258-60. Häring repeated this view with some new arguments along with an edition of the Lectiones in "Two Commentaries on Boethius' (De Trinitate and De Hebdomadibus) by Thierry of Chartres," AHDLMA 27 (1960):114-23. All references to these works, which will henceforth be called the Commentum, Lectiones and Glosa, will come from Häring's combined edition of these and other commentaries on Boethius by the School of Thierry, Commentaries on Boethius by Thierry of Chartres and His School. I follow Jeauneau, "Note," pp. 11-23, and Stollenwerk, pp. 27-37, in believing that the ascription of these works to Thierry is doubtful. I agree with these scholars, however, that all these works belong to the School of Thierry, if not to Thierry himself. Throughout this dissertation I shall also make references to the Abbrevatio monacensis and the Commentarius victorinus, two more commentaries on Boethius' De Trinitate, ed. by Häring, in Commentaries on Boethius by Thierry of Chartres and His School, and viewed by him as the School of Thierry, pp. 34-35.

remained at Poitiers until he died in 1154.[56] Gilbert was clearly the most theologically oriented of the major Chartrians and the most skilled dialectician. Partially as a consequence of his more purely dialectical interests he shows less concern for the themes which constitute William of Conches' theory of man. Gilbert's main work consists of commentaries on the theological works of Boethius.[57] He also wrote glosses on the Psalms, the Acts, the letters of St. Paul, the Gospel of St. John, and the Apocalypse. Other works such as the De discretione animae, spiritus et mentis and the Liber de sex principiis, which some attribute to Gilbert, are at best of doubtful authenticity.[58]

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[56]On the life and work of Gilbert Porreta see Clerval, Écoles, pp. 163-69 and 261-64; Aimé Forest, "Gilbert de la Porrée et les écoles du XIIe siècle," Revue des cours et conférences, ser 2, 35 (1934):410-20 and 640-51; A. Hayen, "Le concile de Reims et l'erreur théologique de Gilbert de la Porrée," AHDLMA 10-11 (1935-35):29-102; Michael E. Williams, The Teaching of Gilbert Porreta on the Trinity, Annalecta gregoriana, vol. 56 (Rome, 1951); Nikolaus M. Häring, "The Case of Gilbert de la Porrée, Bishop of Poitiers, 1142-1154," MS 13 (1951):1-40; idem, "The Cistercian Everard of Ypres and His Appraisal of the Conflict Between St. Bernard and Gilbert of Poitiers," MS 17 (1955): 143-72; idem, The Commentaries on Boethius by Gilbert of Poitiers Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, Studies and Texts, vol. 13 (Toronto, 1966), pp. 3-46; idem, "Bishof Gilbert und seine Erydiakone," Deutsches Archiv 21 (1965):150-71; idem, "Chartres and Paris," pp. 299-313; Gilson, History, pp. 140-44; Artur M. Landgraf, "Zur Lehre des Gilbert Porreta," Zeitschrift fur katholische Theologie 77 (1955):331-37; M. C. Colker, "The Trial of Gilbert of Poitiers, 1148: A Previously Unknown Record," MS 27 (1965):152-83; and H. C. van Elswijk, Gilbert Porreta: Sa vie, son oeuvre, sa pensée, Spicilegium sacrum lovaniense, Études et documents, vol. 33 (Louvain, 1966), pp. 9-124. Gilbert will be referred to as Gilbert Porreta, following the custom of Elswijk, Landgraf, Williams, and others.

[57]All references will be to The Commentaries on Boethius by Gilbert of Poitiers, ed. Häring.

[58]For discussion of the authenticity of the works attributed to Gilbert see Elswijk, pp. 44-73. Gilbert's glosses on Acts is no longer extant and the gloss on St John exists only in a fragment. I have not consulted the glosses on Psalms and St. Paul, which survive in several unedited manuscripts. Gilbert's

In addition to Thierry and Gilbert, William's colleagues at Chartres, valid comparison can be made with the views of several younger writers who either are known to have studied under William or show themselves to have been directly influenced by his work. John of Salisbury provides our major evidence for William's teaching career at Chartres and is the only major writer who describes himself as a student of William.[59] Born at Salisbury between 1115 and 1120, John studied at Paris and Chartres from 1136-47 under William of Conches, Thierry of Chartres, Gilbert Porreta, Abelard, and others. After his studies, he served with the papal curia until 1154 when he became secretary to the Archbishop of Canterbury. He served under Theobald and Thomas Becket both in England and in exile on the continent and during this period composed his major works: Metalogicon, Policraticus, Historia pontificalis, and Entheticus. In 1176 he was elected Bishop of Chartres and served in that post until his death in

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treatise on the Trinity is edited by Nikolaus M. Häring, "A Treatise on the Trinity of Gilbert of Poitiers," RTAM 39 (1972): 14-50. Elswijk, pp. 69-70; Häring, "Paris and Chartres," p. 303; and Lorenzo Minio-Paluello, "Magister sex principiorum," SM 6 (1965):123-51, all reject Gilbert's authorship of the Liber de sex principiis, which will not be utilized. Nikolaus M. Häring, attributes to Gilbert the De discretione animae, spiritus et mentis which he has edited in "Gilbert of Poitiers, Author of the De discretione animae, spiritus et mentis, Commonly Attributed to Achard of Saint-Victor," MS 22 (1960):148-91. The attribution is strongly contested by Elswijk, pp. 66-68; and Jean Châtillon, "Achard de Saint-Victor et le De discretione animae, spiritus et mentis," AHDLMA 31 (1964):7-35. Since I believe Elswijk and Châtillon have the better of the argument, I shall not use this work as a source for Gilbert's thought.

[59]John of Salisbury, Metalogicon 1.5 and 2.10, pp. 16-17 and 79-80. See above n. 26.

1180.[60]

Much less is known of the others who may be described as students of William of Conches. Bernard Silvestris was probably born in the early twelfth century and studied at Chartres, especially under Thierry of Chartres, to whom he dedicated his major work, the Cosmographia, written before 1147.[61] After

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[60]Our major source of information for John's life is his own Metalogicon. For modern examination of his life and works see Schaarschmidt; Poole, Thought and Learning, pp. 176-97; idem, "Masters," pp. 223-47; Clement C. J. Webb, John of Salisbury (London, 1932); idem, "Notes on Books Bequeathed by John of Salisbury to the Cathedral Library of Chartres," MRS 1 (1941-43): 128-29; Hans Liebschütz, Medieval Humanism in the Life and Writings of John of Salisbury (London, 1950); idem, "Chartres und Bologna, Naturbegriff und Staatsidee bei Johannes von Salisbury," Archiv fur Kulturgeschichte 50 (1968):3-32; Knowles, Historian and Character, pp. 16-30; Brian P. Hendley, "John of Salisbury, Defence of the Trivium," in Arts libéraux et philosophie au moyen âge, Actes du quatrième, congrès international de philosophie médiévale, Montreal 1967 (Montreal, 1969), pp. 753-62; Christopher Brooke, The Twelfth-Century Renaissance (Norwich, 1969), pp. 53-74; and Beryl Smalley, The Becket Conflict and the Schools: A Study of Intellectuals in Politics (Totowa, N.J., 1973), pp. 87-108.

All references to the Metalogicon are to the edition by Clement C. J. Webb, and references to the Policraticus are to the edition by the same author, 2 vols. (Oxford, 1909), I have also consulted John of Salisbury, Historia pontificalis, ed. and trans. Marjorie Chibnall, Nelson's Medieval Texts (London, 1956); idem, The Early Letters, ed. and trans. W. J. Millor, H. E. Butler, and C. N. L. Brooke, vol. 1 of 3 proposed volumes, Nelson's Medieval Texts (London, 1955); and idem, Entheticus: "The 'Entheticus' of John of Salisbury: A Critical Text," ed. Ronald E. Pepin, Traditio 31 (1975):127-93.

[61]All references to the Cosmographia are to the edition by Carl S. Barach and Johann Wrobel, under the title De mundi universitate (Innsbruck, 1876). I have also consulted The Cosmographia of Bernardus Silvestris, trans. Winthrop Wetherbee, Records of Civilization, Sources and Studies, no. 89 (New York, 1973). On the life and works of Bernard Silvestris see Étienne Gilson, "La cosmogonie de Bernardus Silvestris," AHDLMA 3 (1928): 5-24; Theodore Silverstein, "The Fabulous Cosmogony of Bernardus Silvestris," Modern Philology 46 (1948-49):92-116; Woolsey, "Bernard Silvester," pp. 340-44; Stock, Myth, esp. pp. 11-31 and 227-37; Wetherbee, Cosmographia, pp. 1-62; and idem, Platonism and Poetry in the Twelfth Century: The Literary Influence of

studying at Chartres, Bernard apparently taught at Tours and perhaps Laon. He never mentions William of Conches, but his works clearly bear evidence of William's influence either from Bernard's having studied under William or from his having closely utilized William's works. In addition to the Cosmographia, Bernard very probably wrote commentaries on Virgil and Martianus Capella, the Mathematicus, and the Experimentarius.[62]

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the School of Chartres, (Princeton, 1972), esp. pp. 152-86.

[62]References to Bernard's commentary on Virgil are to the new edition, The Commentary on the First Six Books of the Aeneid of Vergil Commonly Attributed to Bernardus Silvestris, ed. Julian Ward Jones and Elizabeth Frances Jones (Lincoln, 1977). I have also consulted the older edition, Commentum Bernardi Silvestris super sex libros Eneidos Virgilii, ed. Wilhelm Riedel (Greifswald, 1924). The authorship of the commentary by Bernard is debated. Jeauneau, "Note," pp. 843-50; idem, "L'usage de la notion d'integumentum a travers les gloses de Guillaume de Conches," AHDLMA 24 (1957):42-49; J. Reginald O'Donnell, "The Sources and Meaning of Bernard Silvester's Commentary on the Aeneid," MS 24 (1962):233-49; Wetherbee, Platonism, pp. 105-111; and Dronke, Fabula, 119-43, view the work as probably by Bernard, but Stock, Myth, p. 37; and Jones and Jones, pp. ix-xi, argue against the attribution.

Scholars do agree that the author of the commentary on Virgil also wrote the commentary on Martianus Capella discovered by Jeauneau, "Note," pp. 843-49, who edited several extracts from it, ibid., pp. 855-64. See also Dronke, Fabula, pp. 119-22 and 180-83; Wetherbee, Platonism, pp. 111-25; and Jones and Jones, pp. ix-xi. The author of these two works was under considerable influence from the writings of William of Conches. While the attribution of these works to Bernard cannot be certain at this time, I follow Jeauneau, Dronke, and Wetherbee in tentatively accepting his authorship.

There is less disagreement about the other works of Bernard. References to the Mathematicus are to PL 171, 1365-80. The work is also edited by Barthélemy Hauréau, Le "Mathematicus" de Bernardus Silvestris et la "Passio Sanctae Agnetis" de Pierre Riga (Paris, 1895). See Dronke, Fabula, pp. 126-43; and Wetherbee, Platonism, 153-58. I have also consulted Bernard Silvestris, Experimentarius, ed. by Mirella Brini-Savorelli, Rivista critica di storia della filosofia 14 (1959):283-342, in which Bernard adapts an Arabic treatise on geomancy.

Clarembald of Arras was probably born in the early twelfth century. He speaks proudly of having studied under Hugh of St. Victor and Thierry of Chartres, probably in the 1130's, and reveals definite influence from the ideas of William's commentaries and Philosophia. From at least 1152 Clarembald served as first provost and then archdeacon of Arras until the 1170's. During this period he also spent some time at Laon, to which he transferred about 1173 and where he died in the 1180's. Clarembald's major works, commentaries on the first chapter of Genesis and on two theological works of Boethius, are greatly indebted to the works on the same subjects by Thierry of Chartres.[63]

The Compendium philosophie is an encyclopedic philosophy of the world composed by a student of William of Conches, probably around 1150. It is based largely on William's Philosophia mundi; indeed the last three of the four books are mainly a transcription of William's Philosophia. In book 1 of the Compendium the author brings together a composite of the frequently diverse views of William and Hugh of St. Victor.[64]

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[63]All references to Clarembald's commentary on Genesis 1 (Tractatulus super librum Genesis) and his commentaries on Boethius (Tractatus super librum Boetii "De Trinitate" and Expositio super librum Boetii "De Hebdomadibus") are to the edition by Nikolaus M. Häring, Life and Works. An earlier partial edition was by Jansen, in Kommentar, pp. 33-134. On Clarembald see Jansen, Kommentar, pp. 3-11; Häring, "Unknown Commentary," pp. 212-23; idem, "Creation and Creator," pp. 137-84; idem, Life and Works, pp. 1-57; Gilson, History, pp. 149-50; and Helmut Vaupel, "Clarenbaldus von Arras und Walter von Mortagne," Zeitschrift fur Kirchengeschichte 65 (1953-54):129-38.

[64]The Compendium philosophie, a redaction by a student of William's Philosophia mundi, is edited in part by Carmelo Ottaviano, in Un brano inedito della "Philosophia" di Gugelielmo di Conches (Naples, 1935); and in part by Giorgio Rialdi, in Il

In the following analysis I shall attempt to describe and analyze William of Conches' theory of man. Throughout I shall also compare and contrast William's writings with those of his colleagues and students discussed above. I have deliberately excluded writers such as Alan of Lille, whose contact with William's thought definitely appears to be second hand. The four broad themes already specified as the key components of a concept of the dignity of man will be used as a basis for portraying the view of man of William and his fellow Chartrians. First, a discussion of the Chartrians' use of ancient pagan writers will show their knowledge of and attitude toward such sources. Second, an examination of the Chartrians' theory of knowledge will help portray their attitude toward human reason. Third, a discussion of their theology and natural philosophy will provide an understanding of the Chartrians' attitude toward man and nature. Finally, an analysis of their ethics will further reveal their attitude toward man and the individual's relationship to himself and his surroundings. By understanding the views of William and his fellow Chartrians in each of these areas, we shall obtain a clear view of their theory of man and can see to what extent they possessed a concept of the dignity of man.

"De philosophia mundi," l'autore, la storia, il contenuto medico (Genoa, 1965). It will be referred throughout as Compendium with the name of the editor of the relevant passage. Ottaviano, pp. 11-12; Rialdi, pp. 24-29; Flatten, pp. 9-10; Parent, Doctrine, p. 118; Lemay, Abu Ma'shar, esp. pp. 184-95, accept the work as William's but Gregory, Anima, pp. 28-46; and idem, "Sull'attribuzione a Guglielmo di Conches di un rimaneggiamento della Philosophia mundi," GCFI, 3rd ser., 5 (1951):119-25, has clearly shown that the work is not William's.

Chapter II

ATTITUDE TOWARD ANCIENT WRITINGS

The Chartrian masters, William of Conches, Thierry of Chartres, and Gilbert Porreta, were thoroughly trained in the classics by their master, Bernard of Chartres, and they in turn used Bernard's methods to teach their own students, such as John of Salisbury, Bernard Silvestris, and Clarembald of Arras. They were thoroughly imbued with the classical tradition, and it was largely from their study and explication of the ancient writers that their positive view of man arose. The Chartrians are distinguished from their predecessors and contemporaries not in regaining lost or forgotten classical works--though there is some evidence that Chartres was a center for the reception of the "new" learning coming from Spain--but by their thorough knowledge of those classical works which had long been available, by their drawing together from the diverse strands of classical and Christian authority of a coherent program, and by their new way of looking at the ancients, namely not as Egyptians to be despoiled but as giants to be used as a valid basis of support for their own inquiries.

The division of learning into the seven liberal arts with the two sub-groupings of the trivium and quadrivium had its origin in classical education and formed the basis for education

throughout the Middle Ages,[1] but the Chartrians achieved a balance between the trivium and quadrivium unequaled by their predecessors or immediate successors. Throughout their writings, the Chartrians emphasize the need for excellence in both these faculties for any effective study of philosophy. Thierry of Chartres, in explaining the purpose of his Heptateuchon, or manual of the arts, describes the Chartrian ideal in terms of Martianus Capella's allegory of the marriage of Philology and Mercury:

> In hopes of producing a noble race of philosophers, we have joined together as if in marriage the trivium and the quadrivium. . . . And rightly so. For since there are two principal tools of philosophizing--the understanding and its exposition--and since the quadrivium illuminates the understanding while the trivium supplies it with an elegant, rational, and well-adorned exposition, it is manifest that our Heptateuchon constitutes a singular and unique tool for all philosophy.[2]

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[1]On the seven liberal arts see Henri I. Marrou, A History of Education in Antiquity, trans. George Lamb (New York, 1951), esp. pp. 216-26 and 274-91; R. W. Hunt, "The Introductions to the 'Artes' in the Twelfth Century," in Studia mediaevalia in honorem admodum Reverendi Patris Raymundi Josephi Martin (Bruges, 1948), pp. 85-112; Ernst Robert Curtius, European Literature and the Latin Middle Ages, trans. Willard R. Trask (New York, 1953), pp. 36-54; Pierre Riché, Education and Culture in the Barbarian West, trans. John J. Contreni (Columbia, S. C., 1976), esp. pp. 3-13, 39-47, and 86-99; and Arts libéraux et philosophie au moyen âge, Actes du quatrième congrès international de philosophie médiévale, Montreal, 1967 (Montreal, 1969), especially: Henri I. Marrou, "Les arts libéraux dans l'antiquité classique," pp. 5-27; Margaret T. Gibson, "The Artes in the Eleventh Century," pp. 121-26; J. Reginald O'Donnell, "The Liberal Arts in the Twelfth Century with Special Reference to Alexander Nequam (1157-1217)," pp. 127-35; and Brian P. Hendley, "John of Salisbury's Defense of the Trivium," pp. 753-62.

[2]Thierry of Chartres, Prologus in Eptatheucon, ed. Édouard Jeauneau, "Note sur l'École de Chartres," SM, 3rd ser., 5 (1964): 854. All translations are mine unless otherwise stated. For a discussion of the insistence on excellence in both philosophy and eloquence in the Chartrians see Tullio Gregory, Anima mundi: la filosofia di Guglielmo di Conches e la scuola di Chartres (Florence, 1955), pp. 247-55; Édouard Jeauneau, "Le Prologus in Eptatheucon de Thierry de Chartres," MS 16 (1954): 171-75; Heinrich

William of Conches makes the same analogy and also brings in the often quoted warning of Cicero that "eloquence without wisdom harms; wisdom without eloquence helps but little." William says that to study eloquence but neglect wisdom is to break up the marriage of Mercury and Philology, or to sharpen one's sword constantly but never to use it in battle.[3]

The later Chartrians make wide use of both these references in continuing to urge the need for both eloquence and wisdom. John of Salisbury attacks the Cornificians for their neglect of the trivium:

> For just as eloquence which reason does not enlighten is not only rash but also blind, so also wisdom which is not assisted by verbal skill is not only feeble but also crippled. For it is sometimes possible that

Flatten, Die Philosophie des Wilhelm von Conches (Coblenz, 1929), pp.20-32; and Winthrop Wetherbee, Platonism and Poetry in the Twelfth Century: The Literary Influence of the School of Chartres (Princeton, 1972), pp. 19-28.

[3]William of Conches, Philosophia mundi: Ausgabe des erstes Buchs von Wilhelm von Conches' "Philosophia" mit Anhang, Übersetzung and Anmerkungen, ed. Gregor Maurach (Pretoria, 1974), p. 8, PL 172, 41D-42D, and PL 90, 1127A. Cf. idem, Glosae super Priscianum, MS Paris, Bibl. nat. lat. 15130, fol. 85, as cited by Édouard Jeauneau, "Deux redactions des gloses de Guillaume de Conches sur Priscien," RTAM 27 (1960):237; Glosae super Boetium 1 pr. 1.18. Cf. also Thierry of Chartres, Glosae super Ciceronem, ed. W. H. D. Suringar, in Historia critica scholiastarum latinorum, 2 vols. (Leyden, 1834), 1:217-18. Hugh of St. Victor also insists on the necessity of each of the seven liberal arts, but strongly rejects the Chartrian identification of the trivium with eloquence and the quadrivium with philosophy or wisdom: Didascalicon 3.4, ed. Charles H. Buttimer, Studies in Medieval and Renaissance Latin, vol. 10 (Washington, 1939), p. 55; and Epitome, ed. Roger Baron, Traditio 11 (1955):115. On Hugh's attitude towards the arts and his disagreement with William see Jerome Taylor, Introduction to The Didascalicon of Hugh of St. Victor, Records of Civilization: Sources and Studies, no. 64 (New York, 1961), pp. 15-18; Wetherbee, Platonism, pp. 15-17 and 27-28; and Roger Baron, Science et sagesse chez Huques de Saint-Victor (Paris, 1957), pp. 73-78.

> speechless wisdom may in some measure add to one's personal satisfaction, but it rarely and only slightly contributes to the functioning of human society. . . . One who banishes the teaching of eloquence from philosophical studies begrudges Mercury his Philology and tears Mercury away from the embrace of Philology.[4]

The compiler of the Compendium philosophie attacks those who, having deserted wisdom, depend on eloquence as ones who break the union of Philosophy and Mercury.[5] Bernard Silvestris in his commentary on Virgil interprets Theseus and Pirithous as representing respectively wisdom and eloquence, which Cicero says love to be joined.[6] Later he gives a fuller exposition of the need for eloquence and wisdom:

> No one should profess the name of master before he possesses both wisdom and eloquence. . . . If wisdom alone is present, he knows indeed what he should teach but he lacks the skill to explain himself. If he has only the eloquence of a master, he knows how to speak but does not know what should be said.[7]

The Chartrians insist that the philosopher must master both divisions of the liberal arts so that he possesses both wisdom and eloquence.

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[4]John of Salisbury, Metalogicon 1.1, ed. Clement C. J. Webb (Oxford, 1929), p. 7.

[5]Compendium philosophie, ed. Carmelo Ottaviano, in Un brano inedito della "Philosophia" di Guglielmo de Conches (Naples, 1935), p. 20.

[6]The Commentary on the First Six Books of the "Aeneid" of Vergil Commonly Attributed to Bernardus Silvestris 6.393, ed. Julian Ward Jones and Elizabeth Frances Jones (Lincoln, 1977), p. 88.

[7]Ibid., 6.424, p. 91. Further evidence for the high value the Chartrians placed on the liberal arts may be drawn from their etymologies of the word liberales. See for example John of Salisbury, Metalogicon 1.12, p. 31; and Compendium, ed. Ottaviano, p. 31.

William and his fellow Chartrians found the source of wisdom and eloquence in the writings of the ancients. They praise all of the ancient writers for their wisdom, but they especially venerate Plato and Boethius as authorities second only to the Bible. William repeats his praise of Plato as "the most learned of all philosophers" so often that it seems a commonplace.[8] This phrase should not be dismissed as mere flourish, however, for it represents a very real change in attitude from that of the Chartrians' monastic contemporaries and predecessors. For the first time in centuries the need was felt to write glosses and commentaries on classical works. William wrote the first major commentary on Boethius since Remigius of Auxerre's in the ninth century and the first on the Timaeus since the fifth.[9] In contrast to a single allusion to Cicero's De officiis in the eleventh century, William alone used it as the basis of an entire work, his Moralium dogma philosophorum.[10] The Chartrians also

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[8]William of Conches, Dragmaticon (Dialogus de substantiis physicis), ed. Guilielmus Gratarolus (Strasbourg, 1567), p. 13: "Plato omnium philosophorum doctissimus." Cf. ibid., p. 281; Philosophia, PL 172, 98B, PL 90, 1176D; and Glosae super Macrobium (longer redaction) Prologue. See above, chap. 1, n. 47.

[9]Raymond Klibansky, The Continuity of the Platonic Tradition During the Middle Ages (London,1939), pp. 28-29; Pierre Courcelle, "Étude critique sur les commentaires de la Consolation de Boèce (IX^{e}-XV^{e} siècles)," AHDLMA 12 (1939):77-91; idem, La consolation de philosophie dans la tradition littéraire (Paris, 1967), esp. pp. 301-2; and Margaret T. Gibson, "The Study of the Timaeus in the Eleventh and Twelfth Centuries," Pensamiento 25 (1969):183-94.

[10]N. E. Nelson, "Cicero's De officiis in Christian Thought: 300-1300," in Essays and Studies in English and Comparative Literature, vol. 10 (Ann Arbor, 1933), pp. 88-98. On John of Salisbury, who also quotes extensively from the De officiis, see Nelson, pp. 102-9.

wrote glosses on Macrobius, Priscian, Juvenal, Martianus Capella, Cicero, and Virgil. The monastic writers used the classics as a model for learning Latin and as a source of exemplary lessons in moral conduct; however, the writing of such glosses was definitely outside the interest of contemporary monastic writers such as Bernard of Clairvaux, William of St. Thierry, and even Hugh of St. Victor.

The Chartrians certainly continued to use the ancients to learn grammar and style, but they also found in the pagan writers, especially in Plato and Boethius, a key source of themes and arguments. In explaining Boethius' reference to the myth of Orpheus, William writes:

> Let us first see what the myth is and then how wise men understand it. For it ought not be believed that such a perfect philosopher as Boethius would put anything superfluous or without reason in such a perfect work.[11]

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[11] Glosae super Boetium 3. m. 12.5. See above, chap. 1, n. 47. Cf. Glosae super Platonem, ed. Édouard Jeauneau, Textes philosophiques du moyen âge, vol. 13 (Paris, 1965), p. 71. Numerous historians have referred to the new attitude toward the ancients by the Chartrians. See especially Flatten, Wilhelm, pp. 186-88; J. M. Parent, La doctrine de la création dans l'école de Chartres, Publications de l'Institut d'études médiévales d'Ottawa, vol. 8 (Paris, 1938), pp. 107-12; Philippe Delhaye, "'Grammatica' et 'Ethica' au XII^e siècle," RTAM 25 (1958):69-75; Édouard Jeauneau, "Note," pp. 821-65; David Knowles, "The Humanism of the Twelfth Century," in The Historian and Character and Other Essays (Cambridge, Eng., 1963), pp. 19-21 and 30; Simone Viarre, La survie d'Ovide dans la littérature scientifique des XII^e et XIII^e siècles (Poitiers, 1966), pp. 97-98 and 134-38; Bernard Bischoff, Living with the Satirists," in Classical Influences on European Culture, AD 500-1500, ed. R. R. Bolgar (Cambridge, Eng., 1971), pp. 83-90; and Aimé Forest, "Les doctrines dans les écoles urbaines du XII^e siècle," in Le mouvement doctrinal du IX^e au XIV^e siècle, Histoire de l'Église, ed. Augustin Fliche and Victor Martin, 21 vols. to date (Paris, 1934-), 13:69-71. On the failure of Gilbert Porreta to share his colleagues' strong involvement with the ancients see H. C. van Elswijk, Gilbert Porreta: Sa vie, son oeuvre, sa pensée, Spicilegium sacrum lovaniense, Études et documents, vol. 33 (Louvain, 1966), pp. 165-68.

The monastic writers considered each word of the Bible and Church Fathers worthy of careful scrutiny to determine its precise meaning, but the Chartrians expanded this method to include pagan writers and thereby raised classical writers to the level of legitimate authorities.

However much the Chartrians venerate and utilize classical writings, however much time they spend explaining, citing, or imitating these writings, they consistently maintain the distinction between themselves and the ancients. They repeatedly describe themselves with phrases such as "we the moderns," "in modern times," or "all the moderns."[12] In the twelfth century occur the first significant statements in the quarrel between the ancients and the moderns. John of Salisbury sides with the moderns, arguing that the opinions of the ancients are accepted solely because

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[12]See for example William of Conches, Glosae super Platonem, p. 118; idem, Glosae super Boetium 3. m. 9.5; John of Salisbury, Metalogicon 1. Prologue and 24, pp. 3-4 and 55. For more examples and discussion of the increased use of the concept of ancients and moderns in the twelfth century see Curtius, European Literature, pp. 251-55; Marie-Dominique Chenu, "Tradition and Progress," in Nature, Man, and Society in the Twelfth Century, ed. and trans. Jerome Taylor and Lester K. Little (Chicago, 1968), pp. 310-30; Jacques Le Goff, Les intellectuels au moyen âge (Paris, 1957), p. 14; A. G. Jongkees, "'Translatio studii': les avatars d'un thème médiéval," in Miscellanea mediaevalia in memoriam Jan Frederik Niermeyer (Groningen, 1967), pp. 41-51; Wilfrid Hartmann, "'Modernus' und 'antiquus' zur Verbreitung und Bedeutung dieser Bezeichnungen in der wissenschaftlichen Literatur vom 9 bis zum 12 Jahrhundert," in Antiqui und moderni: Traditionsbewusstsein und Fortschrittbewusstsein im späten Mittelalter, Miscellanea mediaevalia, Band 9 (1974), pp. 21-39; and Elizabeth Gössmann, "'Antiqui' et 'moderni' im 12 Jahrhundert," in ibid., pp. 40-57.

of their antiquity, while the more correct opinions of his contemporaries are rejected solely because of their modernity.[13] After citing Abelard's similar views, he then gives the celebrated remarks of Bernard of Chartres regarding the ancients and moderns:

> Bernard of Chartres used to say that we were like dwarfs perched upon the shoulders of giants. We are able to see more and farther than our predecessors, not because of the sharpness of our own vision or the prominence of our bodies, but because we are raised up and carried on high by their gigantic stature.[14]

William of Conches, the most probable intermediary of the simile between Bernard and John, makes a similar comment in glossing a statement of Priscian, "The younger, the more perceptive":

> He says well that moderns are more perceptive than ancients but not wiser. The ancients had no writings except what they composed. We however have all our writings and in addition all which have been composed from the beginning until our time. . . . Whence we are as a dwarf placed on the shoulders of a giant. That dwarf sees farther, not from his own size, but from the size of what is placed under him.[15]

Critics have vigorously disagreed whether this simile should be seen as denigration or praise of the moderns. Whatever its implications, it clearly reveals a distinction between the ancients and moderns.

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[13]John of Salisbury, Metalogicon 3. Prologue, p. 119. A similar statement may be found in Adelard of Bath, Quaestiones naturales, Prologue, ed. M. Müller, BGPTM, Band 31 (Münster, 1934), p. 1.

[14]John of Salisbury, Metalogicon 3.4, p. 136.

[15]William of Conches, Glosae super Priscianum, MS Florence, Bib. Laur. San Marco 310, fols. 1v-2r, cited by Jeauneau, "Deux redactions," p. 235. The text cited is Priscian, Institutiones, Epist. dedic. 1.

Jeauneau, in a brilliant article on the dwarfs and giants simile, argues that there are three distinct uses of the simile in the twelfth century.[16] William of Conches, Alexander of Neckham, and Peter of Blois preach neither exaltation of the moderns nor servility to the ancients. Instead they use the simile as a grammatical presentation to make their students understand that they can become masters only by fist assimilating what the preceding centuries have left them. They should use the ancients as a point of departure for their own works. John of Salisbury uses the simile to support his belief in the idea of progress which has resulted in a substantial increase of knowledge. Bernard of Troyes and the stained glass windows at Chartres apply the simile to the Bible to express the progress of the Revelation.

Although Jeauneau's analysis is invaluable for revealing the various applications and uses of the simile in the twelfth century, he has been too strict in his separation of the various uses of the simile. Despite William's reverence for the ancients,

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[16] Édouard Jeauneau, "'Nani gigantum humeris insidentes.' Essai d'interprétation de Bernard de Chartres," Vivarium 5 (1967):79-99. Cf. also a slightly different version of the same article: "Nains et Géants," in Entretiens sur la renaissance du XII^{e} siècle, ed. Maurice de Gandillac and Édouard Jeauneau (Paris, 1968), pp. 21-52. For other treatments of the theme see Raymond Klibansky, "Standing on the Shoulders of Giants," Isis 26 (1936):147-49; Joseph de Ghellinck, "Nani et gigantes," Archivum latinitatis medii aevi (Bulletin Du Cange) 18 (1943):25-29; A. Buck, "Aus der Vorgeschichte der 'Querelle des Anciens et des Modernes' in Mittelalter und Renaissance," Bibliothèque d'humanisme et renaissance, Travaux et documents 20 (1958):527-41; and Hubert Silvestre, "Quanto iuniores, tanto perspicaciores," in Recueil commémoratif du X^{e} anniversaire de la faculté de philosophie et lettres (Louvain, 1968), pp. 231-55.

everything indicates that he believed as much as John in the progress of learning. He rejected teachings of the ancients, like the concept of chaos or Boethius' statement that no action occurs without will, because he considered them incompatible with natural or moral laws.[17] John of Salisbury describes with approval how Bernard of Chartres encouraged his students to imitate the ancients in order to become so proficient that they themselves would be imitated by their successors, the use of the simile which Jeauneau applies to William.[18] There is really nothing contradictory in these two applications of the simile, and better account is taken of the views of both William and John if we view their use of the simile both as a grammatical presentation and a statement of belief in the progress of learning. Similarly, the use of the simile in the windows of Chartres should not be seen as unrelated to Bernard's simile. Just as the Apostles by the progress of the Revelation see farther than the prophets but remain supported by them, so the twelfth-century philosophers by the progress in learning see farther than the ancients but must remain supported by them.

The Chartrians are also well aware that their Christianity distinguishes them from the ancients; however, their constant use and praise of pagan sources, combined with their lack of any consistently and overtly Christian element, led monastic writers like

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[17]On William's rejection of the concept of chaos see Glosae super Platonem, pp. 118-19 and below, chap. 4. On his disagreement with Boethius see Glosae super Boetium 4. pr. 2.14, and below, chap. 5.

[18]John of Salisbury, Metalogicon 1.24, p. 56.

William of St. Thierry and Hugh of St. Victor to criticize them for being more concerned with Plato than Christ. Modern critics have for the same reasons questioned the extent of the Christianity of some of the Chartrians.[19] Overtly Christian elements certainly do not dominate Bernard's Cosmographia and William's Philosophia mundi, but both works are perfectly understandable as the products of twelfth-century Christian Platonists. In response to monastic criticism of his reliance on classical sources, William seeks to make explicit in his Dragmaticon what was implicit in his earlier works. At the beginning of the work, he makes a confession of his belief in the main tenets of the Church, and towards the end of the work he declares, "I am a Christian, not an Academician."[20] This recalls the contemporary

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[19]On monastic criticism of such concern for pagan writings see for example Hugh of St. Victor, De arca Noe morali, PL 176, 674B-C; William of St. Thierry, De erroribus Guillelmi de Conchis, PL 180, 340; and Bernard of Clairvaux, Tractatus de erroribus Abaelardi, PL 182, 1059. Modern critics who describe various Chartrian writings as pagan or pantheistic include Jules Alexandre Clerval, Les écoles de Chartres au moyen âge du Ve siècle au XVIe siècle, Mémoires de la Société Archéologique d'Eure-et-Loir, tome 11 (Paris, 1895), pp. 260-61; Reginald Lane Poole, Illustrations of the History of Medieval Thought and Learning, 2nd rev. ed. (London, 1920), pp. 95-115; Lynn Thorndike, A History of Magic and Experimental Science, 8 vols. (New York, 1923-58). 2:102-6; Curtius, European Literature, pp. 112-13; and Brian Stock, Myth and Science in the Twelfth Century: A Study of Bernard Silvester (Princeton, 1972), pp. 278-79. The major attempt to describe the orthodoxy of the Chartrians is by Étienne Gilson, "La cosmogonie de Bernardus Silvestris," AHDLMA 3 (1928):5-24. Most of the more recent critics have attempted to take a stand somewhere between these two extremes. They in general spend little time on the controversy, but tend to see the Chartrians as basically Christian if not completely orthodox in all points. See for example Chenu, "Nature and Man--The Renaissance of the Twelfth Century," in Nature, Man, and Society, pp. 1-48; Jeauneau, "Note," pp. 821-65; and Peter Dronke, Fabula: Explorations into the Uses of Myth in Medieval Platonism, Mittellateinische Studien und Texte, Band 9 (Leyden, 1974), pp. 13-67 and 100-143.

[20]William of Conches, Dragmaticon, p. 306: "Christianus sum, non Academicus." For William's confession of belief see

confession of Abelard, "I do not wish to be a philosopher if it means resisting Paul, nor to be an Aristotle if it cuts me off from Christ."[21] Abelard and William both seek to refute with their confessions the criticism of monastic writers that they are more pagan than Christian. While both see themselves as completely Christian, they do not believe that in declaring their Christianity they are rejecting their work as philosophers. For them there is no contradiction in being both philosopher and Christian. Having accepted both Christian teachings and ancient philosophy as authorities, they believe that, when the two are properly understood, they complement rather than contradict one another.

The Chartrians see paganism as a preparation for Christianity in much the same way that the Old Testament is a preparation for the New; therefore, they feel justified in treating the two similarly. They seek by means of their glosses to find a spiritual continuity between the classical world and Christian revelation. Whenever William arrives at a passage in Plato that conflicts with the Bible, he attempts to explain away the contradiction by giving an allegorical reading either to the ancient or to the Biblical text. But on the rare occasions when he cannot resolve the two texts, he follows Fulgentius in seeing the ancients' lack of Christianity as the explanation for any error on their part. "But what wonder is there if an Academician should somewhere speak academically. For if he were always right, he

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pp. 10-12. William uses Academicus to mean a follower of Plato, not a skeptic.

[21] Peter Abelard, Confessio fidei, PL 178, 375C.

would not be an Academician."[22] William follows the very same procedure whenever he deals with a Biblical passage that appears to conflict with Priscian's grammatical rules. He first attempts to show that the violation of grammatical rules is only apparent, since a particular grammatical rule is being violated in order to follow correctly a more universal rule. But when the violation cannot be explained away, he admits the error, saying that the divine page is not bound to the rules of Priscian and Donatus.[23] In much the same way John of Salisbury, on the one hand, stresses how the pagan and Christian writers reinforce one another and, on the other hand, recognizes the need for the latter to supplement the former.[24]

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[22]William of Conches, Glosae super Platonem, pp. 210-11. Cf. Dragmaticon, p. 18; and Glosae super Macrobium (longer redaction) 2.17.13, MS Vatican, Urb. Lat. 1140, fol. 153v, also quoted by Jeauneau, Glosae super Platonem, pp. 219-20. For William's apparent source see Fulgentius, Virgiliana continentia, ed. R. Helm, in Fabii Panciadis Fulgentii opera (Leipzig, 1898), p. 103.

[23]See the detailed discussion and examples in Jeauneau, "Deux redactions," pp. 239-41.

[24]John of Salisbury, Policraticus 7.16, ed. Clement C. J. Webb, 2 vols. (Oxford, 1909), 2:159. While following much of William's Christianizing of the ancients, John rejects some of his master's efforts to interpret Plato as in agreement with Christian doctrine. For example, unlike William he interprets Plato as a believer in metempsychosis: Epistola 81, PL 199, 68A. For other examples of John's criticism of the ancients see Policraticus 7.2, 10, and 13, vol. 2, pp. 94, 133, and 146. For a discussion of John's humanism see especially Hans Liebschütz, Medieval Humanism in the Life and Writings of John of Salisbury (London, 1961); and Beryl Smalley, The Becket Conflict and the Schools: A Study of Intellectuals in Politics (Totowa, N. J., 1973), pp. 90-101.

The Chartrians thus clearly see the ancients' lack of Christianity, and they recognize in this lack the potential for error, but for William of Conches and many of his fellow Chartrians the risk of such error does not seem too great. William seems to accept the priority of faith in matters of Church doctrine, although as we shall see below he moves contrary to the traditional theology in his rational explanation of the Trinity and the creation of Eve. But in matters of natural philosophy he definitely asserts the priority of the pagan philosophers, for it is not the task of the Bible to teach about the nature of things.[25] Consequently, in the Chartrians' natural philosophy, their glosses on the ancients, and their cosmological poems, Christianity plays no overt role. This does not imply a lack of Christianity in the Chartrians but rather an assurance in their own Christianity and confidence in the compatibility of faith and reason.

As we have seen, the Chartrians' writings include numerous glosses of classical texts which aim at making these texts accessible to twelfth-century students. William explains that Macrobius wrote his commentary because Cicero's Dream of Scipio was so difficult to understand.[26] Bernard Silvestris says that he has slaved for a long time to expound not only the gist but also the words of the Aeneid, because Virgil declared therein such

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[25] Glosae super Boetium 3. m. 9.5. Cf. Dragmaticon, pp. 65-66.

[26] Glosae super Macrobium (longer redaction) Prologue.

deep philosophical truth.[27] Because of the difficulty and importance of classical texts, William and the other Chartrians composed glosses to explain the meaning of words and the grammatical structure, to explicate the author's meaning and the reasons for his statements, and to explain any apparently erroneous or irrelevant statements.

The need to go beyond the literal reading of the text was well established in connection with the allegorical reading of the Old Testament as a preparation for the New. By the twelfth century, the allegorical reading of the scripture had been refined into the threefold or fourfold method of exegesis--literal, allegorical, tropological, and anagogical--and the allegorical reading of the Song of Songs was one of the favorite literary pursuits.[28] Because of their suspicion of pagan texts, monastic writers applied their use of allegory mainly to the Bible.[29] There was, nevertheless, a medieval tradition upheld by Macrobius, Fulgentius, and Remigius of Auxerre which applied to the Greek myths the same allegorical methods used by monastic writers on the Old Testament.

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[27]Bernard Silvestris, Commentary on Vergil 6.1, p. 28.

[28]Hugh of St. Victor, Didascalicon 6.1-2 and 6.4-5, pp. 95-95 and 117-23; De sacramentis, PL 176, 184C-85A. On the general development and use of allegory in the Middle Ages see Henri de Lubac, Exégèse médiévale: les quatre sens de l'Écriture, 2 vols. in 4 (Paris, 1959-64); Beryl Smalley, The Study of the Bible in the Middle Ages, 2nd ed. (Oxford, 1952); and Chenu, "The Symbolist Mentality," in Nature, Man, and Society, pp. 99-161.

[29]For example as learned a twelfth-century writer as Hugh of St. Victor rejected the use of allegory except for scripture: De sacramentis 1. Prologus, PL 176, 185c.

The Chartrians' were led by their high regard for the ancients to read them in an unhesitatingly allegorical fashion. In glossing Plato, William repeatedly refers to Plato as "speaking through integumentum as was his custom."[30] William insists that Plato and Boethius contain neither errors nor anything superfluous. All the criticism against them arises from a failure to understand them properly:

> If anyone would know not only the words but also the meaning of Plato, he would find not heresy but the most profound philosophy hidden by a covering (integumentis) of words. We, loving Plato, will show this.[31]

And Thierry's epitaph perhaps most fittingly describes how their contemporaries viewed the activities of the Chartrians: "What Plato, what Socrates hid under integumenta this one, revealing, taught and discussed openly."[32] Bernard Silvestris provides a clear and revealing definition of integumentum:

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[30]Glosae super Platonem, p. 150. Cf. ibid., pp. 153, 158, 167, 203, and 209. The studies by Marie-Dominique Chenu, "Involucrum: le mythe selon les théologiens médiévaux," AHDLMA 22 (1955): 75-79; Édouard Jeauneau, "L'usage de la notion d'integumentum à travers les gloses de Guillaume de Conches," AHDLMA 24 (1957):35-100; and Dronke, Fabula, pp. 13-78, remove the need for any extended treatment of the theory of integumentum in this paper. In the discussion which follows I lean heavily on these three works, especially Dronke. I follow Dronke's practice of retaining integumentum as a technical term in preference to translating it as "myth." See also Hennig Brinkmann, "Verhüllung (integumentum) als literarische Darstellungsform in Mittelalter," in Der Begriff der Representatio im Mittelalter, Miscellanea mediaevalia, Band 8 (Berlin, 1971), pp. 314-39.

[31]Glosae super Platonem, p. 211: "Si quis tamen non verba tantum sed sensum Platonis cognoscat, non tantum non inveniet heresim sed profundissimam philosophiam integumentis verborum tectam. Quod nos, Platonem diligentes, ostendamus." Cf. Glosae super Boetium 3. m. 12.5.

[32]Andre Vernet, "Une épitaphe inédite de Thierry de Chartres," in Recueil des travaux offert à M. Clovis Brunel, 2 vols. (Paris, 1955), 2:669.

> An integumentum is a kind of demonstration wrapping up the understanding of truth under a fabulous narration, whence it is also called wrapping (involucrum).[33]

The Chartrians, believing that many of the classical writers expressed their deepest ideas through integumenta, set themselves the task of explaining the meaning of these integumenta to their contemporaries.

The Chartrians accept as a partial explanation for the ancients' custom of speaking through integumentum Macrobius' statement that the secrets of nature should be inaccessible to those unable to understand them. In glossing this statement, William explains that an open exposition is repugnant to the nature of the gods because only wise men should know the secrets of the gods. The wise can learn these truths through the interpretation of integumenta, but peasants and foolish men should remain ignorant and only believe.[34]

Significantly, William gives another, though related, reason for the creation of integumenta, one which he emphasizes much more than the traditional reason furnished by Macrobius. It is that by speaking through integumenta the ancient philosophers

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[33]Bernard Silvestris, Commentary on Vergil Prologue, p. 3.

[34]Glosae super Macrobium (shorter redaction) 1.2.17, MS Bern, Stadtbibl. 266, fol. 8ra, cited by Dronke, Fabula, p. 74. Cf. Glosae super Macrobium (longer redaction) 1.2.17; School of Thierry of Chartres, Abbreviatio monacensis, ed. Nikolaus M. Häring, in Commentaries on Boethius by Thierry of Chartres and His School, Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, Studies and Texts, vol. 20 (Toronto, 1971), p. 407; and Macrobius, Commentarii in Somnium Scipionis 1.2.17, ed. James Willis, Bibliotheca scriptorum graecorum et romanorum (Leipzig, 1970), p. 7. For a discussion see Dronke, Fabula, pp. 49-55.

provided something which the uneducated could understand and to which they could relate, while at the same time they made it possible for the learned to go beyond the integumentum to the understanding of some cosmic truth. William thus explains the creation of the first myths about the gods:

> The first philosophers, considering that without fear of powers, men could not be restrained from crime--and certainly not by fear of their equals--taught belief in a greater being which they called divine. But because they saw that unlearned man would not be able to know true divinity nor to understand how one God could do everything, they fabricated many.[35]

In his exposition of Macrobius' reason for the creation of integumentum he brings up the same point. If the unlearned realized that Ceres was only the natural power of producing grain, this would produce no terror in them. But because they think she is a goddess and a thing existing by herself, and that she is in charge of the grain, they are afraid and abstain from many sins.[36] Similarly William describes Plato's creation of the myth of Er and Cicero's of the dream of Scipio as devices intended to inculcate belief in the immortality of the soul and in eternal rewards and punishments.[37] The Chartrians emphasize that by speaking through integumentum the ancients gave the unlearned something in which to believe and at the same time provided a source of deeper understanding to the learned.

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[35] Glosae super Platonem, p. 201.

[36] Glosae super Macrobium (longer redaction) 1.2.17.

[37] Glosae super Macrobium (longer redaction) Prologue.

It is in their explanations of ancient myths that the Chartrians are most indebted to the earlier glossings of Fulgentius and Remigius of Auxerre. William and the other Chartrians draw on the earlier glosses as a source for the explanation of myths, but they do not hesitate to modify their interpretations when the older ones do not fit their needs. In an aside from his treatment of echoes in his Dragmaticon, William remarks, "I am not Narcissus whom Echo follows. I seek not fable but the physical reason for a thing."[38] William shows no interest in the ancient myths for their own sake nor in the creation of new myths. In his glosses he concerns himself with the myths only for the purpose of revealing the natural or moral truth embodied therein.

William and Bernard Silvestris most frequently give naturalistic explanations to the ancient myths. The ancient gods themselves are seen as personifications of natural forces. Ceres is the natural power of the earth of producing grain, Bacchus is the power of producing wine, and Pales is the power of producing pasture.[39] William and Bernard follow Fulgentius and Remigius of Auxerre in explaining the actions of the gods in terms of the naturalistic forces of the world. A good example is William's interpretation of the story of Jupiter and Semele, in which Jupiter consumed Semele with his thunder and lightning, but saved

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[38] Dragmaticon, p. 295.

[39] Bernard Silvestris, Commentary on Vergil 6.68, p. 47. Cf. William of Conches, Glosae super Platonem, p. 201. On the Chartrian treatment of the ancient gods see Chenu, "Symbolist Mentality," pp. 108-9; Dronke, Fabula, p. 43; Viarre, Survie d'Ovide, pp. 45-77; and Jeauneau, "Integumentum," pp. 43-63.

their son, Dionysus.

> By this tale it should be understood that from ether or fire, through the mediation of air, thunder and lightning descend to earth. But while they dry out the earth in summer, they do not entirely carry it away (auferunt) so that wine could not thence arise.[40]

William and Bernard repeatedly find such illustrations of natural phenomena in the tales of the ancient gods.

Whenever William and Bernard do not offer a naturalistic interpretation, they are almost certain to draw a moral lesson instead. A good example occurs in William's explanation of the myth of Ixion, in which giants were created when Ixion's semen fell to the ground following his unsuccessful attempt to lie with Juno. William explains that Ixion's wanting to lie with Juno, who stands for the active life, represents someone who wants to attain beatitude through the active life. His semen falls to the earth because such a life obscures man's reasoning and causes him to place his attention on temporal things. From thence are produced giants, that is, the cares of temporal things.[41] For William and Bernard, and to a lesser extent for the other Chartrians, the ancient myths are invaluable for such moral lessons or insights into the physical nature of things, but they

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[40] Glosae super Platonem, p. 202. Cf. Fulgentius, Mythologiae 2.12, ed. Helm, in Opera, pp. 52-53. For other naturalistic interpretations see Glosae super Platonem, pp. 202-3; and Bernard Silvestris, Commentary on Vergil 6.39, 57, 121, and 595, pp. 39, 45, 55-56, and 110.

[41] Glosae super Boetium 3. m. 12.34-35. Cf. Glosae super Platonem, pp. 93-95; and Bernard Silvestris, Commentary on Vergil 6.286 and 324, pp. 70-71 and 80. For a discussion of this interpretation see Jeauneau, "Integumentum," pp. 142-44; and Dronke, Fabula, pp. 22-24.

concern themselves little or not at all with the myth for its own sake.

As a result of this emphasis on the meaning rather than the form of the integumentum, William is able to expand greatly the number of myths open to such exposition. The myth of Ixion does not fit Macrobius' requirements for interpreting since he allows interpretations only of didactic myths based on true matter containing only seemly things.[42] In practice such medieval commentators as Fulgentius and Remigius of Auxerre had long gone beyond the strictures laid down by Macrobius, but, as Peter Dronke has shown, William was the first to oppose consciously these restrictions and describe a greatly expanded area where serious interpretation of ancient myths was appropriate.[43]

At each point where Macrobius seeks to limit the province of integumentum, William so interprets Macrobius as to include what the latter has excluded. Whereas Macrobius says that fables are either for delight or instruction, William says that there is also a third group, namely those myths written for both utility and delight.[44] He thus effectively introduces for interpretation all myths that delight, and it is these that Macrobius wanted to exclude. When Macrobius seeks to limit the application of

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[42]Macrobius, Commentarii 1.2.7-11, pp. 5-6.

[43]Dronke, Fabula, esp. pp. 14-32. Cf. idem, "New Approaches to the School of Chartres," Anuario de estudios medievales 6 (1969):117-40; and Stock, Myth, pp. 54-56.

[44]Glosae super Macrobium (shorter redaction) 1.2.7, MS Bamberg, Staatl. Bibl. Class. 40, fols. 7rb-va, quoted in Dronke, Fabula, p. 68.

fictional technique to true matter and to exclude its application to fictitious matter, William simply ignores the distinction and proceeds to read allegorically the myth of Jupiter's cutting off his father's testicles.[45] Finally, when Macrobius excludes all the tales of the Olympians' immorality as an improper subject for the philosopher, William, rather than simply ignoring Macrobius' distinction, explains why integumenta with unworthy elements provide appropriate material for interpretation:

> Sometimes a story of this kind is made with base and shameful matter, sometimes with seemly and respectable. "Such as adulterous gods"--these words are base, yet by that adultery something respectable and true is signified, as for instance is read about Jove's adulteries with Cybele and Semele, and other things of this kind which will be explained in their proper place.[46]

As Dronke points out, William is here appealing to new principles; "His emphasis is not, like that of the ancient allegorists of Homer, on drawing a veil over what is unseemly: for him the seemliness of the significatio genuinely eclipses and renders unimportant the unseemliness of the words."[47] William thus retains the whole realm of ancient myth as an appropriate field for philosophic endeavor. For beneath the ancient myths--sometimes hidden by a pleasing tale, sometimes by an ugly-brutish tale--are hidden important truths about man and the natural world.

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[45] Glosae super Macrobium (longer redaction) 1.2.10-11, also quoted in Dronke, Fabula, pp. 70-71. William here transfers to Jupiter the account of Cronos' castration of Uranus.

[46] Glosae super Macrobium (longer redaction) 1.2.10-11, also quoted in Dronke, Fabula, p. 71.

[47] Dronke, Fabula, p. 28.

Concerned solely with these hidden moral and cosmic truths, William remains indifferent to the seemliness or baseness of the covering with which the truth is hidden. In the same way William has no concept of the inviolability or external consistency of integumenta. Jeauneau has shown in his explication of integumentum that for William the same moral lessons can be presented under various integumenta, and a single integumentum can have different significations. Thus on the one hand Orpheus, Ulysses, and Hercules all represent the wise man; and on the other hand giants can signify born from the earth, or the human body, or an immoderate concern for terrestrial things.[48] After describing how Venus may refer either to the legitimate Venus, who represents the music of the spheres or natural justice, or to the shameless Venus, who represents the desires of the flesh, Bernard Silvestris gives his view of such diverse interpretations. He notes that in the Aeneid of Virgil just as in other mystical works, one must look for diverse equivocations, multiple designations, and integumenta, for the same name may designate diverse natures, and diverse names may designate the same nature. The need to use such diverse interpretations arises when the truth cannot be adequately expressed in one form alone.[49]

One would expect that by extending this method, a single integumentum might have several equally viable meanings. We indeed find that William does occasionally offer detailed, dual explications of the same myth. For example, he interprets the

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[48]Jeauneau, "Integumentum," esp. pp. 132-42.

[49]Bernard Silvestris, Commentary on Vergil 1.72, p. 9.

myth of Bacchus' coming back to life in the winnowing fan as referring first to the human soul and later to the anima mundi. And William or one of his students in the Glosae super Martianum Capellam gives both a scientific and a philosophical interpretation to the myth of Hymen.[50] In his explication of the myth of Orpheus, William shows his awareness that he differs from the traditional interpretation of Fulgentius, who describes the myth as symbolizing the study of music. Expanding the explication of Remigius of Auxerre, William describes Orpheus as representing wisdom and eloquence, Eurydice natural concupiscence, and Aristaeus virtue. Orpheus' descent to hell is the wise man's applying his knowledge to temporal goods in order to see their vanity and free himself from them. Having offered his interpretation, William adds:

> If someone reading Fulgentius sees a different way of expounding this fable, he should not on that account condemn ours, because different interpretations are found about the same thing according to how one looks at it. But no one should worry about such diversity of interpretations; instead it should be the cause of gladness. What should be a cause of worry are contradictions within an exposition.[51]

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[50]Myth of Bacchus: Glosae super Macrobium (shorter redaction) 1.2.9, 12, MS Bamberg, Staatl, Bibl. Class. 40, fols. 7va and 15rb, quoted in Dronke, Fabula, pp. 69-70. Myth of Hymen: Glosae super Martianum Cappelam, MS Florence, Bibl. Naz. Conv. Soppr., fol. 50r-v, quoted in Dronke, Fabula, pp. 114-15. For a discussion of the interpretation of the two myths see Dronke, Fabula, pp. 27-29 and 101-6.

[51]Glosae super Boetium 3. m. 12.5, also quoted in Jeauneau, "Integumentum," pp. 45-47. Bernard Silvestris gives a similar interpretation of the myth of Orpheus in Commentary on Vergil 6.119, pp. 54-55. On William's and Bernard's interpretation of the myth see Jeauneau, "Integumentum," pp. 134-42; and John Block Friedman, Orpheus in the Middle Ages (Cambridge, Mass., 1970), pp. 91-109.

William clearly sets forth here his view that integumenta may hold as many interpretations as they can bear. It is essential to remember that for William what is important is not the integumentum itself but the moral or cosmic truth which it contains. The integumentum is only a means of conveying some truth and it may be as variously interpreted as need requires.

In his glosses on Plato and other ancient philosophers, William most often attempts to explain the text through verbal and rational rather than mythical explanations. Each gloss is, of course, a constant explanation of the meaning of a word or the intention of the author. For example, in his Glosae super Platonem, William rejects the criticism that Socrates and Plato approved the holding of women in common. He explains that Plato did not say they would be in common but that they would be reputed to be in common.[52] He then argues that Plato did not advocate giving all women in marriage by lots. He explains that Plato divided the people into classes and only when two men from the same class sought a woman from that class was the use of lots prescribed. "This we are able to prove by reason (ratione probare) and to conjecture from the author's words (ex verbis auctoris conicere)."[53] Here William clearly reveals the major method he employs to interpret Plato and the other ancient philosophers.

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[52] Glosae super Platonem, p. 78. William is here following Plato's description of the ideal state in the Timaeus a Calcidio 18c, ed. J. H. Waszink, in Timaeus a Calcidio translatus commentarioque instructus, Corpus Platonicum medii aevi, Plato latinus, vol. 4 (London, 1962), p. 9.

[53] Ibid., p. 79. Cf. Timaeus a Calcidio 18c, p. 9.

He does not treat the account as a myth, but nonetheless he goes beyond the apparent literal meaning to a more subtle reading which he finds more acceptable. "He proves it by reason." That is, he offers an interpretation which he argues is compatible with his view of Plato as the wisest of philosophers. "He conjectures from the words of the author." That is, by minutely examining each word for every possible meaning, William adroitly finds confirmation for his interpretation in the author's choice of words. Frequently he exults over the writer's wise selection of words, "And well does he say thought out (excogitavit) and not created (creavit) in so far as the anima mundi represents the Holy Spirit."[54] At other times he suggests that the ancient really meant another word, "To say that God created (creavit) the Son would be heretical, but perhaps Macrobius meant brought forth (genuit)."[55] William examines each word for various shades of meaning, explains that meaning to his students, and shows the importance of that word for the author's intentions.

This method of interpretation by word and reason forms the crux of William's explication of Plato as well as of Boethius, Macrobius, and other ancient philosophers. Nevertheless, William

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[54]Ibid., p. 148.

[55]Glosae super Macrobium (longer redaction) 1.14.2, MS Vatican, Urb. lat. 1140, fol. 78v, also ed. Helen E. Rodnite [Lemay], "The Doctrine of the Trinity in Guillaume de Conches' Glosses on Macrobius: Texts and Studies" (Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1973), p. 213: "Hic id est deus creavit ex se mentem. Si dixisset 'genuit' bene dixisset, sed hoc verbum 'creavit' hereticum est. Forsitan autem 'creavit' posuit pro 'genuit.'" On the anima mundi, see below, chap. 4.

frequently interprets a passage in Plato as an integumentum which must be interpreted as were the ancient myths if it is to be properly understood. A good example is William's explanation of the Platonic description of the creation of human souls. Plato says the Creator divided the mixture into souls equal in number to the stars and assigned each of them a star. Having thus placed them as in a chariot, he showed them the nature of the universe.[56] William considers this integumentum in detail in his Glosae super Platonem and in three separate texts in his Glosae super Boetium. He first criticizes those who, reading the passage literally, accuse Plato of heresy. William insists that Plato nowhere says that all souls are created at the same time. He does say that souls are placed over the stars, but this must be understood as an integumentum.[57]

Willian then interprets Plato's myth of the creation of human souls by proposing two possible interpretations of the account. In his Glosae super Platonem he explains that when Plato said that God chose souls equal to the number of stars he did not mean that God made as many souls as there are stars, but that God provided that the stars would determine how long each soul would be united with its body. The stars are thus called vehicles of the souls not because they carried them across the heavens, but because by the influence of the stars the body is so prepared that the soul can be created in it.[58] In addition to

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[56] Timaeus a Calcidio 41d-42e, pp. 36-38.

[57] Glosae super Boetium 5. pr. 2.20. Cf. ibid., 3. m. 9. 19 and m. 11.16.

[58] Glosae super Platonem, p. 211. Ibid., p. 212. On the Chartrian attitude toward the influence of the stars on human life, see below, chap. 5.

this naturalistic interpretation, William adds in his Glosae super Boetium a moralistic one, which he views as equally valid. By saying that God placed the souls over the stars, Plato meant that through reason, which is the gift of God, man transcends the stars and attains knowledge of God. The stars are called companions of the souls because both are always in motion and are rationally moved.[59]

Any interpretation of Plato's account of the creation of human souls as an integumentum must explain what constitutes the chariots of the souls. According to William's naturalistic interpretation, the chariots are the stars, which determine the duration of the soul's connection with the body. But according to his moralistic interpretation, the chariots are reason and understanding, by which the soul is led above the stars to God himself. For Willian one interpretation does not exclude the other, so both can be seen as valuable truths contained hidden within the integumentum of the creation of human souls.

William has left us no Biblical exegesis or commentaries on the Church Fathers. The evidence from the few references to the Bible and the Church Fathers in William's works does, however, lead to the conclusion that he applies to the Bible the same methods used on Plato and Boethius. Having supreme confidence in the compatibility of the Bible and the ancient philosophers as long as they are properly understood, William tends to regard the

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[59]Glosae super Boetium 3. m. 9.19. For a discussion of William's treatment of the creation of human souls see Flatten, Wilhelm, pp. 156-60; Gregory, Anima, pp. 154-66; Jeauneau, "Integumentum," pp. 145-46 and 172-76; and idem, "Macrobe, source du platonisme chartrain," SM, 3rd ser., 1 (1960):16-22.

Bible as he regards Plato, namely as in agreement with his own views of the true nature of things. He explains that the Biblical passage, "the woman, who damned, saved," should be understood figuratively, since the name woman here designates not a person but the whole sex. The passage should be understood to say, the same sex both damned and saved.[60] By such readings William manages to reconcile the Biblical and Platonic ordering of the angels. He argues that by dividing the angels into two groups, Plato does not contradict the Bible, which divides them into nine groups, because the former makes his division according to differences of location, the latter according to differences of duties.[61] In arguing that angels do not have bodies, William uses the same method to dismiss Augustine's remarks in the Enchiridion about what kind of bodies angels have. "For there St. Augustine speaks about the bodies which angels assume whenever they appear to men, whether they are really bodies or not."[62] Applying his

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[60] Glosae super Priscianum, MS Paris, Bibl. nat. lat. 15130, fol. 98rb, quoted in Jeauneau, "Deux redactions," p. 240. I have not succeeded in identifying the Biblical text cited by William.

[61] Philosophia, ed. Maurach, p. 18, PL 172, 48C, and PL 90, 1131D. Cf. Dragmaticon, p. 17; Glosae super Platonem, p. 200; and Compendium, ed. Ottaviano, p. 46. Medieval doctrine on the orders of the angels was based on Romans 8:38; Col. 1:16, and Eph. 1:21, but became systemitized and standardized only with the Pseudo-Dionysius, De caelesti hierarchia 6-9, trans. into Latin by John Scotus Eriugena, PL 122, 1049C-588. On medieval angelology see A. Vacant and G. Bareille, "Ange," DTC 1:1192-1227; Lothar Heiser, Die Engel im Glauben der Orthodoxie, Sophia: Quellen östlicher Theologie, Band 13 (Trier, 1976), pp. 254-66. No studies exist on the angelology of the Chartrians.

[62] Philosophia, ed. Maurach, p. 18, PL 172, 48B, and PL 90, 1131C-D. Cf. Dragmaticon, pp. 17-18. For other examples of figurative reading of the Bible see Philosophia, ed. Maurach, p. 13, PL 172, 45A-B, and PL 90, 1129C-D; Glosae super Platonem, pp. 92 and 178-79.

method of reading by word and reason, William shows that apparent contradictions between his Christian and pagan authorities can generally be reconciled by a "proper" reading of the texts.

In regard to at least three doctrines--the creation of the world, chaos, and the firmament placed between two bodies of water--William treats Biblical passages as integumenta similar to Plato's integumentum of the creation of the human soul. And as with Plato's, these too stand in need of interpretation.[63] His explanation of the Genesis account of the waters above the firmament (Genesis 1:6-7) will provide a good example of how he treats a Biblical passage as an integumentum. Rejecting a literal reading of this passage, he says, "But since that is against

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[63]Jeauneau states in "Integumentum," pp. 178-79, that William uses the term allegoria rather than integumentum when he interprets Biblical passages. He and Brian Stock, Myth, pp. 33-54, find support for this view in a statement by Bernard Silvestris, in Commentum in Martianum Capellam, MS Cambridge, Univ. Libr. Mm. i. 18, fol. 1rb, ed. Jeauneau, in "Note," p. 856: Est autem allegoria oratio sub historica narratione verum et ab exteriori diversum involvens intellectum, ut de lucta Iacob. Integumentum vero est oratio sub fabulosa narratione verum claudens intellectum, ut de Orpheo. Name et ibi historia et hic fabula misterium habent occultum, quod alias discutiendum erit. Allegoria quidem divine pagine, integumentum vero philosophice competit." However, Dronke has shown in Fabula, pp. 51-55, that William describes the Biblical statement that God placed the firmament in the midst of waters (Genesis 1:6-7) as an integumentum in his Glosae super Macrobium (shorter redaction) 1.17.15, MS Bamberg, Staatl. Bibl. Class. 40, fol. 17rb: "Autoritati facile est respondere, nam divina pagina integumento deservit." And Jeauneau himself, in "Integumentum," p. 87, says: "Mais l'habitude créée par l'usage de l'exégèse allégorique dans la lecture des auteurs profanes pouvait, par un choc en retour, transformer en pures allégories certaines pages de la Bible. Après avoir servi à ramener les philosophes dans les limites de l'orthodoxie, elle pouvait, servir à interpréter la Sainte Écriture d'une façon qui la rendit conforme à la philosophie." It seems clear from his treatment of the few Biblical texts he considers, that William applies the same method to reading Biblical passages as he does to reading the integumenta in Plato, whether or not he calls such Biblical passages integumenta.

reason, we will show why it is not so and how the divine scripture ought to be understood."[64] First William explains that for water to be above the firmament is scientifically unthinkable. For one thing, the proper place for water, which is heavy, is not above but beneath the air. For another, if congealed water were above the firmament, either it would be joined to fire or not. But if it were joined to fire either the fire would evaporate the water or the water would put out the fire. But if it were separated from the fire by some medium, we would see that medium. We see no such medium; therefore, there is no congealed water above the firmament.[65] William then explains that the Biblical passage

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[64] Philosophia, PL 172, 57D, and PL 90, 1139C. Most of William's predecessors and contemporaries, including his fellow schoolmen, accept the literal meaning of this passage. See for example Augustine, De Genesi ad litteram 2.5, P. 45, 267A; Bede, Hexaemeron 1, PL 91, 18B-20A; Peter Abelard, Expositio in Hexaemeron, PL 178, 741D-47A; Hugh of St. Victor, Adnotationes elucidatoriae in Pentateuchon 6, PL 175, 35A; and Bernard Silvestris, Commentum in Martianum Capellam, MS Cambridge, Univ. Libr. Mm. i. 18, fol. 19rb, ed. Jeauneau, in "Note," pp. 860-62. The main proponent of rejecting this literal reading before William is John Scotus Eriugena, in Periphyseon 3.27, PL 122, 697A-698B. For discussion of William's treatment of this passage see Jeauneau, "Note," pp. 847-50; Gregory, Anima, pp. 239-44; and B. Nardi, "Sguardo panoramico alla filosofia della natura nel medioevo," in La filosofia della natura nel medioevo, Atti del terzo congresso internazionale di filosofia medievale (Milan, 1966), pp. 6-7. An extended treatment of the Chartrian treatment of this passage, which appeared after my writing of this section was completed, is Helen E. Rodnite Lemay, "Science and Theology at Chartres: The Case of the Supracelestial Waters," British Journal for the History of Science 10 (1977):226-36.

[65] Philosophia, PL 172, 57D-58B, and PL 90, 1139C-D. Cf. Dragmaticon, pp. 64-69; and Glosae super Macrobium (longer redaction) 1.17.8, MS Vatican, Urb. lat. 1140, fol. 99v.

should be read allegorically rather than literally. In the passage firmament signifies the air, which firms and tempers the earth. There is water over the air suspended like a vapor in the clouds, and this water is separated by the air from the water on the earth.[66] Accustomed to reading as integumenta passages in the ancients which vary from his perceptions of the true nature of things, William applies the same method to Biblical passages. In both instances his aim is to get at cosmic or moral truths hidden by the literal meaning of the passage.

By means of such an allegorical reading of the pagan and Christian sources, William and his fellow Chartrians greatly expand the value of the ancient poets and philosophers as authorities of wisdom as well as eloquence. They are thoroughly imbued with these ancient writings, and it is the ancients who form the basis of much of the Chartrian speculation. But their method of reading the ancients allegorically allows them not only to introduce the ancients as authorities, but also to use these authorities with discrimination. The ancients become authorities whose dicta are accepted not literally but only after close verbal and rational scrutiny. Thus while continuing to revere authority, the Chartrians place reason as a judge to decipher the often cryptic sayings of their authorities.

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[66] Philosophia, PL 172, 58C-D, and PL 90, 1140C. See below, appendix C.

Chapter III

ATTITUDE TOWARD REASON

The Chartrians' attitude toward man's rational capabilities plays a vital role in their view of man. William of Conches and his fellow Chartrians took with them from their close study of the classical sources a high regard for the power of human reason. They were quick to apply their rational inquiries not only to an explication of the ancient texts but also to an explanation of philosophical problems. They approached their philosophical speculations with a very optimistic view of what man can comprehend of both the material and the immaterial worlds. The Chartrians' positive view of human reason had its origins in their theories of knowledge which were based largely on Boethius' division of the powers of the soul into the senses, imagination, reason, and understanding.[1]

William offers the most complete and detailed account of human cognition, the basic elements of which are relatively simple.

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[1]Boethius' theory of cognition appears especially in his Consolatio philosophiae 5. pr. 3 and 4, Loeb Classical Library, pp. 372-98. For an analysis of his theory of knowledge see Karl Bruder, Die philosophischen Elemente in den Opuscula sacra des Boethius (Leipzig, 1928), pp. 11-33; H. J. Brosch, Der Seinsbegriff bei Boethius (Innsbruck, 1931), pp. 81-83; Viktor Schürr, Die Trinitätslehre des Boethius im Lichte der 'skythischen Kontroversen,' Forschungen zur christlichen Literatur- und Dogmengeschichte, Band 15, Heft 1 (Paderborn, 1935), pp. 46-50; and Étienne Gilson, History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages (New York, 1955), pp. 97-109.

Whatever thing is perceived, for example a man, is known in different ways depending on whether it is perceived by the senses (sensus), imagination (imaginatio), reason (ratio), or understanding (intelligentia or intellectus). Sense is the power of the soul by which man sees, hears, smells, tastes, or touches. This power functions only when the corporeal substance perceived is present to the senses located in various parts of the body. The imagination is the power of the soul by which man perceives something which is not present. Imaginative knowledge is based on sense knowledge because whatever we imagine, we imagine either as we have seen it before or as similar to something else we have seen. Reason is the power by which man perceives what each thing is and how it is similar to and different from other things. It is based on sense and imaginative knowledge because we reason only about those things which we have sensed or imagined. Understanding is the power by which man perceives incorporeal things and discerns certain reasons as to why they are so. Understanding is based on rational knowledge because from rational understanding of the nature of things man comes to knowledge of the existence and nature of incorporeals.[2] The senses and imagination are

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[2]William of Conches, Glosae super Boetium 5. pr. 4.82. See above, chap. 1, n. 47. Cf. Glosae super Platonem, ed. Édouard Jeauneau, Textes philosophiques du moyen âge, vol. 13 (Paris, 1965), pp. 100-101 and 281-84; Philosophia mundi, PL 172, 98D, and PL 90, 1177A; Dragmaticon (Dialogus de substantiis physicis), ed. Guilielmus Gratarolus (Strasbourg, 1567), pp. 279-280, 299-301, and 306-10. William draws this and the rest of his discussion of the powers of the soul predominantly from Boethius, Consolatio philosophiae 5. pr. 4 and 5, pp. 372-98; Plato, Timaeus 27d and 51d-e, ed. J. H. Waszink, Timaeus a Calcidio translatus commentarioque instructus, Corpus platonicum medii aevi, Plato latinus, vol. 4 (London, 1962), pp. 20 and 49-50; Chalcidius, Commentarius in Timaeum Platonis 191-95, 230-35, and 340-45, in

powers of the soul which man shares with other animals, but reason and understanding are unique to man among terrestrial creatures. The progression of knowledge from the senses to reason and understanding occurs causally and temporally so that sense knowledge provides the essential basis for all cognition.[3]

To this basic system William makes a number of additions, without, however, fully integrating them. In several places he lists cleverness (ingenium), memory (memoria), and opinion (opinio) as powers of the soul unique to man in addition to reason and understanding. Cleverness is the natural power of perceiving things quickly.[4] William seems to identify it as

ibid., pp. 214-17, 244-48, and 332-38. For discussion of William's theory of knowledge and powers of the soul see Heinrich Flatten, Die Philosophie des Wilhelm von Conches (Coblenz, 1929), pp. 45-83; Tullio Gregory, Anima mundi: la filosofia di Guglielmo di Conches e la scuola di Chartres (Florence, 1955), pp. 167-75; J. M. Parent, La doctrine de la création dans l'école de Chartres, Publications de l'Institut d'études médiévales d'Ottawa, vol. 8 (Paris and Ottawa, 1938), pp. 29-32; Pierre Michaud-Quantin, "La classification des puissances de l'âme au XII^{e} siècle," RMAL 5 (1949):15-34; and Marie-Dominique Chenu, "Imaginatio: Note de lexicographie philosophique médiévale," in Miscellanea Giovanni Mercati, 2 vols. (Vatican City, 1946), 2:593-602.

[3]William of Conches, Glosae super Boetium 1. pr. 1.3; and Glosae super Platonem, pp. 101-2. Cf. Glosae super Platonem, p. 250.

[4]William of Conches, Glosae super Platonem, p. 102. Cf. ibid., pp. 65 and 83; Dragmaticon, p. 307; Glosae super Boetium 1. pr. 1.3; and Glosae super Juvenalem, MS Baltimore, Walters Art Gallery W. 448, fol. 2vb. Boethius does not use ingenium in his theory of knowledge. William's probable source is Isidore of Seville, Etymologiae 10.123, PL 82, 380A. For other twelfth-century use of ingenium see Ysagoge in Theologiam 1, ed. Artur M. Landgraf, in Écrits theologiques de l'école d'Abelard (Louvain, 1934), p. 70; and Isaac of Stella, Epistola de anima 7, PL 194, 1879B-D.

synonymous with or a part of the imagination.[5] It is clearly a subservient power for William, despite his failure always to state so specifically, and need concern us no further. Memory is the power of firmly retaining what is known. William seems especially uncertain whether to accord memory a status equal with or subservient to reason and understanding.[6] This uncertainty stems from the lack of precision in his sources and his efforts to enumerate additional powers of the soul while retaining the Boethian system as the basis of his thought. It is not clear that William ever resolves the problem, but it is certain that whatever the status of memory in relation to reason and understanding, it does not affect the essentials of William's concept of the progression of knowledge from the senses to understanding. The third extra power of the soul is opinion, which is the

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[5]Glosae super Boetium 1. pr. 1.3. On William's use of ingenium see Winthrop Wetherbee, Platonism and Poetry in the Twelfth Century (Princeton, 1972), pp. 94-97; and Theodore Silverstein, "The Fabulous Cosmogony of Bernardus Silvestris," Modern Philology 46 (1948-49):98.

[6]Glosae super Platonem, p. 102. Here William states specifically that memory is a power which serves reason and understanding. He excludes memory from his discussion of the four basic powers of the soul in his Glosae super Boetium 5. pr. 4.82. But in his Philosophia, PL 172, 98D, and PL 90, 1177A, he states, "Hujus animae diversae sunt potentiae, scilicet intelligentia, ratio, memoria." Cf. Glosae super Boetium 1. pr. 1.3; and Compendium philosophie, ed. Giorgio Rialdi, in Il "De philosophia mundi," l'autore, la storia, il contenuto medico (Geneva, 1965), p. 101. In the Dragmaticon, pp. 306-10, William lists five powers of the soul distinct to man: ingenium, opinio, ratio, intelligentia, and memoria. Boethius does not integrate memoria into his psychology, but he does mention memoria, for example, in Consolatio 4. pr. 2.32, p. 306. Another probable source for William's concept of memoria is Macrobius, Commentarii in Somnium Scipionis 1.14.12, ed. James Willis, Bibliotheca scriptorum graecorum et romanorum (Leipzig, 1970), p. 57.

uncertain perception of things. If an opinion about a corporeal object is confirmed, it becomes reason; if an opinion about an incorporeal is confirmed, it becomes understanding.[7] William thus develops the concept of opinion drawn largely from Chalcidius as a refinement of the Boethian system. It can be seen either as the link between the senses and imagination on the one hand and reason and understanding on the other or as part of reason. William seems to use it in both ways without making its exact position clear.[8] In any case, opinion is an addition to or refinement of the Boethian system concerning the development from sense knowledge to reason and understanding, and, like cleverness and memory, it does not interfere with the functioning of that system.

To the Boethian system of the power of the soul William also adds Constantine the African's tripartite division of the brain into the visionary or imaginative, the memory, and the rational, which contain respectively the powers of perceiving,

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[7] Glosae super Platonem, p. 102. William draws his doctrine of opinio from Boethius, Consolatio 5. pr. 3, pp. 374-76; Plato, Timaeus a Calcidio 51d-e, pp. 49-50; and Chalcidius, Commentarius 230 and 340-48, pp. 245 and 333-39.

[8] In the Glosae super Platonem, William in some places identifies imagination with opinion, for example on p. 109: "opinio id est imaginatio commota aliquo sensu quia omnis opinio, ut prediximus, habet principium a sensu." Cf. p. 152. In other places he seems to define it as a form of human reasoning, for example on p. 115: "Omnis enim humana ratio aut fama est aut opinio." In still other places opinion seems more like something transitional between imagination and reason, for example on p. 173: "Et est opinio vis anime qua percipit mutabilia sine certa ratione ut me legere cras." Cf. pp. 174-75 and 182. Other passages are ambiguous but generally seem to tend to the last meaning. This seems to be the most likely interpretation and is also the one William presents in his last work, the Dragmaticon, pp. 307-8.

remembering, and reasoning.[9] William fails to describe the relation between these two systems. It is, therefore, impossible always to specify through which divisions of the brain the various powers of the soul function, but some can be ascribed with a reasonable degree of certainty. The senses, as such, do not possess a center in the brain but are located in the appropriate sense organs. Imagination and cleverness, which is closely related to it, clearly function through the front portion of the brain, which is called the phantastic, that is the visual or imaginative, because in it is the power of seeing and perceiving.

A further difficulty arises here from William's lack of precision in his terminology. William describes the sense perception, which is centered in the front section of the brain, with the same words used to describe the highest power of the soul, the understanding of incorporeals. In both cases he indiscriminately uses either intellectus or intelligentia. The contradition is more apparent than real. When referring to the visual or imaginative part of the brain, he describes it as intellectus or intelligentia, in the sense of perception or sensation. When referring to man's power of understanding

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[9]Philosophia, PL 172, 95B-D, and PL 90, 1176A-B. Cf. Dragmaticon, pp. 276-80; and Glosae super Boetium 1. pr. 1.3. For discussion of the divisions of the brain in William see Gregory, Anima, pp. 169-71; Flatten, Wilhelm, pp. 167-68; Ynez Violé O'Neill, "William of Conches and the Cerebral Membranes," Clio medica 2 (1967):13-21; idem, "William of Conches' Descriptions of the Brain," Clio medica 3 (1968):203-23; and Brian Lawn, The Salernitan Questions: An Introduction to the History of Medieval and Renaissance Problem Literature (Oxford, 1963), p. 22 and 52-53. William's major sources for the divisions of the brain were Nemesius of Emessa, Premnon physicon 5, 6, and 12-13, trans. into Latin by Alfanus of Salerno, ed. Carolus Burkhard (Leipzig, 1914), pp. 72-75 and 87-90; and Constantine the African, Pantegni 4.9-11, in Opera, 2 vols. (Basil, 1536-39), 2.91-96.

incorporeals, he describes it with the same two words, but in the sense of understanding or comprehension.[10] While William is certainly guilty of a lack of precision in his terminology, his ideas are not contradictory or disordered.

The power of memory obviously functions through the back portion of the brain which controls memory, and reason in the middle or rational section. Any assignment of the powers of understanding and opinion to a division of the brain can be only provisional, but both of these probably function through the section of the brain which involves rational activity. Opinion, as we have seen is very closely related to reason, and understanding is a power which develops from reason. William also

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[10]For examples of William's use of intellectus and intelligentia to mean perceiving with the senses see above, n. 9. For examples of their use to mean understanding see above, n. 2. Boethius uses these two words interchangeably but always in the sense of comprehending or understanding. See for example his In Isagogen Porphyrii commenta 1.8, ed. Samuel Brandt, Corpus scriptorum ecclesiasticorum latinorum, vol. 48 (Leipzig, 1906), p. 8. On Boethius' use of these words see Marie-Dominique Chenu, "Aetas Boetiana," in La théologie au douzième siècle, Études de philosophie médiévale, vol. 45 (Paris, 1957), pp. 146-47. Similar uses of intellectus and intelligentia may be found in Timaeus a Calcidio 46d-48a and 51d-e, pp. 43-45 and 50; Chalcidius, Commentarius 261, 267-70, and 339-41, pp. 268, 272-74, and 332-34; and John Scotus Eriugena, Periphyseon 4, PL 122, 750B and 787A. The use of intellectus and intelligentia in the sense of perception or sensation is not as common in William's major sources with the exception of Constantine the African, Pantegni 4.9-11, in Opera 2:91-96. This use of the words was, however, common in classical Latin, for example in Seneca, Ad Lucilium epistulae morales 94.10, Loeb Classical Library, 3 vols., 3:2; Cicero, Orator 184, Loeb Classical Library, p. 460; and Pliny, Naturalis historiae 11.174, Loeb Classical Library, 10 vols., 3.542. This use was also common among William's contemporaries. See for example Adelard of Bath, Quaestiones naturales 17, ed. Martin Müller, BGPTM, Band 31, Heft 2 (Münster, 1934), p. 22; and Bernard Silvestris, The Commentary on the First Six Books of the Aeneid of Vergil Commonly Attributed to Bernardus Silvestris 6.63, ed. Julian Ward Jones and Elizabeth Frances Jones (Lincoln, 1977), p. 46.

frequently uses the term ratio or rationalis to include both reason and understanding.[11] It seems logical, therefore, that opinion and understanding, which are both rational powers or aids to the rational power, should function through the rational division of the brain.

Neither the additional powers of the soul nor the tripartite division of the brain contradicts or significantly modifies the Boethian system of the powers of the soul which forms the core of William's theory of knowledge. But William does make a significant change in the Boethian system in the relationship between the power of understanding and the other powers of the soul. For Boethius there is a natural progression from sense knowledge to rational knowledge, but understanding is a mode of comprehension radically distinct from the lesser forms of knowledge and arising from divine illumination. Boethius thereby establishes a complete barrier between reason and understanding.[12] For William, on the other hand, understanding arises

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[11] Glosae super Platonem, p. 207: "ratio vero in hoc quod Deus iure est rationalis"; p. 174: "Et motus eius rationalis, id est discernere et intelligere." Cf. pp. 143, 150, 223, and 254. In the latter sections of this chapter where I discuss the Chartrians' optimistic view of the power of reason, I shall follow William's example and include comprehension of the world and of God as rational knowledge.

[12] Boethius' views on the power of understanding appear most fully in his Consolatio 5. pr. 4-5, pp. 382-96 and his In Isagogen 1.1.2, pp. 8-9. In Consolatio 5. pr. 5.12-50, pp. 394-96, Boethius uses the distinction between understanding and reason to explain how God's foreknowledge does not destroy human freedom of choice. Schürr, Trinitätslehre, pp. 46-50, interprets Boethius as attributing intelligentia to God and the angels alone. Bruder, pp. 11-13, and Brosch, pp. 81-83, offer the more commonly accepted view that intelligentia is a human form of knowing which is basically a priori and that it is highly influenced by Augustine's theory of illumination. The latter is the interpretation followed

not from any divine illumination but from the exercise of reason.

William offers two not totally unrelated explanations of the relation of reason and understanding. In the Glosae super Platonem he says that from his sense knowledge man forms certain opinions, some of which are true and some false. The false opinions remain only false opinions, but the true opinions become reason or understanding. True opinions about genera and species, distinctions, and essential and accidental qualities are reason; true opinions about incorporeal substances like God, angels, and the soul are understanding.[13] In his more common explanation of their relation, William describes opinion as arising from the senses, reason from opinion, and understanding from reason. Man led by reason recognizes that because bodies are heavy, they are not able to move themselves. With great effort man rationally considers the various possible causes of that motion and, having discarded the false opinions, finally comes to an understanding of the human soul and of God.[14]

Though these two explanations differ slightly, both concur in the essential connection of reason and understanding and the

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by Gilson, History, p. 100; and Bernard McGinn, The Golden Chain: A Study in the Theological Anthropology of Isaac of Stella, Cistercian Studies Series, no. 15 (Washington, 1972), esp. pp.174-76 and 203-5. Both interpretations view the intelligentia of Boethius as a unique form of knowledge very different from those powers which both groups grant to man.

[13]Glosae super Platonem, p. 175. For discussion see Flatten, Wilhelm, pp. 77-81; Parent, pp. 30-31; and Peter Dronke, Fabula: Explorations into the Uses of Myth in Medieval Platonism, Mittellateinische Studien und Texte, Band 9 (Leyden, 1974), pp. 36-38.

[14]Dragmaticon, pp. 308-9. Cf. Glosae super Boetium 5. pr. 4.82; and Chalcidius, Commentarius 341, p. 334.

basis of both in sense knowledge. Ths only factor in man's rational knowledge besides his sense knowledge and his rational capacity is that man's mind, made in the image of God, naturally contains the ideas of certain things.[15] For William, understanding and reason are both natural capacities of the soul, and they differ from one another only in the object of their attention. Reason considers universals, i.e. genera and species; and understanding considers incorporeal substances, i.e. God. Knowledge both of the physical world and of God comes only through rational investigation.

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[15] Glosae super Macrobium (shorter redaction) 1.2.14, MS Bamberg, Staatl. Bibl. Class. 40, fol. 7vb, ed. Helen E. Rodnite [Lemay], "The Doctrine of the Trinity in Guillaume de Conches' Glosses on Macrobius: Texts and Studies" (Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1973), p. 126: "Sic ergo deus in mente sua formas omnium rerum continet. Homo vero similiter formas quarundam rerum, etsi non omnium, in mente sua continet." Only in this redaction of the Glosae does William so describe forms of things as being contained in the mind of man, and he does not offer any further elaboration. This statement surely seems to indicate an implicit doctrine of innatism, drawn perhaps from Boethius, Consolatio 3 m. 11 and 5 m. 4, pp. 284-86 and 390-92. On the other hand, William's gloss on Consolatio 3 m. 11, one of the major Boethian statements regarding innatism, definitely seems to present something other than an innatist interpretation. In this gloss William presents no theory of innatism or abstraction but a somewhat vague theory of deliberation which emphasizes man's natural power of understanding. He explains that the act of judgment involves a long process of deliberation in which the vis anime (i.e. ratio) is directed by the soul to be turned toward a thing to consider whether or not that thing is as it appears. William admits that the body can disturb the intellect, but he argues that it cannot remove the natural power of understanding, if it is exercized. Although William uses the word excitare in this passage, it does not seem to have the meaning assigned by Boethius, namely that of sense experience bringing innate ideas to consciousness. Later in the passage William rejects the possibility of the soul's prior existence and therefore its having knowledge before it is joined to the body. He explicitly denies that either Plato or Boethius believed in such a doctrine of reminiscence.

Among monastic writers the Augustinian division of the powers of the soul into memory, reason, and will is more common through the early twelfth century than the Boethian division.[16] But the Boethian division, with some variations, forms the basis of the theory of knowledge in all Chartrian writings,[17] in Hugh of St. Victor, and in such Cistercian writers of the generation after Bernard of Clairvaux as Alcher of Clairvaux and Isaac of Stella.[18] Most of these writers also concur with William in

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[16]See for example Anselm of Canterbury, Monologion 67, ed. F. S. Schmitt, Sancti Anselmi opera omnia, 6 vols. (Rome and Edinburgh, 1938-61), 1:77-78; and William of St. Thierry De natura et dignitate amoris 2.3, PL 184, 382C-D. Cf. Augustine, De Trinitate 10.11.17-18, Corpus christianorum, series latina, vol. 50 (Turnhout, 1968), pp. 329-31.

[17]School of Thierry of Chartres, Commentum, in Commentaries on Boethius by Thierry of Chartres and His School, ed. Nikolaus M. Häring, Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, Studies and Texts, vol. 20 (Toronto, 1971), pp. 68-70; idem, Lectiones, in ibid., pp. 155-56; idem, Glosa, in ibid., pp. 26-70; Clarembald of Arras, Tractatus super librum Boetii "De Trinitate", in Life and Works of Clarembald of Arras, ed. Nikolaus M. Häring, Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, Studies and Texts, vol. 10 (Toronto, 1965), p. 82; Bernard Silvestris, Cosmographia (De mundi universitate) 2, ed. Carl S. Barach and Johann Wrobel (Innsbruck, 1876), pp. 86-89; idem, Commentary on Vergil 6.133, p. 58; John of Salisbury, Metalogicon 4.8-20, ed. Clement C. J. Webb (Oxford, 1929), pp. 172-87; and Gilbert Porreta, The Commentaries on Boethius by Gilbert of Poitiers, ed. Nikolaus M. Häring, Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, Studies and Texts, vol. 13 (Toronto, 1966), pp. 244-52. For treatments of various aspects of the twelfth-century discussion of the powers of the soul see H. C. van Elswijk, Gilbert Porreta: Sa vie, son oeuvre, sa pensée, Spicilegium sacrum lovaniense, Études et documents, vol. 33 (Louvain, 1966), pp. 215-35; Chenu, "Imaginato," pp. 596-602; and Michaud-Quantin, "Classification," pp. 15-34.

[18]Alcher of Clairvaux, De spiritu et anima, PL 40, 807-09; Isaac de Stella, Epistola de anima, PL 194, 1879-85; and Hugh of St. Victor, De unione corporis et spiritus, PL 178, 287-89. For a discussion of the powers of the soul in these writers see in addition to the references in n.17 above John P. Kleinz, The Theory of Knowledge of Hugh of St. Victor, The Catholic University of America, Philosophical Studies, vol. 87 (Washington, 1944), pp. 63-86; Roger Baron, Science et sagesse chez Hughes de Saint

linking Constantine the African's division of the brain with Boethius' division of the powers of the soul. They locate imagination in the front or phantastic division of the brain and reason in the middle or rational division. Most of them, however, describe understanding as distinct from the other three powers and thus fail to follow William's description of it as a natural outgrowth of the other powers. The Lectiones of the School of Thierry of Chartres simply discusses the four modes of knowing without describing one as the basis of another.[19] The Commentum of the school of Thierry, Clarembald of Arras, and Gilbert Porreta all seek more or less specifically to sever understanding from its relation to the other powers and from any reliance on sense knowledge.[20] Hugh of St. Victor and Isaac of Stella find the understanding formed not from sense perception, but from above and within.[21]

Of all these writers, only John of Salisbury and the author of the Glosa of the School of Thierry describe the understanding as based on the lower powers of the soul. The Glosa very briefly describes how sense knowledge becomes imagination and the latter becomes reason, and then reason, extending itself to the simple

Victor (Paris, 1957), pp. 58 and 218-19; and McGinn, Golden Chain, pp. 153-77.

[19]Lectiones, pp. 155-56.

[20]Commentum, p. 70; Clarembald of Arras, Tractatus, p. 82; and Gilbert Porreta, Commentaries on Boethius, pp. 84-85, 252, and 271-72.

[21]Hugh of St. Victor, De unione, PL 177, 287; Isaac de Stella, Epistola de anima, PL 194, 1888.

universe of universal things, becomes understanding (intelligibilitas).[22] John is the only Chartrian besides William to devote a lengthy discourse to the development from sense knowledge through imagination and reason to understanding. He insists that "wisdom itself flows originally from the fountainhead of the senses."[23] While following William's insistence that understanding arises from reason, John weakens the naturalism of William's psychology by increasing the dependence on God's grace to proceed from the utilization of one power to the next. In place of William's "Next comes understanding if God grants it," John says, "Nature does not bring about these steps; grace does."[24] The emphasis in both, but especially in William, nevertheless, remains on the necessity of the sense for all man's knowledge.

William and John insist throughout their works that all our knowledge is based on sense knowledge. In discussing the powers of the soul, William does not merely list the function of the various powers but also shows emphatically that each power develops directly or indirectly from sense knowledge. In his gloss on Macrobius, he argues that man's knowledge proceeds from knowledge of his body to knowledge of incorporeal things.[25] And he states explicitly that without the power of sensing the physical

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[22]Glosa, p. 270.

[23]John of Salisbury, Metalogicon 4.19, pp. 184-85.

[24]Ibid., p. 185; and William of Conches, Glosae super Platonem, p. 102.

[25]Glosae super Macrobium (longer redaction) 1.5.4. For reference to powers of the soul in William of Conches see above, n. 1.

world, man would be incapable of discerning or understanding.[26] John similarly repeats throughout Book 4 of his Metalogicon that "bodily sensation, which is the primary power or first operation of the soul, constitutes the foundation of all the arts."[27] Unlike William, who brings forward his emphasis on sense knowledge in conjunction with Boethius and Plato, John cites Aristotle as his main authority:

> It is impossible for universals to be throught about except through induction, since, as Aristotle says, those things which are said to be from abstraction become known through induction. Moreover, induction is impossible without sensation.[28]

For John and William, the senses serve as the basis for man's knowledge not only of the world and man, but also of universals and God.

But following classical and Christian tradition, the Chartrians insist that while the senses serve, reason must dominate.

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[26] Glosae super Platonem, p. 250. This is the argument which William repeatedly gives and which forms the cornerstone of his thought. But for an isolated contradictory statement see Dragmaticon, pp. 301-2: "Si enim homo rationem retinens et intelligentiam omni sensu careret, non solum beatior, immo beatissimus esset." A possible explanation for this statement is that it is part of an argument by William that reason and understanding are superior to the senses. Thus he does not intend that one can have reason and understanding without the sense, but that if one could, he would be better off.

[27] John of Salisbury, Metalogicon 4.8, p. 174. Bernard Silvestris also says that what man can know comes through sense knowledge, Cosmographia 2.4, p. 40.

[28] John of Salisbury, Metalogicon 4.8, p. 173. John is here quoting Boethius' translation of Aristotle, Analytica posteriora 1.13, PL 64, 730.

William repeats Plato's injunction to bridle the senses and argues that anyone who judges by the senses alone acts bestially. Just as man excels other creatures by means of his rational ability, so he should base his judgment on reason rather than the senses alone.[29] John of Salisbury closely follows William's account of how man forms judgments or opinions based on what he feels through his senses. Since such opinions may be either true or false, reason must examine them prudently to determine their validity.[30] John, Bernard Silvestris, and other Chartrians rarely miss an opportunity to say that reason must rule and guide the senses.[31]

William frequently describes the condition of the soul of a person in whom the senses rather than reason rule. In a child the domination of the senses is, of course, the natural state, but in an adult it represents a complete inversion of the natural and proper order. The senses, which should be like the feet serving the body, are elevated; and reason, which should be the head of the soul, is cast down. In such a condition man cannot know himself and so seeks only bodily goods with no thought to his

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[29]Dragmaticon, p. 38. Cf. Glosae super Boetium 3. m. 12. 34-35; and Glosae super Platonem, pp. 217-18 and 236.

[30]Glosae super Platonem, pp. 174-75. Cf. Dragmaticon, pp. 307-8; and John of Salisbury, Metalogicon 4.11, p. 177.

[31]For example, when Bernard comes to Aeneid 6.613, he centers on one word for his Commentary on Vergil, p. 112: "Dominorum sicuti corporis membra servos dicimus, sic econtra animi potentias et iudicia . . . dominos vocamus." For other examples see ibid., pp. 32 and 80; John of Salisbury, Policraticus 4.1, ed. Clement C. J. Webb, 2 vols. (Oxford, 1929), 2:235-37; Compendium philosophie, ed. Carmelo Ottaviano, in Un brano inedito della "Philosophia" di Guglielmo di Conches (Naples, 1935), p. 23.

soul or mind.[32] When this happens, man in effect deserts his divine heritage and, yielding up his superiority over the animals, becomes no better than a beast.

William argues throughout his works that the opinions which we form from sense perceptions are often false because they are based solely on the appearance of things. He enumerates many instances in which our senses, especially vision, lead us to a false opinion about things. A straight stick in the water appears bent; two towers seen from the distance may appear joined together although they are widely separated; and the sun, although it is eight times bigger than the earth, seems about two feet in circumference.[33] In order to ascertain the real nature of things, the investigator of nature must go beyond appearances. By careful consideration and long rational deliberation thereon, he can eliminate these false opinions and, in effect, go beyond the knowledge which the sense provide.[34]

William explains that whenever there is any doubt about appearances, the issue must be resolved by rational deliberation. Neither the obviously true nor the obviously false need to be

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[32] Glosae super Platonem, p. 230. Cf. ibid., pp. 218-19, 226, and 280; Philosophia, PL 172, 91B, and PL 90, 1171D; Dragmaticon, pp. 249-50; Glosae super Boetium 1. pr. 6.40; and Das Moralium dogma philosophorum, ed. John Holmberg (Uppsala, 1929), pp. 41-46. Similar statements are found in other Chartrians such as Bernard Silvestris, Commentary on Vergil 1.96, p. 20; and Compendium, ed. Ottaviano, p. 19.

[33] Dragmaticon, p. 69. Cf. ibid., pp. 142-43; Glosae super Platonem, p. 175.

[34] Glosae super Boetium 3. m. 11.3. Cf. John of Salisbury, Metalogicon 4.17, p. 183. One might interpret this passage as maintaining an implicit innatism, but see n. 15 above.

proved, but only those things which are in doubt.[35] In our deliberations about the natural world, we frequently must be content with probable arguments, since necessary arguments are often not possible.[36] William uses such probable arguments (argumenta probabila) to attack false opinions based solely on sense perception. For example, those who rely only on their senses think that the earth is flat because it seems so when they walk. But reason proves that the earth is round. For if the earth were flat, the waters of the earth would not be spread out as they are but would be pooled up like a lake. Furthermore, there would be neither the uniform daily change from sunrise to noon to sunset nor the appearance of different stars in different parts of the world.[37] Our senses would also lead us to think that it is warmer on the mountains which are nearer the sun, but it is in fact colder there because of the thinness of the air in

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[35]Philosophia mundi: Ausgabe des erstes Buchs von Wilhelm von Conches' "Philosophia" mit Anhang, Übersetzung und Anmerkungen, ed. Gregor Maurach (Pretoria, 1974), p. 19. Cf. PL 172, 49A-B, and PL 90, 1132D.

[36]Dragmaticon, p. 40. Cf. ibid., p. 23; Glosae super Platonem, pp. 115 and 281-84. William draws his concept of probable and necessary arguments from Plato, Timaeus a Calcidio 29c-d, p. 22; Boethius, In Isagogen 1.12, pp. 167-69; and Cicero, De inventione rhetorica 1.29.44, Loeb Classical Library, pp. 83-85. On the concept of probable and necessary reasons and the general development of dialectical reasoning through the twelfth century see especially A. M. Jacquin, "Les 'rationes necessarie' de Saint Anselme," in Mélanges Mandonnet: Études d'histoire littéraire et doctrinale du moyen âge, 2 vols., Bibliothèque thomiste, vol. 14 (Paris, 1930), 2:67-78; Pierre Michaud-Quantin, Études sur le vocabulaire philosophique du moyen âge (Rome, 1970), esp. pp. 59-72 and 216-19; and L. M. de Rijk, Logica modernorum: A Contribution to the History of Early Terminist Logic, 2 vols. (Assen, 1962-67), 2:95-125 and 177-234.

[37]Dragmaticon, pp. 213-16.

regions farther from the earth.[38]

William gives some of his most detailed considerations of the need to go beyond appearances in his discussion of heavenly phenomena. He cites three types of authorities who discuss the heavens. Fables tell stories explaining the configuration of the constellations. Astrology treats those things which appear to be, whether or not they really are. Astronomy treats the true structure of the heavens, whether or not it so appears.[39] In treating the heavens, William clearly concerns himself with an astronomical rather than astrological or fabulous study. He explains that the "fixed stars" are so called, not because they do not move, but because they do not seem to move. All motion is perceived by viewing a moving object in relation to an immobile or slower moving object. When such an immobile object is lacking, as with a ship moving through the sea, motion is not perceived. Since nothing is visible over the "fixed" stars, we are unable to observe their motion.[40] Similarly, in rejecting the view that a watery firmament exists above the sky, William argues that the watery-looking matter we think we see in the heavens is simply

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[38] Philosophia, PL 172, 87B-C, and PL 90, 1169A-B. For other examples see ibid., PL 172, 81B-82C, and PL 172, 77B-C; and Glosae super Platonem, p. 250.

[39] Dragmaticon, pp. 70-71. Cf. Philosophia, PL 172, 59A-B, and PL 90, 1140D-1141A; Glosae super Platonem, p. 138; Glosae super Boetium 1. m. 2.9; and John of Salisbury, Policraticus 2.18, vol. 1, pp. 106-7.

[40] Dragmaticon, pp. 87-88. Cf. Glosae super Platonem, p. 194; and Philosophia, PL 172, 59C-D, and PL 90, 1141A. William here follows Macrobius, Commentarii, p. 69.

due to a failure of our senses.[41] In these and other observations about the heavenly phenomena, William insists that the senses lead man to incorrect conclusions which only reason can correct.

William further describes reason's ability to go beyond the senses in terms of Boethius' statement that man's soul has the power to separate the joined and to join together the separated.[42] He utilizes this idea to explain his theory of elementum--elementatum. The true elements (elementa), which are the simple and minimal particles of matter, we perceive not with the sense of sight but only by reason. In the same way we speak of the divisions of the human body. Some of these divisions, such as the body into members and the members into organs, we can actually see. But the division of organs into humors and humors into elements we can never see but can only comprehend through reason.[43] John of Salisbury uses this favorite idea of his master's to explain Aristotle's opinion concerning

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[41] Dragmaticon, p. 70. Cf. Philosophia, PL 172, 58D, and PL 90, 1139C-D; and Thierry of Chartres, Tractatus de sex dierum operibus, in Commentaries on Boethius by Thierry of Chartres, p. 560. For further consideration of the failure of the senses in observing heavenly phenomena see Philosophia, PL 172, 65C-67A and 79C-D, and PL 90, 1147C-1150B and 1163B-C; and Dragmaticon, pp. 85-86 and 187-91.

[42] Philosophia, ed. Maurach, p. 20, PL 172, 49C, and PL 90, 1132D. Cf. Glosae super Platonem, pp. 129, 259, and 280; and Glosae super Boetium 5. pr. 3.18. The source of the quotation is Boethius, In Isagogen 1.11, p. 165.

[43] Glosae super Platonem, p. 129. Cf. Philosophia, ed. Maurach, p. 20, PL 172, 49A-B, and PL 90, 1132D.

genera and species. The mind conceives of genera and species by contemplating the form without the matter, although the former cannot exist apart from the latter:

> This is not opposed to the nature of things which has conferred on the intellect, for the purpose of the investigation of nature itself, the power to separate the joined and to join together the separated.[44]

William and John also describe reason as transcending the senses by moving from a comprehension of the visible universe to a comprehension of the invisible and immaterial. William says that if man had only his senses to guide him, he could believe only in the physical world; only through the use of reason can man come to a belief in the immortality of the soul.[45] John sees reason as the judge of spiritual and material things which can rise to the contemplation of heavenly things.[46]

Reason, for William and his fellow Chartrians, is the human power by which man surpasses the limits sense knowledge alone would place on man, but human reason also has limits. The Chartrians repeatedly make this observation, but with William in particular it seems tied explicitly or implicitly to the belief that reason, though limited, is still a viable power. Near the beginning of his Philosophia, William admits that although we know God to be, we do not know any of the ten Aristotelian categories as applied to God. He concludes, "therefore

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[44]John of Salisbury, Metalogicon 2.20, pp. 98-99.

[45]This is a constant theme in William. See for example Glosae super Macrobium (longer redaction) Prologue. Cf. Philosophia, ed. Maurach, p. 17, PL 172, 47D-48A, and PL 90, 1131B-C.

[46]John of Salisbury, Metalogicon 4.16, p. 182.

neither are we ignorant of everything about him whom we know to be, nor do we know perfectly him about whom we do not know the aforesaid things."[47] William, Thierry, and John all describe man's reason as a mere imitation of the only real reason, which is God's ("simulacrum rationis," id est imperfecta ratio).[48] This description of human reason as an image of divine reason recognizes the weakness of human reason in relation to divine reason, but at the same time it praises man's reason as the human power which most closely relates man to God. The Chartrians follow the traditional Christian theme of attributing the deficiency of man's reason to the debilitating effects of the body and of original sin. But the references to original sin are few, and the consequences seem serious rather than catastrophic. William explains that if the soul were not weighed down by the corrupted body, it would be able from infancy to have perfect knowledge just as the first parents did. But after the corruption, man, while retaining the power of understanding and reasoning, cannot exercise those powers without experience and without being aroused

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[47] Philosophia, ed. Maurach, p. 11, PL 172, 43C-44A, and PL 90, 1128C. Cf. Glosae super Platonem, pp. 113, 106, and 109; Dragmaticon, p. 31; Glosae super Macrobium (shorter redaction) 1.2.14, MS Bamberg, Staatl. Bibl. Class. 40, fol. 7vb, ed. Lemay, "Doctrine of the Trinity," pp. 127-28; School of Thierry of Chartres, Lectiones, pp. 121, 131, and 223; idem, Commentum, pp. 60 and 116; and idem, Abbreviatio monancensis, in ibid., pp. 317 and 396. William probably drew his knowledge of the Aristotelian categories from Boethius, in Categorias Aristotelis, PL 64, 159-61; and idem, De Trinitate 4, Loeb Classical Library, p. 16. On the application of the Aristotelian categories to God in the Middle Ages see Étienne Gilson, The Spirit of Mediaeval Philosophy, trans. A. H. C. Downes (New York, 1940), pp. 248-68; and Flatten, Wilhelm, pp. 87-88 and 170.

[48] Glosae super Platonem, p. 114. Cf. ibid., p. 106; School of Thierry of Chartres, Commentum, p. 58; and John of Salisbury, Metalogicon 2.20, p. 104.

by some teaching.[49]

The overall impression derived from the Chartrians' discussion of the limitations of man's rational capacities is not the weakness of man's reason but its strength. Weighed down by the body, original sin, and its own sin, man's soul cannot know God perfectly and cannot discern without learning and experience. But although human reason is limited, it remains a valid power. William explains that "'The wisdom of this world is folly to God' (1 Cor. 1:20) not because God regards the wisdom of this world as folly, but because it is folly in comparison to the wisdom of God; nevertheless, it does not therefore follow that it is folly."[50] William gives a similar interpretation to Vulcan's attempted rape of Pallas Athena:

> Vulcan desiring to lie with Pallas is like someone, from the fervor of his mental powers, aspiring to perfect wisdom. But Pallas resists because no one in this life is able to have perfect wisdom. But although Vulcan does not hold fast to Pallas, he produces semen because, even if someone may not have perfect wisdom, he may nevertheless acquire some [degree of wisdom].[51]

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[49] Dragmaticon, pp. 310-11. Cf. Glosae super Platonem, p. 213. On the debilitating effects of the body see Glosae super Platonem, p. 210; School of Thierry of Chartres, Glosa, p. 300; John of Salisbury, Metalogicon 4.33, p. 201. In contrast the monastic writers who were contemporary with the Chartrians placed a much greater emphasis on the debilitating effects of the fall. See for example St. Bernard of Clairvaux, De diversis, Sermo 12.2, in Opera, 6.1:128; Isaac de Stella, Epistola de anima 19, PL 194, 1886B-C; Hugh of St. Victor, De sacramentis 1.10, PL 176, 329-30; idem, De unione, PL 177, 292B-C; and William of St. Thierry, De natura corporis et animae, PL 180, 714C-717A. For further discussion and references to secondary literature see below, chap. 4.

[50] Philosophia, ed. Maurach, p. 18, PL 172, 48B, and PL 90, 1131C-D.

[51] Glosae super Platonem, p. 93. On the much less optimistic attitude toward reason of many monastic writers prior to and contemporary with William see above, chap. 1, n. 12.

William accepts man's rational capacities as limited but far from useless. And his praises of reason far surpass his criticisms in quantity and intensity.

The Chartrian paeans to reason, which appear most prominently in William, are numerous and diverse. A good example appears in William's gloss on Boethius' reference to the mind wandering in outer darkness, deprived of its proper light. William explains that reason and understanding are called light because they light man's way to knowledge of the creator and the creation. They are called proper light to differentiate them from the bodily light of the eyes which is not man's proper light, since it is common to many others.[52] By the use of this proper light, which the Chartrians also commonly refer to as the image of God in man, man can examine and come to an understanding of himself, the world, and God.[53] The Chartrians also all insist that through reason man can resist his vices and strengthen his virtues. Bernard Silvestris explains that reason and virtue work together since reason is the natural knowledge of behaving and virtue is the voluntary exercise of that knowledge.[54]

In glossing Plato's description of the soul, William explains that it is called "greatest" because through it man is

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[52] Glosae super Boetium 1. m. 2.2.

[53] See below, chap. 4, for the theme of man as the image of God.

[54] Bernard Silvestris, Commentary on Vergil 6.218, p. 64. For other statements on reason leading to virtue see ibid., pp. 66 and 75; William of Conches, Glosae super Platonem, pp. 252-54; idem, Glosae super Boetium 3. m. 12.34; and School of Thierry of Chartres, Commentum, p. 62.

similar to the creator, "best" because of reason and understanding, and "first" because it rules the body.[55] The Chartrians commonly refer to the appropriateness of wisdom's having its seat in the head since thereby the worthy powers of man, his reason and understanding, are located in the most worthy part of his body, his head.[56] While physically inferior to many other creatures, man excels all other terrestrial beings by his reason.[57] William perhaps most clearly reveals the high value he ascribes to reason in describing the relationship which should exist between teachers and pupils. He explains that a student should love his teacher like a father, or even more than he loves his father, because we ought to love him more from whom we receive greater and more worthy things. From our fathers we receive merely to be unformed (esse rude) but from our teachers to be wise, which is clearly greater and more worthy.[58]

Reason represents for William the natural power of man. That the soul should naturally have knowledge of all things is shown by the ease with which a youth, when he first begins to understand, commits to memory everything which he perceives, as

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[55]Glosae super Platonem, p. 248. Also see below, chap. 4.

[56]Glosae super Platonem, p. 74. Cf. ibid., pp. 207 and 233; Philosophia, PL 172, 95C, and PL 90, 1174D-1175A; Dragmaticon, pp. 269-70; Glosae super Boetium 1. pr. 1.3; John of Salisbury, Metalogicon 4.17, p. 183; idem, Policraticus, 4.1, vol. 1, p. 235; Bernard Silvestris, Commentary on Vergil 3.1, pp. 245-46.

[57]John of Salisbury, Metalogicon 1.1, p. 5. Cf. ibid., 1.7 and 4.17, pp. 23 and 182-83; and William of Conches, Glosae super Platonem, pp. 101-2.

[58]Philosophia, PL 172, 100A-B, and PL 90, 1178A-B. Cf. Glosae super Macrobium (longer redaction) 1.1.1.

if rejoicing in his true nature.[59] William provides lengthy glosses of the celestial imagery of Boethius' Consolatio to show that the rational life is the only one appropriate for man. Reason and understanding are like the sun because as it lights the world, so do they light the way for man. And just as the sun hides when Corus (the northwest wind) brings in clouds, so reason and understanding hide when adversity brings in sorrow. And just as when the sun is in eclipse an unnatural night spreads over the earth, so when reason and understanding are absent by some chance, an ignorance that is not natural but blameworthy appears in man.[60] William explains in the same terms the line, "Stars hidden by black clouds send down no light." Just as the stars illuminate what is under them and shine naturally unless clouds get in the way, so reason and understanding illuminate man and shine naturally unless some temporal effect gets in the way.[61] William views reason as a natural power through whose use man attains his greatest potential. Reason, man's highest power, relates him to God and raises him above the other creatures.

William's advocacy of the use of reason in conjunction with areas traditionally allotted to the domain of faith most

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[59] Glosae super Platonem, pp. 96-97.

[60] Glosae super Boetium 1. m. 3.3-5. The text that he is explaining is Consolatio 1. m. 3.3-5, p. 136: "Ut, cum praecipiti glomerantur sidera Coro / Nimbosisque polus stetit imbribus, / Sol latet ac nondum caelo venientibus astris."

[61] Glosae super Boetium 1. m. 7.1. For other references to the analogy of the heavens to man see ibid., 3. m. 9.19; Glosae super Macrobium (longer redaction) 1.8.204; and below, chap. 4.

clearly reveals the power he ascribes to reason. In confessing his faith in the Dragmaticon William does indeed say, "We believe these things, some confirmed by human reason, some even if they are against human reason."[62] But the import and emphasis of the Chartrian writings, as of Abelard's, is to expand the use of reason. William seeks to delineate the supremacy of reason in the field of natural science. He says that modern divines attack his examinations of nature because they do not find what he says written in the books of the Church Fathers. They do not understand that the authors of divine things are generally silent about the nature of things, not because such explanations are against the faith but because they do not pertain to the edification of faith, which is their subject.[63] William affirms that it is not permissible to contradict the holy Fathers in those things which pertain to the faith or the teaching of morals. But in the field of philosophy, it is permissible to contradict them, for while they were greater they were still men.[64] Gilbert similarly explains that reason follows faith in the field of theology, but faith follows reason in natural science.[65] But while subscribing to the priority of faith in theological matters, the Chartrians at the same time apply reason to areas which their

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[62]Dragmaticon, p. 12. Cf. Glosae super Platonem, p. 76.

[63]Glosae super Boetium 3. m. 9.5.

[64]Dragmaticon, pp. 65-66.

[65]Gilbert Porreta, The Commentaries on Boethius, p. 164. For an examination of Gilbert's view of the domain of reason see Elswijk, esp. pp. 226-29.

contemporaries and predecessors view as the domain of faith. William, Thierry, and Gilbert all attempt rational explanations of the Trinity, and the first two combine the Biblical and Platonic accounts of creation with a heavily rational emphasis. The Chartrians clearly believe, "It is not absurd to offer philosophical reason to confirm and maintain the faith."[66] They are convinced that true reason and true faith must be in accord; consequently, all matters of faith as well as natural science, to the extent they are accessible to human reason, ought to be proved.

Their monastic contemporaries, with their much narrower view of the areas appropriate for rational examination, saw much of the Chartrian writing as empty curiosity, undue reliance on reason, and heresy. They launched a barrage of criticism against William of Conches, Gilbert Porreta, and Thierry of Chartres, and

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[66] School of Thierry of Chartres, Lectiones, p. 141. Cf. Abbreviatio monacensis, p. 326. On the Chartrians' rational explanation of the Trinity and the creation of the world see below, chap. 4. On the belief in the concordance of faith and reason and in the large areas of faith accessible to rational proof for the Chartrians, see Elswijk, pp. 226-43; Parent, pp. 18-25; Flatten, Wilhelm, pp. 32-40; Pierre Duhem, Le système du monde, 10 vols. (Paris, 1913-59) 3:93-100; Reginald Lane Poole, Illustrations of the History of Medieval Thought and Learning, 2nd rev. ed. (London, 1920), pp. 176-86; Marie-Dominique Chenu, "Nature and Man--The Renaissance of the Twelfth Century," in Nature, Man, and Society in the Twelfth Century, ed. and trans. Jerome Taylor and Lester K. Little (Chicago, 1968), pp. 1-48; Raymond Klibansky, "The School of Chartres," in Twelfth-Century Europe and the Foundations of Modern Society, ed. Marshall Clagett, Gaines Pose, and Robert Reynolds (Madison, 1961), pp. 3-14; Édouard Jeauneau, "Mathématiques et Trinité chez Thierry de Chartres," in Die Metaphysik im Mittelalter: Ihr Ursprung und ihre Bedeutung, Miscellanea mediaevalia, Band 2 (Berlin, 1963), pp. 289-95; and idem, "Note sur l'École de Chartres," SM, 3rd ser., 5 (1964):821-65.

succeeded in obtaining the condemnation of Abelard's writings.[67] The Chartrians were just as vituperative in their criticism of their opponents' lack of learning. William directs some of his criticism against those who, without adequate study or proper understanding of their subject, "usurp the name of master."[68] But most of his criticism aims clearly at those who criticize philosophic views without having studied the liberal arts. He strongly attacks those who, in order to cover up their ignorance of the use of integumentum, dismiss parts of Boethius as unworthy

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[67]For examples of this criticsm see William of St. Thierry, De erroribus Guillelmi de Conchis, PL 180, 33-40; idem, Disputatio adversus Petrum Abaelardum, PL 180, 249-82; Bernard of Clairvaux, Tractatus de erroribus Abaelardi, PL 182, 1053-72; idem, De consideratione 2.3.6, in Opera, 3:414-15; Hugh of St. Victor, In Pentateuchon, PL 175, 33B; idem, De sacramentis 1.1, PL 176, 187B; and Walter of St. Victor, Contra quatuor labyrinthos Franciae, ed. P. Glorieux, AHDLMA 19 (1955):187-355. For a discussion of this monastic opposition and of the conflict between the two groups see Jean Leclercq, The Spirituality of the Middle Ages, trans. the Benedictines of Holmes Eden Abbey, A History of Christian Spirituality, 3 vols. (London, 1963-69), 2:187-204; A. Hayen, "Le concile de Reims et l'erreur théologique de Gilbert de la Porrée," AHDLMA 10-11 (1935-36):29-102; Poole, Thought and Learning, pp. 146-75; Jean Leclercq, "Textes sur saint Bernard et Gilbert de la Porrée," MS 14 1952):107-28; Nikolaus M. Häring, "The Case of Gilbert de la Porrée," MS 13 (1951):1-40; Martin Grabmann, Die Geschichte der scholastischen Methoden, 2 vols. (Freiburg, 1909-11), 2:104-8; Raymond Klibansky, "Peter Abailard and Bernard of Clairvaux: A Letter by Abailard," Mediaeval and Renaissance Studies 5 (1961):1-27; A. V. Murray, Abelard and St. Bernard (Manchester, 1967); Leif Grane, Peter Abelard, trans. Frederick Crowley and Christine Crowley (London, 1970), pp. 134-41; Jerome Taylor, Introduction to The Didascalicon of Hugh of St. Victor (New York, 1961), pp. 16-19 and 34-37; and Étienne Gilson, The Mystical Theology of Saint Bernard, trans. A. H. C. Downes (London, 1940), pp. 64-66.

[68]Philosophia, ed. Maurach, p. 8, PL 172, 43A, and PL 90, 1127A. Cf. Philosophia, PL 172, 57B, and PL 90, 1139D-1140A; Dragmaticon, pp. 62-64, 80, and 210-21; and School of Thierry of Chartres, Commentarius victorinus, in Commentaries on Boethius by Thierry of Chartres, pp. 494 and 501.

of explication.[69] His greatest ire is raised against those who, themselves ignorant of nature, want no one to inquire into such things, so that they might have companions in their ignorance. Having more confidence in their monkish cowls than in their wisdom, they call anyone they find investigating the powers of nature a heretic.[70]

In his Dragmaticon, written after the condemnation of Abelard's writings and after strong criticism had forced him to retract some of his earlier statements, William laments the current state of the Church where the care of souls is committed to children and fools ignorant of what a soul is.[71] In these passages William clearly attacks those monastic writers who condemned his writings without having themselves studied natural philosophy. In much the same way, Gilbert rebuffed Bernard's request for a meeting to discuss theology by telling him first to seek further instructions in the liberal arts and other preliminary studies.[72] And in a passage which strongly recalls some of William's criticism of his opponents, John of Salisbury attacks the Cornificians, who insanely prefer to remain foolish than to learn from the humble, who do enjoy the gift of God's grace. He concludes, "If you do not believe me, enter the cloister and

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[69]Glosae super Boetium 3. pr. 12.5.

[70]Philosophia, ed. Maurach, pp. 32-33, PL 172, 56B-D, and PL 90, 1138B-D.

[71]Dragmaticon, p. 158.

[72]John of Salisbury, Historia pontificalis, ed. and trans. Marjorie Chibnall, Nelson Medieval Texts (London, 1956), p. 26.

examine the conduct of the brothers."[73]

William of Conches gives by far the most detailed statement of the Chartrian view of the proper areas for rational examination. He defends himself against charges of heresy by arguing that something is heretical not because it has not been written before, but if it is against the faith.[74] William directly attacks the view of his monastic contemporaries that it suffices to explain something to say God could have done it:

> But I know what they will say, "We do not know how this might be, but we know God could have done it." Miserable creatures! What is more miserable than to say something exists simply because God is able to make it and not to see how it exists, nor to have any reason why it exists, nor to show any use for which it exists. For God does not make everything he is able to make. As the peasant is accustomed to say, "God can make a calf from a tree trunk. Has he ever done it?" Let them either show a reason or use for which it exists, or let them cease declaring it exists in such a fashion.[75]

William offers an eloquent defense for the expanded use of reason based on his exposition of the directions for conducting Passover in Exodus 12. He explains that just as the Israelites were supposed to call in their neighbors to assist them with eating the Passover lamb, so should man ask the help of all his neighbors in seeking a rational explanation of things. And just as only the parts of the lamb which no one could consume should be burnt as

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[73]John of Salisbury, Metalogicon 1.4, pp. 12-13.

[74]Philosophia, ed. Maurach, p. 15, PL 172, 46C, and PL 90, 1130C. Cf. John of Salisbury, Historia, pp. 17 and 21-22.

[75]Philosophia, PL 172, 58C, and PL 90, 1139D-1140C. See text in appendix C., below. Cf. Dragmaticon, pp. 68-69; and Glosae super Boetium 3. m. 9.5.

an offering, so only those things for which no one can find a rational explanation should be consigned to the realm of faith.[76]

The theme that reasons ought to be sought for everything possible runs throughout the inquiries of William and the other Chartrians. Their works represent essentially the search for a rational explanation. Their optimism about what reason can accomplish places them at the forefront of the rational examination of theological, philosophical, and scientific topics in the twelfth century. Since William, followed by a few of the other Chartrians, insists that all knowledge derives directly or indirectly from sense perception, the logical object for his rational inquiries was the natural world. William consistently focused his attention on natural philosophy in an attempt to comprehend rationally the creation, structure, and function of the natural world.

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[76] Philosophia, ed. Maurach, p. 32, PL 172, 56C, and PL 90, 1138C-D.

Chapter IV

GOD, NATURE, AND MAN

Relying on the wisdom of their ancient authorities and on the validity of rational inquiry, William of Conches and his fellow Chartrians devoted their energies to a thorough consideration of the world and man. The Chartrians were in general much less concerned with theology than were their monastic contemporaries and, with the exception of Gilbert Porreta, occupied themselves much more with the arts. William, who shows even less theological interest than his fellow Chartrians, was described by himself and his associates as a grammarian and natural philosopher rather than as a theologian.[1] His theological

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[1]John of Salisbury describes William as "grammaticus post Bernardum Carnotensem opulentissimus," Metalogicon 1.5, ed. Clement C. J. Webb (Oxford, 1929), pp. 16-17. William of St. Thierry refers to him as "homo physicus et philosophus," in De erroribus Guillelmi de Conchis, PL 180, 339A. William similarly calls himself "physicus" in his Glosae super Priscianum, MS Paris, Bibl. nat. lat. 15130, fol. 125rb, cited by Édouard Jeauneau, "Note sur l'École de Chartres," SM, 3rd ser., 5 (1964):851. William's lack of theological interest is commented on by Heinrich Flatten, Die Philosophie des Wilhelm von Conches (Coblenz, 1929), p. 175; Helen E. Rodnite [Lemay], "The Doctrine of the Trinity in Guillaume de Conches' Glosses on Macrobius: Texts and Studies (Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1973), pp. 50-51; and Heinrich Schipperges, "Die Schulen von Chartres unter dem Einfluss des Arabismus," SAGM, o.s., 40 (1956):204. But for a contrary view see M. Carol Sullivan, "The Concept of Man in the Twelfth-Century Humanism of Chartres" (Ph.D. dissertation, Loyola University of Chicago, 1967), esp. pp. 83-91. Sullivan emphasizes the Chartrians' spirituality, but without offering any convincing evidence. Thierry of Chartres is also described as other than a theologian. John of Salisbury calls him "artium

inquiries normally appear in conjunction with and as a continuation of his treatment of nature and man, especially in terms of the creation of the world. William's discussions of God, nature, and man and his analysis of their relationship to one another provide significant insight into his view of man.

Even the Trinitarian speculation of William and Thierry, though not of Gilbert, is closely connected with their study of nature and the creation. Drawing on Boethius and perhaps on Augustine and the Pseudo-Dionysius, William emphasizes the unity of God and identifies each person of the Trinity with unity. He explains that whatever is in God is God and that while there is a trinity of persons, there is a unity of being.[2] But from this

studiossissimus investigator," in Metalogicon 1.5, p. 16. And an epitaph refers to him as "dignus Aristotelis successor Teodoricus," ed. André Vernet, "Une épitaphe inédite de Thierry de Chartres," in Recueil des travaux offert à M. Clovis Brunel, 2 vols. (Paris, 1955), 2:669.

All of the Chartrians were involved in the arts much more than their monastic contemporaries. On the differences in the orientation of the monks and the schoolmen see especially Philippe Delhaye, "'Grammatica' et 'Ethica' au XII^{e} siècle," RTAM 25 (1958):59-110; Marie-Dominique Chenu, "Platon à Citeaux," AHDLMA 21 (1954):99-106; Jean Leclercq and François Vandenbroucke, The Spirituality of the Middle Ages, trans. the Benedictines of Holmes Eden Abbey, A History of Christian Spirituality, ed. Louis Bouyer et al., 3 vols. (London, 1963-69), 2:127-282; François Vandenbroucke, Pour l'histoire de la théologie morale: la morale monastique du XI^{e} au XVI^{e} siècle, Analecta mediaevalia namurcensia, vol. 20 (Louvain, 1966), pp. 70-155; Jerome Taylor, Introduction to The Didascalicon of Hugh of St. Victor (New York, 1961), p. 21; Jean Châtillon, "Les écoles de Chartres et de Saint-Victor," XIX Settimana di studio, 2 vols. (Spoleto, 1972), 2:795-804; and above chap. 1, n. 16.

[2]Glosae super Macrobium (longer redaction) 1.6.8; also ed. Lemay, "Doctrine of the Trinity," pp. 172-76; and Glosae super Platonem, ed. Édouard Jeauneau, Textes philosophiques du moyen âge, vol. 13 (Paris, 1965), p. 278. Cf. Philosophia mundi: Ausgabe des erstes Buchs von Wilhelm von Conches' "Philosophia" mit Anhang, Übersetzung und Anmerkungen, ed. Gregor Maurach (Pretoria, 1974), p. 14, PL 172, 45D, and PL 90, 1130A; Glosae super Boetium 3. pr. 10.89-90; and Glosae super Macrobium (shorter redaction) 1.6.7, MS Bamberg, Staatl. Bibl. Class. 40, fol. 7v,

basically traditional account of the unity of God, William and Thierry, believing in man's ability to comprehend at least partially the nature of God, proceed to a rational explanation of the Trinity drawn from God's creative activity. Bringing together Christian and Platonic thought, William identifies the Demiurge

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ed. Lemay, "Doctrine of the Trinity," pp. 165-66. For similar descriptions of God's unity by other Chartrians see for example Gilbert Porreta, The Commentaries on Boethius by Gilbert of Poitiers, ed. Nikolaus M. Häring, Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, Studies and Texts, vol. 13 (Toronto, 1966), pp. 86, 89, and 199-201; Thierry of Chartres, Tractatus de sex dierum operibus, ed. Nikolaus M. Häring, in Commentaries on Boethius by Thierry of Chartres and His School, Pontifical Institue of Mediaeval Studies, Studies and Texts, vol. 20 (Toronto, 1971), pp. 568-70; School of Thierry of Chartres, Glosa, ed. Häring, in ibid., p. 271; idem, Lectiones, ed. Häring, in ibid., p. 174; idem, Commentum, ed. Häring, in ibid., p. 75; idem, Abbreviatio monacensis, ed. Häring, in ibid., p. 448; idem, Commentarius victorinus, ed. Haring, in ibid., p. 502; and Bernard Silvestris, Cosmographia (De mundi universitate) 2.13, ed. Carl S. Barach and Johann Wrobel (Innsbruck, 1876), p. 61.

The doctrine of the unity of God was of course common to the Church Fathers and writers throughout the Middle Ages. Possible sources for the Chartrians' doctrine are Boethius, De Trinitate 3, Loeb Classical Library, p. 12; Augustine, De Trinitate 1.6, Corpus christianorum, series latina, vol. 50 (Turnhout, 1968), pp. 37-44; and Isidore of Seville, Etymologiae 7.1.26, PL 82, 262C. Numerous studies deal specifically with the trinitarian views of the Chartrians or make significant remarks about them within a broader study. See especially Lemay, "Doctrine of the Trinity," pp. 38-72; Michael E. Williams, The Teaching of Gilbert Porreta on the Trinity, Analecta gregoriana, vol. 56 (Rome, 1951); Anneliese Stollenwerk, Der Genesiskommentar Thierrys von Chartres und die Thierry von Chartres zugeschriebenen Kommentare zu Boethius 'De Trinitate' (Cologne, 1971), esp. pp. 49-73; Tullio Gregory, Anima mundi: la filosofia di Guglielmo di Conches e la scuola di Chartres (Florence, 1955), pp. 106-21; Édouard Jeauneau, "Mathematiques et Trinité chez Thierry de Chartres," in Die Metaphysik in Mittelalter: Ihr Uhrsprung und ihre Bedeutung, Miscellanea mediaevalia, Band 2 (Berlin, 1963), pp. 289-95; idem, "Un représentant du platonisme au XII^{e} siècle: Maître Thierry de Chartres," Mémoires de la Société archéologique d'Eure-et-Loir 20 (1954-57):1-12; Nikolaus M. Häring, "The Lectures of Thierry of Chartres on Boethius' De Trinitate," AHDLMA 25 (1958):113-23; idem, "Two Commentaries on Boethius' (De Trinitate and De Hebdomadibus) by Thierry of Chartres," AHDLMA 27 (1960):65-79; Flatten, Wilhelm, pp. 179-84; and J. M. Parent, La doctrine de la création dans l'école de Chartres, Publications de l'Institut d'études médiévales d'Ottawa, vol. 8 (Paris, 1938), pp. 69-81.

of the Timaeus with the Creator of Genesis, and the four causes of the world (efficient, formal, final, and material) with divine power (essentia), divine wisdom (sapientia), divine goodness or will (bonitas or voluntas), and the four elements respectively. Each of these causes is essential for the creation, and the first three are identifiable with the three persons of the Trinity. In God there is, therefore, power, wisdom, and goodness, which are metaphorically called the three persons: the Father designating power, the Son wisdom, and the Holy Spirit goodness.[3] These identifications, while foreign to Church tradition and contemporary monastic writers, were very common among those with Chartrian connections and have been the object of considerable discussion about their originator.[4]

These speculations about the Trinity are brief, but they are significant for what they reveal of Chartrian thought. First of all, William's identification of the Demiurge of the Timaeus with the Creator of Genesis and his efforts to reconcile the

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[3]Glosae super Platonem, p. 98; and Philosophia, ed. Maurach, p. 14, PL 172, 44D-45A, and PL 90, 1129C. Cf. Compendium philosophie, ed. Carmelo Ottaviano, in Un brano inedito della "Philosophia" di Guglielmo di Conches (Naples, 1935), p. 111.

[4]See for example Thierry of Chartres, De sex dierum operibus 2-3, pp. 555-56; Peter Abelard, Theologia 'Summi boni', ed. H. Ostlender, in Peter Abelards Theologia "Summi boni" zum ersten Male vollständig herausgegeben, BGPTM, Band 35 (Münster, 1939), pp. 3-4; John of Salisbury, Policraticus 7.5, ed. Clement C. J. Webb, 2 vols. (Oxford, 1909), 2:108. Most critics have followed William of St. Thierry, De erroribus Guillelmi de Conchis, PL 180, 333A, in crediting Abelard with originating this identification. See for example Reginald Lane Poole, Illustrations of the History of Mediaeval Thought and Learning, 2nd rev. ed. (London, 1920), p. 107; Parent, pp. 70-81; Gregory, Anima, pp. 106-21; and Brian Stock, "Hugh of St. Victor, Bernard Silvester and MS Trinity College, Cambridge, 0.7.7," MS 34 (1972):155. But Stollenwerk, pp. 6-8, argues that Thierry is a more likely source.

Platonic and Christian descriptions of the Creator indicate the importance he attached to Plato as an almost sacred authority. While contemporaries rejected Plato because he contradicted the Bible, William and Thierry viewed the two authorities as completely compatible.[5] Second, explaining the Trinity in terms of its creative activity rather than its internal nature reveals the focus of Chartrian thought. William and Thierry directed their attention toward an investigation of the natural world rather than toward inward contemplation because the world, which came from and reflects God, is the only source of information about God. Finally, by attempting a rational explanation of the Trinity, the Chartrians declared their confidence in reason and aroused the opposition of their monastic contemporaries. William, in a slap at possible critics of such an explanation, said that Isaiah 53:8, "Who will explain his birth?," does not mean it cannot be explained but that it is difficult.[6] Thierry and Gilbert likewise defended the possibility of rationally explaining the Trinity,[7] but the monks strongly criticized the Chartrians'

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[5]For rejection of the identification of Plato's Demiurge with the Creator of Genesis, see for example Hugh of St. Victor, Adnotationes elucidatoriae in Pentateuchon, PL 175, 33; and Peter Lombard, Sententiae 2.1.1, Spicilegium Bonaventurianum, vol. 4, 1 tome to date (Grottaferrata, 1971), 1.2:330. For a discussion see Joseph Moreau, "'Opifex, id est Creator': Remarques sur le platonisme de Chartres," AGP 56 (1974):33-49.

[6]Philosophia, ed. Maurach, p. 13, PL 172, 45A-B, and PL 90, 1129C-D. Cf. Glosae super Platonem, pp. 113-14; and Dragmaticon (Dialogus de substantiis physicis), ed. Guilielmus Gratarolus (Strasbourg, 1567), pp. 6-7. In the latter William of Conches, under attack from William of St. Thierry, retracts his earlier interpretation of the Biblical passage.

[7]Gilbert Porreta, Commentaries on Boethius, pp. 61-62; and Thierry of Chartres, De sex dierum operibus 2, pp. 555-56.

Trinitarian and other theological doctrines, in which they felt a vested interest. Bernard of Clairvaux described the Trinity as a great mystery which should not be scrutinized, and William of St. Thierry viewed any such explanation as insane and blasphemous.[8]

Indicative of the extent of their interest in the world and man, a much greater proportion of the Chartrians' work was devoted to explaining God's creation of the natural world than to discussing the nature of the Trinity. Bernard of Chartres apparently established a framework for Chartrian inquiry into the creation with his acceptance of Eriugena's description of the divine ideas. According to John of Salisbury, Bernard taught that the divine ideas were in the divine mind and were eternal but not co-eternal with God.[9] William, like many other Chartrians, follows Bernard's location of the ideas in God's mind, but he does not follow Bernard's description of them as eternal but not co-eternal with God.[10]

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[8]Bernard of Clairvaux, De consideratione 5.18.18, ed. Jean Leclercq, C. H. Talbot, and H. M. Rochais, in Sancti Bernardi opera, 7 vols. to date (Rome, 1957-), 3:482; William of St. Thierry, De erroribus Guillelmi de Conchis, PL 180, 334D-335A. See above chap. 1, n. 12. on monastic criticism of human reason.

[9]Since no writings of Bernard of Chartres survive, we must rely on John's account of Bernard's theory of the divine ideas in Metalogicon 4.35, pp. 205-7. For Bernard's probable source for these views see John Scotus Eriugena, Periphyseon 2.20-21, ed. and trans. I. P. Sheldon-Williams, Scriptores latini Hiberniae, vol. 9, 2 vols. to date (Dublin, 1972), 2:66-84.

[10]William's clearest statements on the co-eternity of the divine ideas with God occur in Glosae super Platonem, pp. 99 and 278; and Philosophia, ed. Maurach, p. 14, PL 172, 45B-D, and PL 90, 1129B-C. I follow Parent, pp. 45-49, in viewing William as making the ideas co-eternal with God, but for an opposing interpretation see Flatten, Wilhelm, p. 122. William shows little

He insists that in the beginning unity, i.e. God, existed by itself and that from this unity came all the multiplicity of the universe. The divine mind, which William identifies with the Son, is called the archetype of the world because in it are contained the forms of all things. God had the forms of all things in his mind from eternity because he provided from eternity which form would agree with which thing. Some of these forms are of genera, some of species, and some of individuals.[11] Just

interest in the universals controversy, and efforts to delineate his precise position are bound to be conditional at best.

[11] Glosae super Macrobium (shorter redaction) 1.2.14, MS Bamberg, Staatl. Bibl. Class. 40, fol. 7v, ed. Lemay, "Doctrine of the Trinity," pp. 125-26: "Idea in greco forma vel figura dicitur in latino. Ideas vero omnium rerum deus in mente ab eterno habuit quia providit ab eterno que forma cui rei conveniret. Sed idearum quedam sunt generales, quedam speciales, quedam individuales. . . . Sic ergo volumus deum habere in mente formas omnium rerum, under Plato in Thimeo mentem divinam archetipum mundum vocavit. Originales species rerum quia ab illis oriuntur et habent omnia esse." Cf. Glosae super Platonem, pp. 99, 126, 192, and 278; Philosophia mundi, ed. Maurach, p. 14, PL 172, 45-46, and PL 90, 1129-30; and Dragmaticon, p. 145. Similar statements appear frequently in William's colleagues and students. See for example Thierry of Chartres, De sex dierum operibus 3, p. 556; School of Thierry of Chartres, Lectiones, 2.42-48, pp. 168-70; idem, Glosa, 2.30-43, pp. 275-78; Gilbert Porreta, Commentaries on Boethius, pp. 81-82; Compendium, ed. Ottaviano, pp. 40-41; and John of Salisbury, Metalogicon 4.35, pp. 205-7. The Chartrians developed their theory of divine ideas in an effort to reconcile the Christian doctrine of the Trinity with the Platonic account of the creation, especially Timaeus a Calcidio 52, ed. J. H. Waszink, in Timaeus a Calcidio translatus commentarioque instructus, Corpus platonicum medii aevi, Plato latinus, vol. 4 (London, 1962), pp. 50-51. Probable influences include Chalcidius, Commentarius in Timaeum Platonis 29, 329-30, and 341-42, in ibid., pp. 79, 323-24, and 334-35; Boethius, De Trinitate 2, pp. 8-12; Macrobius, Commentarii in Somnium Scipionis 1.2.14, ed. James Willis, Bibliotheca scriptorum graecorum et romanorum (Leipzig, 1970), pp. 6-7; Augustine, In Johannis Evangelicum 1.17, Corpus christianorum, series latina, vol. 36 (Turnhout, 1954), pp. 27-28; and idem, De diversis quaestionibus 83.46, PL 40, 29-30. For further discussion of Chartrian conceptions of divine ideas, see Parent, pp. 44-48; Flatten, Wilhelm, pp. 92-96; Gregory, Anima, pp. 68-78; Robert Javelet, Image et ressemblance au douzième siècle de St. Anselme à Alain de Lille, 2 vols. (Paris, 1967), 1:102-10; and Stollenwerk, pp. 37-38 and 83-101. For some

as a carpenter visualizes something in his mind before he makes it, so God, before he created anything, had the idea or form of it in his mind.[12] The archetype of the world containing the forms of all things has existed as the unity of God from eternity and is the truest reality. From this true reality come the images and likenesses of reality which constitute the world and are our only source of knowledge.

William describes the sensible world as made in the image (imago) and likeness (simulacrum) of its archetype, the divine mind. Just as "likeness" is said properly of pictures and "image" of statues, so the sensible world is called "likeness" of the archetype insofar as it contains spirits, and it is called "image" insofar as it contains bodies.[13] A writer of the School of Thierry of Chartres explains that things in the sensible world can never equal the truth (veritas) in the divine mind, for the things of the created world always remain imperfect copies. Just as a circle made in the mud or water can never be a perfect circle because of the flux of matter, so all likenesses of the divine mind, since they are united with matter, will always fall

discussion of Plato's theory of ideas see Harry Austryn Wolfson, "The Logos and the Platonic Ideas," in The Philosophy of the Church Fathers, vol. 1: Faith, Trinity, Incarnation, 3rd rev. ed. (Cambridge, Mass., 1970), pp. 257-86; and idem, "Extradeical and Intradeical Interpretations of Platonic Ideas," in Religious Philosophy: A Group of Essays (Cambridge, Mass., 1961), pp. 27-68.

[12] Glosae super Platonem, p. 99. Cf. Glosae super Boetium 3. m. 9.5; Glosae super Macrobium (shorter redaction) 1.2.14, MS Bamberg, Staatl. Bibl. Class. 40, fol. 7v, ed. Lemay, "Doctrine of the Trinity," p. 126.

[13] Glosae super Platonem, pp. 266-67. Cf. ibid., pp. 99 and 106.

short of their archetype or "truth."[14] But although only a copy of reality, everything which exists does bear some resemblance to God. And the creation as a whole, termed so frequently universitas by the Chartrians, reflects the divine mind on which it is based.[15] Man can know only the images of the divine mind united with matter, not the archetype itself; but the status of the world as a reflection of the divine mind makes the reality of the latter accessible to man by means of an investigation of the sensible world.

The Chartrians naturally view the matter which is united with the reflections of the divine mind and makes up the sensible world as created from nothing. William says: "The Creator is prior to everything for everything receives its existence from him and he from nothing."[16] They interpret Plato as agreeing

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[14] Lectiones, p. 161. Cf. William of Conches, Glosae super Platonem, pp. 112-15.

[15] Glosae super Macrobium (longer redaction) 1.6.8, also ed. Lemay, "Doctrine of the Trinity," pp. 172-76. For a discussion of the importance of this theme in William and the other Chartrians see Winthrop Wetherbee, Platonism and Poetry in the Twelfth Century (Princeton, 1972), pp. 4, 16-17, 31-32, and 172-73. For use of the term universitas and the idea of the world as a whole see Glosae super Platonem, pp. 103, 110, 206-7, 213, 252, and 254; Glosae super Boetium 3. m. 9.1, also ed. Parent, p. 124; Glosae super Macrobium (longer redaction) 1.8.4, MS Vatican, Urb. Lat. fol. 59v, also cited by Jeauneau, Glosae, p. 103. On the use of the term universitas see Marie-Dominique Chenu, "Nature and Man--The Renaissance of the Twelfth Century," in Nature, Man, and Society in the Twelfth Century, ed. & trans. Jerome Taylor and Lester K. Little (Chicago, 1968), pp. 5-8; and Pierre Michaud-Quantin, Universitas: Expressions du mouvement communautaire dans le moyen âge latin, L'église et l'état au moyen âge, vol. 13 (Paris, 1970), esp. pp. 11-57.

[16] Philosophia, ed. Maurach, p. 10, PL 172, 43C, and PL 90, 1127C. Cf. Philosophia, PL 172, 98C, and PL 90, 1177A; Dragmaticon, p. 27; Glosae super Platonem, p. 111; and Thierry of Chartres, De sex dierum operibus 31, p. 568. For critical discussion of

with them and Christian tradition on the creation of matter. According to William, Plato ascribes to God the creation of all matter from nothing. Similarly, when the ancients said the world never began, they did not deny that the world began but that it began in time. The world for Plato and Aristotle, as for Augustine, began with time.[17] Believing firmly in the sacredness of both the Bible and Plato, William consistently interprets them as in agreement.

The prime matter, which God created from nothing, has no form and quality of its own but is able to receive the forms and qualities of all things. Everything is able to be composed from it because it becomes whatever form it has received.[18] From prime matter, also called hyle, a thing is made to be, but from its form it is made to be what it is. For a statue is not called a statue of Achilles because it is made from copper but because it is imprinted in his form.[19] Prime matter is able to be understood by itself but it is not able to exist by itself. God simultaneously created both the prime matter and the elements

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the Chartrian views on creation from nothing see Parent, pp. 40-43 and 95-107; Flatten, Wilhelm, pp. 122-26; Gregory, Anima, pp. 189-97; Jeauneau, "Maître Thierry," pp. 80-83; Moreau, pp. 40-48; and George Economou, The Goddess Natura in Medieval Literature (Cambridge, Mass., 1972), pp. 34-47.

[17] Glosae super Platonem, pp. 104 and 180. Cf. ibid., pp. 108 and 176-81; and School of Thierry of Chartres, Lectiones, p. 163. But the author of the Commentum, p. 77, says that Plato erred in holding that matter was not created by God.

[18] Glosae super Platonem, pp. 168-69 and 258.

[19] Ibid., p. 261.

which are composed from prime matter joined with form.[20]

William explains that the elements--pure earth, water, air, and fire--are the simple and minimal particles of which all bodies are formed. Unlike prime matter, the elements have their own distinct forms and qualities, but like prime matter, they are unable to exist by themselves. Although they cannot exist by themselves, these elements, when mixed with one another, are present in the composition of all bodies. Visible earth, water, air, and fire, which are also commonly called elements, are each composed of a combination of these four simple elements and are named after the element which dominates in their make-up. If we wanted to use a more precise terminology, we would call the simple particles elements (elementa) and the four bodies which are seen, elemented things (elementata).[21] William accepts the

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[20]Ibid., pp. 259-60. The primary sources for William's concept of prime matter are Plato, Timaeus a Calcidio, 47e-51a, pp. 45-49; and Chalcidius, Commentarius, esp. 268-345, pp. 273-338. On Chalcidius' doctrine of prime matter see especially J. Reginald O'Donnell, "The Meaning of Silva in the Commentary on the Timaeus of Plato by Chalcidius," MS 7 (1945):1-20; and J. C. M. van Winden, Calcidius on Matter: His Doctrine and Sources, Philosophia antiqua, vol. 9 (Leyden, 1959), esp. pp. 143-203. For examples of other Chartrians' concept of prime matter see Thierry of Chartres, De sex dierum operibus 24-26, pp. 565-66; School of Thierry of Chartres, Commentum, pp. 84-85; idem, Glosa, pp. 272-75; and Bernard Silvestris, Cosmographia, pp. 7-11. On the Chartrians' doctrine of prime matter see Gregory, Anima, pp. 189-201. The theme is also treated by Heinrich Flatten, "Die materia primordialis in der Schule von Chartres," AGP 40 (1931):58-65, but in a rather confused fashion and only in terms of the relation to the Aristotelian doctrine of prime matter as possibility.

[21]Glosae super Platonem, pp. 129-30 and 278-80. Cf. ibid., p. 272; Philosophia, ed. Maurach, pp. 18-23, PL 172, 49D-50D, and PL 90, 1133A-D; and Dragmaticon, pp. 22-28. For discussion of the significance and origin of the term elementatum see Theodore Silverstein, "Elementatum: Its Appearance Among the Twelfth-Century Cosmogonists," MS 16 (1954):156-62; idem, "Guillaume de Conches and Nemesius of Emessa: On the Sources of the 'New Science' of the Twelfth Century," in Harry Austryn Wolfson Jubilee Volume,

Epicurean theory of atoms as similar to his view of elements, but he criticizes the Epicurean view that atoms had no beginning and no place.[22] He insists emphatically on the primacy of God and the creation of everything by God. Since William describes the elements as existing only in the composition of elemented things, he apparently considers the elemented things to have been created by God simultaneously with the prime matter and elements.

Consistent with his constant emphasis on the orderliness of the creation as a reflection of the divine mind, William emphatically rejects the existence of chaos, a doctrine supported by ancient and Christian tradition: "We say that the opinion they propound is false, the reasoning they follow is inappropriate, and the authority they cite is not well understood."[23]

3 vols. (Jerusalem, 1965), 2:719-34; Peter Dronke, "New Approaches to the School of Chartres," Anuario de estudios medievales 6 (1969):129-31; Lemay, "Doctrine of the Trinity," pp. 31-35; Richard Lemay, Abu Ma'shar and Latin Aristotelianism in the Twelfth Century (Beirut, 1962), pp. 170-79; Richard McKeon, "Medicine and Philosophy in the Eleventh and Twelfth Centuries, The Problem of Elements," The Thomist 24 (1961):236-43; and Flatten, Wilhelm, pp. 105-21. On Plato's theory of elements see Friedrich Solmsen, Aristotle's System of the Physical World: A Comparison with his Predecessors, Cornell Studies in Classical Philology, vol. 33 (Ithaca, 1960), pp. 40-66; Francis Macdonald Cornford, Plato's Cosmology: The "Timaeus" of Plato Translated with a Running Commentary (London, 1937), esp. pp. 33-57; and Gregory Vlastos, Plato's Universe (Seattle, 1975), pp.66-97.

[22]Dragmaticon, p. 27. William's source for the Epicurean theory of atoms is uncertain, but he probably drew his ideas from Isidore of Seville, Etymologiae 13.2-3, PL 82, 472D-474A; and perhaps from a survival of Lucretius, De rerum natura, esp. ll. 146-328, 599-634, and 705-896, Loeb Classical Library, pp. 12-24, 44-46, and 52-66. On William's possible knowledge of Lucretius see Gregory, Anima, pp. 207-12.

[23]Philosophia, ed. Maurach, p. 26, PL 172, 53B, and PL 90, 1136B. For William's rejection of the idea of chaos see ibid., ed Maurach, pp. 26-29, PL 172, 53A-54C, and PL 90, 1136A-1137B; Dragmaticon, pp. 30-33; Glosae super Platonem, pp. 118-23 and 287-90; and Glosae super Boetium 3. m. 9.5. For discussion see Marie-Dominique Chenu, "Nature ou histoire? Une contoverse exégétique

William first explains that the idea of elements originally existing in chaos is ridiculous. From their original creation the elements, which are the matter of bodies, had to be in some space, since all bodies occupy some space. If they were in some space, they were either where they are now or someplace else, but outside of the elements no place exists. The elements were, therefore, where they are now, even if not so disposed as they are now: some above, some below, and some in the middle. But since the elements occupied all the space there was, they could not at the same time all arise or all descend; therefore, there was no chaos.[24] William then rejects the reason proposed for the existence of chaos, namely that God created chaos to show what confusion there would be if he had not ordered the world. But since the angels already knew the nature of things and men had not yet been created, there was no one to whom he could show it.[25] Next William attacks the proponents of chaos for misinterpreting their authorities. Plato said that God led the elements to order from an unordered tossing about not because there ever was such a disordered confusion, but because there could have been. For where is there a place for disorder when

sur la création au XII^{e} siècle," AHDLMA 20 (1953):25-30; Gregory, Anima, pp. 197-201; Flatten, Wilhelm, pp. 123-26; and Édouard Jeauneau, "Simples notes sur la cosmogonie de Thierry de Chartres," Sophia 23 (1955):172-83.

[24] Philosophia, ed. Maurach, p. 27, PL 172, 53C-D, and PL 90, 1136B. Cf. Glosae super Platonem, pp. 118-19.

[25] Philosophia, ed. Maurach, p. 27, PL 172, 53D, and PL 90, 1136C. Cf. Glosae super Platonem, p. 119. The reason which William here rejects is the one which Hugh of St. Victor gives for the existence of chaos: De sacramentis 1.1.6, PL 176, 190; and idem, In Pentateuchon, PL 175, 33-34.

God disposes everything?[26]

Having disposed of his opponents' view of chaos, William gives his view of the original condition of the elements. All the elements were from the beginning where they are now and had the same substantial qualities, but not all their present accidental qualities. The earth was covered with water, and the other three elements were thicker and darker than they are now, but there was never any disordered tossing about of the elements.[27] God created in the sensible world an ordered whole, a universe, which reflects the order in the divine mind and which man can rationally understand.

William's colleagues, who held a world view similar to his, were not unanimous in following his rejection of the concept of original chaos. Clarembald of Arras repeats William's rejection,[28] but Bernard Silvestris portrays a very disordered chaos in his Cosmographia.[29] Thierry of Chartres retains the concept of chaos and the rationale for it as God's wish to reveal his wisdom and power. But his chaos is much nearer William's mixing

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[26] Philosophia, ed. Maurach, p. 28, PL 172, 53D-54A, and PL 90, 1136C-D. Cf. Glosae super Platonem, pp. 122-23; and Dragmaticon, p. 33.

[27] Glosae super Platonem, p. 119. Cf. Philosophia, ed. Maurach, pp. 28-29, PL 172, 54B, and PL 90, 1137A.

[28] Clarembald of Arras, Tractatulus super librum Genesis, ed. Nikolaus M. Häring, in Life and Works of Clarembald of Arras, Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, Studies and Texts, vol. 10 (Toronto, 1965), pp. 236-37.

[29] Cosmographia, pp. 7-11.

of the elements than the disordered tossing about described by Hugh of St. Victor. Like William, Thierry believes that the elements had their distinctive properties from the beginning, but the properties were at first not so well defined. The development he describes in the work of six days was not the substitution of order for disorder, but the passage from a less perfect to a more perfect order.[30]

According to Chartrian thought, the world, as a reflection of the divine mind, must be not only ordered but also good. Goodness was, of course, one of God's main attributes in all Christian tradition and Augustine had frequently referred to the beauty and order of God reflected in the world.[31] William and Thierry followed Augustine in identifying the final cause of the world with God's goodness.[32] Throughout the early Middle Ages the monastic writers viewed the natural world as good and

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[30]Thierry of Chartres, De sex dierum operibus 23, p. 565. Cf. ibid., pp. 556 and 565-66.

[31]For Augustine's statements on the beauty of the world see Enchiridion 4.13-15, Corpus christianorum, series latina, vol. 29 (Turnhout, 1970), pp. 233-34; and De civitate Dei 12.4-5, Corpus christianorum, series latina, vol. 48 (Turnhout, 1955), pp. 358-59. On Augustine's concept of the goodness and beauty of nature see William A. Christian, "Augustine on the Creation of the World," Harvard Theological Review 46 (1953): 1-25; Charles Boyer, "The Notion of Nature in St. Augustine," Texte und Untersuchungen 64 (1957):175-86; Étienne Gilson, The Christian Philosophy of Saint Augustine, trans. L. E. M. Lynch (New York, 1960), esp. pp. 130-31 and 142-48; and A. H. Armstrong, "St. Augustine and Christian Platonism," in Augustine: A Collection of Critical Essays, ed. R. A. Markus (New York, 1972), esp. pp. 9-19.

[32]Thierry of Chartres, De sex dierum operibus 3, p. 556. Cf. William of Conches, Glosae super Platonem, pp. 60, 62, 97-99, and 116-17; and Augustine, De Genesi contra Manichaeos 1.2.4, PL 34, 175.

beautiful primarily as a consequence of the fact that the world symbolized the beauty and goodness of God.[33] Like the monastic writers, the Chartrians find the basis for the world's beauty in the world's relation to God, but they emphasize that the world is good and beautiful because God created it in harmony and order. William says that the goodness of the world is the glory of the Creator. Man cannot know all the causes of divine actions, but he can know that all things disposed by God are directed to some good.[34]

William significantly extends his praise of the goodness of nature to include the postlapsarian world. The Fall of man was for monastic writers the central focus of any discussion of nature and man. The Fall corrupted, stupefied, and despoiled man so that, incapable of recovering himself, he has to be restored by God.[35] William naturally cites the Fall as the source

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[33]On the monastic attitude which found beauty in nature because of its symbolic connotations see Robert Bultot, La doctrine du mépris du monde, en Occident, de S. Ambroise à Innocent III, tome 4, vols. 1 and 2: Le XIe siècle (Louvain, 1963-64), 4.1:112-16; idem, "La dignité de l'homme selon S. Anselme de Cantorbéry," in La Normandie bénédictine au temps de Guillaume le Conquérant, ed. Louis Gaillard and Joseph Daoust (Lille, 1967), pp. 56-62; Jean Leclercq, The Love of Learning and the Desire for God, trans. Catharine Misrahi (New York, 1961), pp. 135-37; and Étienne Gilson, "Sub umbris arborum" MS 14 (1952):149-51.

[34]Glosae super Platonem, p. 176; and Glosae super Boetium 4. pr. 6.199. On the Chartrian theme of the goodness of the world see Gregory, Anima, pp. 98-106; and Flatten, Wilhelm, pp. 88-92.

[35]Anselm of Canterbury, Cur Deus homo 2.3, ed. F. S. Schmitt, S. Anselmi opera omnia, 6 vols. (Rome and Edinburgh, 1938-61), 2:5; idem, De casu diaboli 16, Opera 1:259-62; Hugh of St. Victor, De arca Noe morali, PL 174, 169; and idem, Didascalicon 1.1-2 and 2.1, ed. Charles H. Buttimer, Studies in Medieval and Renaissance Latin, vol. 10 (Washington, 1939), pp. 4-7 and 23-24.

of evil in the world, but the scarcity of references to the Fall in his works is striking. He insists that nature in the post-lapsarian period, though it may lack perfection, remains essentially good.[36] William shows a readiness to allow enjoyment of earthly pleasures by rejecting as too narrow Macrobius' definition of temperance as the use of only those things which nature requires. For rye bread and plain water would satisfy nature's requirements; but if someone enjoys better food, he does not violate temperance, for otherwise no one could be temperate.[37]

William's differences with the monastic view of the natural world are especially prominent in the discussion of sexual relations. Many monastic writers describe all sexual desires and relations as sinful in themselves because they are the means of propagating a sinful nature. Sexual pleasure is described as irrational and beastly, and Anselm of Canterbury argues that sexual relations should be accomplished without any desire.[38]

Cf. Augustine, De civitate Dei 14.12 and 19.12-13, pp. 433-34 and 675-80. On the importance of the Fall in medieval tradition see E. Portalié, "Saint Augustin," DTC 1:2394-98; Martin Strohm, "Der Begriff der natura vitiata bei Augustin," Theologische Quartalschrift 135 (1955):188-203; Bultot, "Anselme," pp. 549-68; Taylor, Introduction to Didascalicon, pp. 11-12; Javelet, Image et ressemblance, 1:266-85; and Robert J. O'Connell, "Augustine's Rejection of the Fall of the Soul," Augustinian Studies 4 (1973):1-32.

[36]Glosae super Platonem, pp. 117-18. Cf. ibid., pp. 213 and 219. These are the only three references to the Fall in William's Glosae super Platonem of which I am aware. His other works similarly deemphasize the theme.

[37]Glosae super Macrobium (longer redaction) 1.8.4.

[38]Anselm of Canterbury, Cur Deus homo 2.16, Opera, 2:119; idem, De conceptu virginali 7 and 10, Opera, 2:149 and 152. Cf. Peter Damian, Epistola 1.15, PL 144, 232-33; and Gregory the Great, Moralia in Iob 9.32 and 54, PL 75, 884D-885B and 903C. On the monastic attitude toward sexual relations see Bultot, Mépris, 4.1:100-111 and 4.2:62-66; Marie-Dominique Chenu, "L'ancien testament dans la théologie médiévale," in La théologie au douzième

But in the Dragmaticon when the Duke suggests that William discontinue his discussion of coitus because it is not respectable (honesta), William replies, "Nothing which is natural is ugly for it is the gift of creation."[39] For William, the world retains its value and goodness; it remains worthy of study because of its order, harmony, and goodness as a creation in the image of the divine mind.

Belief in the goodness of all creation includes a belief in God's providential ordering of the universe. The Chartrians see the world as structured and functioning according to God's will. William describes the working of nature as the result of God's will, and the Lectiones describes the universe of things as the unfolding of the simplicity which is in God.[40] Nature is thus the creation of God serving to unfold his will, and it is God's will that the universe be as good as possible. William explains that the motion of the planets is contrary to that of

siècle, Études de philosophie médiévale, vol. 45 (Paris, 1957), pp. 215-16; Michael Müller, Die Lehre des hl. Augustinus von der Paradiesesehe und ihre Auswirkung in der Sexualethik des 12. und 13.Jahrhunderts (Regensburg, 1954), esp. pp. 42-87; and William M. Alexander, "Sex and Philosophy in Augustine," Augustinian Studies 5 (1974):197-208.

[39] Dragmaticon, p. 244. Cf. Philosophia, PL 172, 89D-90A, and PL 90, 1171A; Adelard of Bath, Quaestiones naturales 19, ed. Martin Müller, Die Quaestiones naturales des Adelardus von Bath, BGPTM, Band 31, Heft 2 (Munster, 1934), pp. 23-24. William does not discuss the question of whether intercourse occurred only after the Fall.

[40] Philosophia, ed. Maurach, p. 32, PL 172, 56A, and PL 90, 1138C; and School of Thierry of Chartres, Lectiones, p. 156. John of Salisbury takes the view that nature is a manifestation of the will of God further than William and Thierry and says that miracles do not violate the laws of nature: Policraticus 2.12, vol. 1, pp. 85-86.

the firmament because if both moved in the same direction, the speed would be so great that nothing would be able to stand or live on the earth.[41] The sun moves obliquely around the earth because if it were always directly overhead there would be no change of seasons, and without the change of seasons the earth would never conceive, fruits would never mature, and so nothing would be able to live.[42] After giving a physical explanation for the absence of stars in the air, William continues:

> But what is more important it was not the divine will of the creator for stars to be in the air. For since air is near the earth, if stars were in it, they would burn the earth by their nearness and nothing would be able to live on earth.[43]

The structure of the world is good because in creating the world God willed that it reflect his divine order and goodness.

Although the world is the result of God's will, it nevertheless remains in general subject to certain orderly and discernable rules. William limits the direct actions of God in the world to the original creation of the elements from nothing and rare miracles like the virgin birth, which occur against the

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[41] Philosophia, PL 172, 66B-C, and PL 90, 1149B; see appendix C below. Cf. Dragmaticon, pp. 116-17.

[42] Philosophia, PL 172, 70B-D, and PL 90, 1152B-C. Cf. Dragmaticon, pp. 120-32; and Adelard of Bath, Quaestiones naturales, pp. 63-64.

[43] Philosophia, ed. Maurach, p. 30, PL 172, 55B, and PL 90, 1137C. Cf. Dragmaticon, pp. 73-74. William gives a similar explanation for why stars' orbits do not come close to the earth in Philosophia, PL 172, 61D, and PL 90, 1144B.

usual course of nature.[44] According to the Chartrians, the adorning of the universe and its continuing operation are not the direct effects of God but the effects of God working through nature, and they define nature as the power of producing like from like.[45] As Tullio Gregory has shown, this view of the work of nature bears certain similarities to Augustine's rationes seminales but with important differences. Both allow for God's instantaneous creation of souls and elements from nothing and for the further development through agents of God. But Augustine used the rationes seminales to reconcile the doctrine of the simultaneous creation of all things with the daily appearance of new birth, so that he could then deny the appearance of truly new being. William of Conches, on the other hand, places his definition of nature as a presupposition of a scientific vision of the world which permits him to attribute a proper efficacy to secondary

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[44] Glosae super Platonem, p. 104. Cf. ibid., pp. 99-118; and Dragmaticon, pp. 31-32. On the Chartrian practice of limiting God's direct role to the creation from nothing and explaining the adorning of the world by secondary causes see Gregory, Anima, pp. 171-88; Flatten, Wilhelm, pp. 88-92 and 132-39; Chenu, "Nature and Man," pp. 4-24; Dronke, "New Approaches," pp. 133-39; Parent, pp. 82-94; Wetherbee, 32-35; Jeauneau, "Note," pp. 921-32; and ideam, "Cosmogonie de Thierry," p. 174.

[45] Dragmaticon, pp. 31-32. Cf. Glosae super Platonem, p. 104; Glosae super Boetium 3. m. 9.4, also ed. Parent, pp. 127-28; School of Thierry of Chartres, Abbreviatio monacensis, p. 442; John of Salisbury, Metalogicon 1.8, pp. 23-24; idem, Entheticus, vv. 1061-64, ed. Ronald E. Pepin, "The 'Entheticus' of John of Salisbury: A Critical Text," Traditio 31 (1975): 170; Clarembald of Arras, Tractatulus 6.233, p. 238; and Bernard Silvestris, Cosmographia, pp. 7-15. The Chartrians' probable source for this definition of nature is Chalcidius, Commentarius 23, ed. J. H. Waszink, Corpus Platonium medii aevi, vol. 4 (London, 1962), p. 73.

causes.[46] The Chartrians are thus able to explain all developments, except miracles, following the original instantaneous creation "according to physics."[47] Nature has for the Chartrians a proper efficacy of its own and, though created in conformity to the will and mind of God, enjoys a relative autonomy. Since the rules of nature are unchangeable except for the rare interventions of God and since they are ordered reflections of the divine mind, they are in general comprehensible to human reason. Even in his Dragmaticon, where he retracts his identification of the Son with sapientia, his explanation of Eve's birth, and his speculation on the Son's generation, William steadfastly retains his doctrines of the creation through secondary causes and the autonomy of nature.

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[46] Gregory, Anima, pp. 179-81. For Augustine's doctrine of rationes seminales see De Genesi ad litteram 5.4.7-11 and 6.5.8-6.6.10, PL 34, 323D-25B and 342C-43B; and De Trinitate 3.9.16, p. 143. In so contrasting the natural philosophy of Augustine and the Chartrians, Gregory follows the view that Augustine's use of rationes seminales diminishes the role of secondary causes and emphasizes the power of the creator. Proponents of this interpretation include Christopher J. O'Toole, The Philosophy of Creation in the Writings of St. Augustine, Catholic University of America Philosophical Series (Washington, 1944), esp. pp. 70-83; and Gilson, Augustine, pp. 206-8. For analyses which interpret Augustine as giving more weight to secondary causes see Christian, pp. 15-18; and Boyer, pp. 180-81. All these critics agree that Augustine shows little interest in scientific speculation for its own sake, but only as support for his theology. On Augustine's natural philosophy see, in addition to the works cited above, R. A. Markus, "Marius Victorinus and Augustine," in The Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy, ed. A. H. Armstrong (Cambridge, Eng., 1967), pp. 395-405; and R. Lorenz, "Die Wissenschaftslehre Augustins," Zeitschrift für Kirchegeschichte 67 (1955-56):29-60 and 213-51.

[47] Thierry of Chartres, De sex dierum operibus 1, p. 555. Cf. ibid., 16, p. 562.

In asserting the efficacy of secondary causes, the Chartrians clearly recognize the autonomy they are ascribing to nature and the restrictions this autonomy places on God's power. In the Dragmaticon, William has the Philosopher explain that four elements were necessary in the construction of the universe. Earth and fire, the two elements necessary for the world to be seen and touched, had to be separated by some medium. Otherwise fire would burn up whatever was on the earth. A single medium would not have sufficed because air was more like fire and water more like earth; therefore, two media were necessary. At this point the Duke raises an objection

> Duke: It is obvious even to the blear-eyed and tonsured that these and other disagreeable things would follow if only one of these [air and water] were placed in the middle. But I wish you would say whether God could not have created some body which would be equidistant from both extremes.
>
> Philosopher: I do not place a limit on divine power, but I will tell you that if he had done that there would be neither air . . . nor water, whose use is necessary to man in many ways.
>
> Duke: If God had wanted to make the world without man, one medium between these extremes could have sufficed.
>
> Philosopher: No, not if the nature of things remains.[48]

William specifically states that he is not limiting God's power since God could have done whatever he willed. But in creating the nature of things as he has, God has given autonomy to secondary causes and voluntarily limited himself.

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[48] Dragmaticon, p. 46. Cf. Philosophia, ed. Maurach, p. 24, PL 172, 51B-52A, and PL 90, 1134B-1135A. William here follows Plato's geometrical argument from Timaeus a Calcidio 31b-32c, pp. 24-25.

William argues that such a view does not really detract from God's power because it confirms that divine power granted such a nature to things and through nature created other things.[49] All the works of nature are ultimately the result of the will and power of God, and the autonomy of nature does not detract from God. Establishing the efficacy of secondary causes does, however, make an examination of the nature and causes of things a valid subject for human study, because they are governed by certain comprehensible and orderly rules willed by God at the beginning of the world.

After God's creation of the four elements from nothing comes the adorning (ornatus or exornatio) of the universe. William describes the four elements at the creation as located where they are now but somewhat mixed with one another. The stars were formed from the water which was mixed in the air:

> From what they were [by their fiery nature] they immediately began to be moved. And from their motion they began to warm the air underneath and by the mediation of the air the water. From the warmed water were created two kinds of animals: flying and aquatic. . . . But since those were made from water, the water was dried up in places and muddy earth appeared. In certain places it was thinner and, warmed by the heat of the sun, the earth produced various kinds of animals, namely reptiles and man.[50]

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[49] Glosae super Boetium 3. m. 9.5. Cf. Philosophia, ed. Maurach, p. 32, PL 172, 56A-D, and PL 90, 1138B-D.

[50] Glosae super Boetium 3. m. 9.5. Cf. Glosae super Platonem, pp. 119-22; Dragmaticon, pp. 72-77; and Philosophia, ed. Maurach, pp. 30-31; PL 172, 54B-56A, and PL 90, 1137A-1138A. Bernard Silvestris presents an allegorical account of the creation in his Cosmographia whose similarities with William and Thierry have been pointed out by Brian Stock, Myth and Science in the Twelfth Century: A Study of Bernard Silvester (Princeton, 1972), pp. 63-118 and 240-62. See also Bernard Silvestris, The Commentary on the First Six Books of the "Aeneid" of Vergil Commonly

Thierry gives a somewhat different and more detailed account in his exposition of Genesis. The chaos Thierry describes is similar to William's description of the location of the elements at creation. On the first day the fire and air began to move because of their lightness, and, since the elements filled all space, they moved in a circle. In revolving, the fire naturally illuminated the air and on the second day warmed the water and earth.[51] When the water was heated, some of it evaporated and rose above the firmament. On the third day earth appeared like islands because of the evaporation of the water, and the earth warmed by the heat of the upper air naturally conceived the power of producing herbs and trees.[52] On the fourth day stars were formed from the water which had evaporated into the heavens, and on the fifth day the stars began to move. The motion of the stars further heated the water, and from it were

Attributed to Bernardus Silvestris, ed. Julian Ward Jones and Elizabeth Frances Jones (Lincoln, 1977), p. 77. For examples of the Chartrians' description of the developments following the original creation as ornatus or exornatio see William of Conches, Glosae super Platonem, pp. 287-90; Thierry of Chartres, De sex dierum operibus 2, p. 556; and Bernard Silvestris, Cosmographia, p. 6. The major source for the theme of the exornatio mundi was Plato, Timaeus a Calcidio 52d-53b, pp. 51-52. On the Chartrian development of this theme see Gregory, Anima, pp. 181-88; Flatten, Wilhelm, pp. 125-26; and Stock, Myth and Science, pp. 119-37.

[51] De sex dierum operibus 5-6, p. 557. Cf. ibid., p. 564. On Thierry's treatment of the creation see Nikolaus M. Häring, "The Creation and Creator of the World According to Thierry of Chartres and Clarenbaldus of Arras," AHDLMA 22 (1955): 137-57; Jeauneau, "Note," pp. 821-39; idem, "Maître Thierry," pp. 1-10; and Stollenwerk, pp. 34-48.

[52] De sex dierum operibus 7-8, pp. 558-59. For William of of Conches' rejection of the tradition that water is above the firmament as scientifically impossible see above, chap. 2, n. 64.

created aquatic and flying animals. On the sixth day the earth was heated and land animals were created from it.[53]

William and Thierry disagree over details of the creation such as whether there was ever a chaos or whether there is water above the firmament, but they agree completely in attributing the adornment of the world to secondary causes. They suppose that what occurred after the original creation of the four elements was done not directly by God but by the laws of nature. While these natural laws owe their existence to God, they operate autonomously after their creation. William and Thierry thus present a rigorously rational explication of the origins of things, for they see the world basically as a closed system. God may choose to enter this closed system at times through miracles, but the Chartrians seek to limit such incursions to a minimum of events such as the virgin birth and the resurrection.[54]

Congruent with this closed system regarding the development of nature, William descibes a closed system regarding the quantity of matter. In rejecting the concept of chaos, he explains, as we have seen above, that the four elements filled all available space. Within the filled space, bodies may be resolved into the elements of which they are composed and one element may be transformed into another, but nothing perishes.[55] The amount of each element in the universe remains constant because however much of earth is dissolved into water, the same amount of water is

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[53] *De sex dierum operibus* 13-14, p. 561.

[54] See above, n. 43.

[55] *Dragmaticon*, p. 168. Cf. ibid., p. 233.

solidified into earth and so with the other elements. Therefore the universe remains constantly filled with matter and there is no room for any new matter to be created.[56]

Before moving to William's treatment of the creation of man, it is necessary to see how his concept of the anima mundi fits into his view of nature as a closed system. In his Philosophia William offers three possible ways of considering the anima mundi. Some say that the anima mundi is the Holy Spirit, which gives life to all that lives. Others say it is a natural vigor by which some things live, some live and feel, and some live, feel, and discern. Still others say that the anima mundi is an incorporeal substance which is complete in each body but does not function the same in all because of the lassitude of certain bodies.[57] In his gloss on Boethius he gives the second definition

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[56] Glosae super Platonem, p. 142. Cf. ibid., p. 147; and Dragmaticon, pp. 55-56.

[57] Philosophia, ed. Maurach, pp. 115-16, PL 172, 46C-D, and PL 90, 1130C-D. A student of William's gives five possible definitions of the anima mundi in the Compendium, ed. Ottaviano, pp. 46-47. Among the many discussions of the anima mundi in the Chartrians see especially Gregory, Anima, pp. 123-59; Flatten, Wilhelm, pp. 126-34; Richard Lemay, pp. 188-93; Édouard Jeauneau, "L'usage de la notion d'integumentum à travers les gloses de Guillaume de Conches," AHDLMA 24 (1957):68-80; Ludwig Ott, "Die platonische Weltseele in der Theologie der Frühscholastik," in Parusia: Studien zur Philosophie Platons und zur Problemgeschichte des Platonismus. Festgabe für Johannes Hirschberger, ed. Kurt Flasch (Frankfurt, 1965), pp. 307-31; and Peter Dronke, Fabula: Explorations into the Uses of Myth in Medieval Platonism, Mittellateinische Studien und Texte, Band 9 (Leyden, 1974), pp. 126-34. For references to the anima mundi by other twelfth-century writers see Thierry of Chartres, De sex dierum operibus 27, pp. 566-67; School of Thierry of Chartres, Glosa, p. 273; Bernard Silvestris, Cosmographia, pp. 35, 53, and 70; Abelard, Introductio ad theologiam 1.17, PL 178, 1012-13; and Adelard of Bath, De eodem et diverso 15 and 16, ed. H. Willner, BGPTM, Band 4, Heft 1 (Münster, 1903), pp. 15-16.

listed above as his view of the anima mundi, and in his gloss on Plato the third.[58] The differences in these two definitions are slight and allow the relatively certain ascription of William's basic idea of the anima mundi as a natural vigor or spirit which animates things differently according to their different natures. The animating force in all living things, it does not define or alter the workings of natural bodies.

In his glosses on Boethius, Macrobius, and Plato, William also suggests more or less specifically that the anima mundi should be identified with the Holy Spirit. He states this most clearly in his Glosae super Boetium:

> It seems to me that the natural vigor is the Holy Spirit, that it, the divine and blessed concord by which all things have their being, their moving, their growth, their feeling, their life, and their discerning. It is well called natural vigor because by divine love all things grow and flourish. And it is well called anima mundi because by divine love and charity alone all things that are in the world live and have the ability to live.[59]

In his Glosae super Platonem William says that while some people identify the anima mundi with the Holy Spirit, he will neither affirm nor deny this. But a few pages later he praises Plato's choice of words in saying that God "thought out" (excogitavit) the anima mundi rather than that he "created" (creavit) it "in so far as the soul is called the Holy Spirit."[60] Referring to

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[58]Glosae super Boetium 3. m. 9.13, also ed. Charles Jourdain, Excursions historiques et philosophiques à travers le moyen âge (Paris, 1888), p. 60; and Glosae super Platonem, pp. 144-45.

[59]Glosae super Boetium 3. m. 9.13, also ed. Jourdain, p. 60.

[60]Glosae super Platonem, p. 145. Cf. ibid., p. 148.

Macrobius' statement that God created the anima mundi, William comments that this is heretical if it is said about the Holy Spirit, but perhaps Macrobius wrote "creates" (creare) in place of "sends" (mittere).[61]

In linking the Platonic anima mundi with the Christian Holy Spirit, William had considerable support among schoolmen of the twelfth century. Thierry of Chartres, in glossing Genesis 1:2, "and the Spirit of God moved upon the face of the waters," explains that by the virtue of the Creator, i.e. the spirit of God, working in matter, all things are formed. This virtue Virgil calls spirit, Plato anima mundi, and Christians the Holy Spirit.[62] Abelard says that whatever Plato has said about the anima mundi may be shown to be best understood to refer to the Holy Spirit.[63] The identification was, however, very uncongenial to monastic writers. Under attack from Bernard of Clairvaux and

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[61]Glosae super Macrobium (longer redaction) 1.14.2, MS Vatican, Urb. Lat. 1140, fol. 80v, also ed. Lemay, "Doctrine of the Trinity," p. 215: "De se creat [Si] hoc dicatur de spiritu sancto hereticum est quod creat. Non enim ex se creat spiritum sanctum, sed mittit. Sed forsitan ponit 'creare' pro 'mittere'." Cf. ibid., fol. 26v, ed. Lemay, pp. 178-79; and Glosae super Martianum Capellam, attributed by Dronke to the School of William in Fabula, pp. 104-13. See discussion of the passage in Macrobius in Lemay, "Doctrine of the Trinity," pp. 70-72.

[62]De sex dierum operibus 25-27, pp. 566-67. For a discussion see Jeauneau, "Maître Thierry," pp. 152-54.

[63]Abelard, Theologia christiana 1.1, PL 178, 1152C. Cf. ibid., 1.5, PL 178, 1155A; Introductio ad theologiam 1.17, 19, and 20, PL 178, 1013D, 1019D, 1019B, and 1023; and Theologia "Summi boni", pp. 15-16. For a discussion of the anima mundi in Abelard see Leif Grane, Peter Abelard, trans. Frederick Crowley and Christine Crowley (London, 1970), pp. 91-92; Gregory, Anima, pp. 136-37 and 145-51; Ott, pp. 308-18; and David E. Luscombe, "The Authorship of the Ysagoge in Theologiam," AHDLMA 35 (1968): 7-8.

William of St. Thierry, Abelard condemned such identification in his Dialectica, and William left it out of his Dragmaticon, observing that what was omitted from his earlier works should be considered false.[64]

Most discussion about the anima mundi has centered on William's identification of it with the Holy Spirit and whether this was heretical. Jeauneau has pointed out that what is essential in understanding this identification is that for the twelfth-century schoolmen the anima mundi is an integumentum subject to different interpretations without contradiction.[65] William does in fact repeatedly refer to the anima mundi as an integumentum and shows that he considers it subject to diverse interpretations.[66] William explains that the anima mundi is called the third kind in Homer's golden chain either because it comes from divine being and divine wisdom or because it confers three powers to living things: vegetative, sensitive, and rational.[67] The first

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[64]Peter Abelard, Dialectica, ed. L. M. de Rijk, 2nd rev. ed. (Utrecht-Assen, 1970), pp. 558-59; and William of Conches, Dragmaticon, p. 7. For monastic condemnation of this identification see Bernard of Clairvaux, Tractatus de erroribus Abelardi, PL 182, 1062; William of St. Thierry, Disputatio adversus Petrum Abaelardum 5, PL 180, 265-66; and idem, De erroribus Guillelmi de Conchis, PL 180, 340.

[65]Jeauneau, "Integumentum," pp. 78-79.

[66]Glosae super Platonem, pp. 150, 153, 156, 158, and 167.

[67]Ibid., pp. 149-50. Cf. Glosae super Boetium 3. m. 9. 13, also ed. Jourdain, p. 60. See Jeauneau, "Integumentum" pp. 159-61. References to Homer's golden chain of being are very common among twelfth-century writers. See for example Bernard Silvestris, Cosmographia, p. 31; Hugh of St. Victor, De unione corporis et spiritus, PL 177, 285B-86B; and Isaac of Stella, Epistola de anima 18, PL 194, 1185C-D. On the theme of the catena aurea in the Middle Ages see especially Arthur O. Lovejoy,

explanation certainly relates the anima mundi to the Holy Spirit, but the second has no relevance to such an identification. William here offers two complementary rather than mutually exclusive explanations of an integumentum, and both are thought to shed some light on the meaning of the anima mundi. William also rejects the criticism that if the anima mundi and a human soul are both in a man, he then has two souls, "because we do not say that anima mundi is a soul, just as we do not say that the head of the world [Rome] is a head."[68] Since the anima mundi is not literally a soul, it does not really possess the properties Plato ascribes to it. The anima mundi is said to be made from the same and diverse nature because men animated by it possess both reason and understanding (eadem natura because they are immutable and invariable) and also sense and opinion (diversa natura because they are changeable and often fallacious).[69] The anima mundi is said to be composed of numbers to signify the excellence of nature and the harmony of the universe.[70] It is called understanding either because of the intelligible part of the universe, namely men and angels, or because of the rational and orderly

The Great Chain of Being: A Study of the History of an Idea (Cambridge, Mass., 1936), pp. 67-98; Édouard Jeauneau, "Macrobe, source du platonisme chartrain," SM, 3rd ser., 1 (1960):3-24; Javelet, Image et ressemblance, 1:145-47 and 371-76; and Bernard McGinn, The Golden Chain: A Study in the Theological Anthropology of Isaac of Stella, Cistercian Studies Series, no. 15 (Washington, 1972), esp. pp. 51-102.

[68] Philosophia, ed. Maurach, p. 16, PL 172, 46D-47A, and PL 90, 1130C-D. Roma is lacking in most of the manuscripts and in all the printed version.

[69] Glosae super Platonem, p. 152.

[70] Ibid., pp. 154-66. See Jeauneau, "Integumentum," pp.161-67.

movement of the firmament and of all parts of the universe.[71]

William in fact seems to take away all reality from the anima mundi. It is an integumentum and can perhaps best be viewed as a personification of the powers of nature, similar to the ancient gods. The further identification of the anima mundi with the Holy Spirit is equally valid, however, as long as it aids in understanding the creation and order of the universe. William's concern is to portray an ordered universe comprehensible to human reason, but not so comprehensible that analogies and comparisons--which should not be taken literally--are not required.

The creation of man, like the rest of the adorning of the universe, occurs, according to Chartrian accounts, within the closed system of nature. William explains that, following the creation of the other animals, the human body was made from a certain part of the earth where there was an equality among the four elements. This is the meaning of Genesis 2:8, "and God formed man from the mud of the earth."[72] For William, the account in Genesis does not mean that God directly created the human body, but that the forces of nature, which God had created, produced the human body, like the other land animals, from the mud of the earth. Thierry similarly describes man's

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[71] Glosae super Platonem, pp. 124-25. Cf. ibid., p. 174; and Glosae super Macrobium (longer redaction) 1.13.2, MS Vatican, Urb Lat. 1140, fol. 78v, also ed. Lemay, "Doctrine of the Trinity," p. 219.

[72] Philosophia, ed. Maurach, p. 31, PL 172, 55D-56A, and PL 90, 1138A. Cf. Dragmaticon, p. 76; Glosae super Platonem pp. 121-22; and Glosae super Boetium 3. m. 9.1.

creation as a part of the general creation of land animals from the heating of the earth.[73] Having his body created by natural causes strengthens man's ties to nature. He is not distinct from the world, but rather a part of it. William defends his naturalistic explanation of man's creation:

> Again someone will say it detracts from divine power to say man was so created. We respond that on the contrary it is to confer the same on him because we attribute to him both to have given such a nature to things and so to have created the human body through the working of nature.[74]

By thus explaining the creation of man's body in terms of secondary causes, the Chartrians further insist on the comprehensibility of the world and emphasize that man himself is a part of nature.

William also endeavors to apply a naturalistic interpretation to Eve's creation:

> But since what is nearest to equality is, even if less, nevertheless somewhat temperate, it is likely that the body of woman was created from nearby mud. And, therefore, women is neither the same as man nor is she entirely different from man. Nor is she so temperate as man because the hottest woman is colder than the coldest man. And this is what the divine page says, "God made woman from the side of man." For it ought not to be believed literally that God tore a rib from the first man.[75]

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[73] De sex dierum operibus 14, p. 561.

[74] Philosophia, ed. Maurach, p. 32, PL 172, 56B, and PL 90, 1138B-C.

[75] Philosophia, ed. Maurach, p. 31, PL 172, 56A, and PL 90, 1138A-B.

In order to ascribe the creation of woman's body to natural causes, William interprets the Biblical account of Eve's creation as an integumentum. Woman was not formed by God from the side of man, but by natural forces from mud which was near the mud where the first man was formed. Obviously he uses the same method in explaining the creation of man and the rest of the universe, but his account of the first woman's creation differs more blatantly from the Bible. Under attack from William of St. Thierry, William replaces his naturalistic account of Eve's creation with the Biblical account in his Dragmaticon.[76] Nevertheless, except for the account of the creation of woman, William retains his explanation of the creation through secondary causes. His withdrawal of the explanation of Eve's creation seems a withdrawal under criticism from a minor point rather than a real change in his thinking.

While attributing the creation of man's body to nature, the Chartrians remain closer to Christian tradition in attributing the creation of man's soul to God.[77] In doing so, they are following Plato's own account (Timaeus 41a-43a) in which the Demiurge fashions the human souls but delegates the task of creating the human bodies to the stars and spirits. William explains in detail Plato's account of how the creator placed each

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[76]Dragmaticon, p. 7. Cf. p. 77. For William of St. Thierry's criticism see his De erroribus Guillelmi de Conchis, PL 180, 340.

[77]Philosophia, ed. Maurach, p. 31, PL 172, 55D, and PL 90, 1138A. Cf. Dragmaticon, p. 76; and Glosae super Platonem, p. 122.

soul on a star to show it the nature of the universe:

> . . . no one should believe that the souls were placed on the stars and as if on horseback rode off on them to the east and west, for this exceeds the vileness of a scurrilous joke. But Plato wanted the souls to be placed on the stars in relation to cause, not to place, and the stars are called vehicles of the soul because the body is prepared through their effect so that the soul can be created in it.[78]

William applies the Platonic account to the Biblical description of creation. Natural forces created the body of man and prepared it for the soul, which was created by God. The original creation is similar to the daily birth of new people: the parents produce the body and God creates the soul from nothing.[79] Following William, Bernard Silvestris has Natura state, "God's will is that man be formed, his body to issue from below and his spirit from above."[80] Bernard then recounts the creation of man's body by the various powers and the latter's conveyance of man's soul to earth to unite it with the body they have made. By attributing the creation of man's soul to God and his body to the forces of nature, the Chartrians place man in the unique position of being the only creature created in part by nature and in part directly

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[78] Glosae super Platonem, p. 212. Cf. ibid., pp. 203-4 and 222; and Philosophia, PL 172, 98C, and PL 90, 1176D-1177A. For a discussion see Gregory, Anima, pp. 158-66; and Flatten, Wilhelm, pp. 156-60.

[79] Dragmaticon, p. 306. Cf. Abelard, Expositio in Hexaemeron, PL 178, 770; and Hugh of St. Victor, De sacramentis 1.7.30, PL 176, 300D.

[80] Bernard Silvestris, Cosmographia, p. 39. Cf. idem, Commentary on Vergil 3.96, p. 20. Thierry of Chartres and Clarembald of Arras describe only the naturalistic creation of man and do not refer to the creation of the soul.

by God. They establish man's kinship to both God and nature while at the same time granting as much autonomy as possible to secondary causes.

Despite their own two-fold account of man's creation, the Chartrians emphasize the unity rather than the dualism of soul and body. For example, the Glosa of the School of Thierry of Chartres says that man is neither soul nor body, but a body with a soul.[81] William describes precisely how soul and body are joined. The soul is neither placed next to, compounded with, nor mixed with the body. Instead they are joined with one another so that the whole soul is in all parts of the body, retaining its being whole and entire throughout.[82]

For the Chartrians, man is the most worthy of all God's creations. William says he will omit discussing the various forms of irrational animals in order to concentrate on the only

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[81]School of Thierry of Chartres, Glosa, p. 279. Contrast this with the dualism traditional in medieval thought: Augustine, De moribus ecclesiae 1.27.52, PL 32, 1332; Alcher of Clairvaux, De spiritu et anima, PL 40, 781; and Peter Damian, De perfectione monachorum, PL 145, 321C-D. On the opposition between body and soul see Gilson, Augustine, pp. 44-49; idem, Spirit, pp. 168-88; Bultot, Mépris, 4.1:17-30; Robert J. O'Connell, St. Augustine's Early Theory of Man, A.D. 386-391 (Cambridge, Mass., 1968), esp. pp. 183-87; and Pierre Daubercies, "La théologie de la condition charnelle chez les maîtres du haut moyen âge." RTAM 30 (1963): 5-54. Gerhart B. Ladner, Ad imaginem Dei: The Image of Man in Mediaeval Art (Latrobe, Pa., 1965), pp. 55-56, finds a new view of the relationship between body and soul in the twelfth century. I find little merit in his argument that the new psychology originated with Hugh of St. Victor, who then influenced the Chartrians. For Hugh's treatment of the relationship of body and soul see De unione corporis et spiritus, PL 177, 285A.

[82]Philosophia, PL 172, 98A-b, and PL 90, 1176C-D. Cf. Dragmaticon, pp. 303-5. For discussion see Gregory, Anima, pp. 158-66; Flatten, Wilhelm, pp. 160-65; and Sullivan, pp. 107-11.

one that is rational and mortal.[83] One of William's students adds to the Philosophia a discourse on the attributes of man by which he exceeds other creatures: only man of all creatures stands erect and sees the heavens, has reason and intelligence as well as the senses and imagination, and speaks.[84] While William himself at no point lists these as the virtues which reveal man's excellence, such a view agrees with what William does say about man, and he does repeat the praise, traditional in classical and Christian writings, that only man holds his head erect as a sign that he should tend to greater things.[85] Two other students of William similarly praise the excellence of man. John of Salisbury says man's superiority to other living beings stems from his powers of speech and reason, and Bernard Silvestris says that "man alone, his stature testifying to the majesty of

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[83] Philosophia, PL 172, 88B, and PL 90, 1169D. Cf. Compendium, ed. Giorgio Rialdi, in Il "De philosophia mundi," l'autore, la storia, il contenuto medico (Genoa, 1965), p. 90.

[84] Compendium, ed. Rialdi, p. 21. For treatment of the virtues of man see ibid., pp. 29-30.

[85] Glosae super Boetium 5. m. 5.1. Probable sources for theme of the symbolism of man's erect stature include Boethius, Consolatio 5. m. 5.10-15, Loeb Classical Library, p. 398; Macrobius, Commentarii 1.14, pp. 55-60; Isidore of Seville, Etymologiae 11.1.5, PL 82, 397D-98B and Augustine, De Genesi ad litteram 6.12.22, PL 34, 348. On the use of this theme in medieval literature see Theordore Silverstein, "The Fabulous Cosmogony of Bernard Silvestris," MP 46 (1948-49):97; and R. W. Southern, Medieval Humanism and Other Studies (New York, 1970), pp. 39-40.

his mind, will lift up his noble head to the stars."[86]

The Chartrians' emphasis on the excellence of man leads them to propose new reasons why man was created. They see man not as an accident of creation or a replacement for the fallen angels, but as the very reason for creation. William asserts that after God, man himself is the final cause of creation and that God created everything to serve man.[87] In his gloss on Plato, he apparently offers a different explanation for man's creation when he states that God created the soul and gave it the power of understanding so that his goodness would be known. The author of the Lectiones similarly says that man was created to exercise reason.[88] These definitions complement rather than contradict each other. God created man so that he could perceive and understand God's goodness. But because man was incapable of knowing God himself, God also created the universe for man so that it would lead him to a knowledge of God's goodness. Bernard Silvestris, continuing the Chartrian tradition of emphasizing the excellence of man, has Noys tell Natura, Urania, and Physis:

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[86]John of Salisbury, Metalogicon 1.7, p. 23; and Bernard Silvestris, Cosmographia, p. 55.

[87]Glosae super Boetium 3. m. 9.5. Cf. Das Moralium dogma philosophorum, ed. John Holmberg (Uppsala, 1929), p. 27. For man as replacement of the fallen angels see Anselm of Canterbury, Cur Deus homo 1.16-18, in Opera, 2:75-84; and Peter Damian, Sermo 46, PL 144, 725B-C. For a discussion of the twelfth-century changes in the views of the reason of man's creation see Bultot, "Anselme," pp. 551-52; Parent, pp. 59-68; Jacques LeGoff, Les intellectuels au moyen âge (Paris, 1957), p. 37; and Marie-Dominique Chenu, "Cur homo? Le sous-sol d'une controverse," in La théologie au douzième siècle, Études de philosophie médiévale, vol. 45 (Paris, 1957), pp. 52-61. The Chartrians show little interest in angelology; see above, chap. 2, n. 61.

[88]Glosae super Platonem, pp. 123-24; and School of Thierry of Chartres, Lectiones, p. 130.

> So that this sensible universe, the image of a better world, may be able to be complete in every part, man must be made, his form similar to the divine, a sacred and blessed conclusion of my work.[89]

Man, the only creature capable of understanding the beauty and order of the universe, is the summit of creation without whom the universe would be incomplete.

Three themes describing man's relation to God and nature recur repeatedly in the Chartrians' writings. The Chartrians explain the Biblical description of man as made in the image and likeness of God (Genesis 1:26) as referring to man's reason. William says that the highest part of man is his soul, which was made directly by God. Plato calls the soul "greatest" (summam) because in it man possesses the likeness of the creator, "best" (optimam) because in it are reason and intellect, and "first" (primariam) because it dominates the body.[90] Reason, the part

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[89] Cosmographia, p. 55. Cf. ibid., p. 94.

[90] Glosae super Platonem, p. 248. Cf. Philosophia, PL 172, 97C-D, and PL 90, 1176B. For examples of the traditional theme that the image of God is situated in man's mens, intelligentia, or ratio see Augustine, De Trinitate 7.6.12, Corpus christianorum, series latina, vol. 50 (Turnhout, 1968), pp. 266-67. Gregory the Great, Moralia in Iob 5.34, PL 75, 713C-D; and Hugh of St. Victor, De sacramentis 1.6.2, PL 176, 264. It is significant that Bernard of Clairvaus and other Cistercians identify the image of God with man's libertas arbitrium rather than his reason. See Bernard, De gratia et libero arbitrio 9.28, in Opera, 3:190; and William of St. Thierry, De natura corporis et animae, PL 180, 717C. For the development and usage of the theme of ad imaginem Dei see Ludwig Hödl, "Zur Entwicklung der frühscholastischen Lehre von der Gottebenbildlichkeit des Menschen," in L'homme et son destin d'apres les penseurs du moyen âge, Actes du premier congrès international de philosophie médiévale, Louvain and Brussels, 1958 (Paris, 1960), pp. 347-59; Stephan Otto, Die Funktion des Bildbegriffes in der Theologie des 12. Jahrhunderts, BGPTM, Band 40, Heft 1 (Münster, 1963), esp. pp. 107-99; and Javelet, Image et ressemblance, esp. 1:176-250. Obviously any metaphysics using Plato's Timaeus has as a central theme the relationship between the images in this world and the archetype or Ideas in the supracelestial world. Although Otto and Javelet direct their attention to this topic, their discussions are not completely satisfactory. I hope to study this

of man which relates him to God, is properly located in the highest part of man, his head, which, like divinity, lacks beginning and end.[91] While there is little original in the Chartrians' identification of man's reason as the image of God, they have modified the import of that identification by portraying the image as still viable. On the other hand, the monastic writers, whether they identify reason or will with the image of God, consistently and repeatedly refer to man's resemblance to God as lost or deformed with the Fall and in need of restoration.[92] For the Chartrians, man's reason is only a copy of the perfect reason of God, but it is still a viable image whose use can lead every man to God and beatitude.

Just as man is called the image of God in that he mirrors the Creator, so he is called a microcosm in that he reflects all parts of the universe. This theme of man as a microcosm, common in ancient and patristic writers, received new impetus from the increasing interest in man and nature in the twelfth century.

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difficult question on a later occasion.

[91] Glosae super Platonem, p. 207. Cf. ibid., p. 233. For further examination of the Chartrians' praise of reason see above chap. 3.

[92] Bernard of Clairvaux, De gradibus humilitatis et superbia 5.16, in Opera, 3:28-29; idem, De gratia et libero arbitrio 4.9-10, in Opera, 3:172-73; and William of St. Thierry, De natura et dignitate divini amoris, PL 184, 379D-382A. For discussion of monastic emphasis on the destruction or darkening of the image of God in man by the Fall see Jean Leclercq, The Spirituality of the Middle Ages, trans. the Benedictines of Holmes Eden Abbey, A History of Christian Spirituality, ed. Louis Bouyer et al., 3 vols. (London, 1963-69), 2:194-219; Robert Bultot, "La 'dignite de l'homme' selon S. Pierre Damien," SM, 3rd ser., 13 (1972):948-50; Vandenbroucke, Morale monastique, pp. 78-82 and 124-52; Jean Châtillon, "La culture de l'école de Saint-Victor," in Entretiens sur la renaissance du 12e siècle, ed. Maurice de Gandillac and Édouard Jeauneau (Paris, 1968), pp. 158-59; and above, n. 35.

William uses the theme to show not only man's status in the creation but also his kinship to the natural world:

> Man, who is, as it were, a mixture of all creatures, has all these three powers at the same time, and so he has something in common with the Creator and also with every creature. For in reason he is similar to God; in sensibility, to brute animals; he has vegetation in common with plants and trees; and with inanimate bodies existence alone. Whence even in scripture man is called "all creatures," for he contains some property of every creature within himself. He is called microcosm, i.e. a small world, by the philosophers for the same reason.[93]

Man also reflects the universe in a number of other ways. Just as the universe contains harmony and order, so man's body contains four elements; just as the world soul moves itself and the world, so the human soul moves itself and man; and just as the firmament governs the world, so should man's soul govern his body.[94] Bernard Silvestris adopts his master's theme of man as microcosm as the subject of his major work, the Cosmographia, in

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[93] Glosae super Macrobium (longer redaction) 1.14.7, 81r, also ed. Lemay, "Doctrine of the Trinity," pp. 217-18. Cf. Compendium, ed. Rialdi, p. 99; and Philosophia, PL 172, 97B-C, and PL 90, 1176A-b; see below, appendix C. The most important sources for the theme of man and microcosm were Macrobius, Commentarii 2.12.10-11, p. 132; Chalcidius, Commentarius 202, p. 222; and Nemesius of Emessa, Premnon physicon, trans. into Latin by Alfanus of Salerno, ed. Carolus Burkhard (Leipzig, 1917), pp. 3-4 and 22. On the medieval use of the theme see Chenu, "Nature and Man," pp. 24-37; Rudolph Allers, "Microcosmus from Anaximandros to Paracelsus," Traditio 2 (1944):319-407; Heinrich Schipperges, "Einflüsse arabischer Medizin auf die Mikrokosmos-literatur des 12. Jahrhunderts," in Antike und Orient im Mittelalter, Miscellanea mediaevalia, Band 1 (Cologne, 1962), pp.129-53; Javelet, Image et resemblance, 1:231-33 and 2:153-54 and 200-202; Philippe Delhaye, Le Microcosmos de Godefrey de Saint Victor, 2 vols. (Lille, 1951), 1:137-44; and McGinn, pp. 122-33.

[94] Glosae super Platonem, pp. 143 and 254; and Glosae super Boetium 1. m. 3.3-5, 1. m. 7.1, and 1. pr. 4.4.

which he describes man as reflecting both God and the universe.[95]

William and his fellow Chartrians adopt the Chalcidian theme of the three creators to compare the activities of God, nature, and man. William says that everything is a product of the creator, of nature, or of man imitating nature:

> And the work of the creator is either the first creation without pre-existing matter, like the creation of the elements and spirits, or those things which we see happen against the customary course of nature, like the virgin birth. The work of nature is to produce similar from similar, from seed or from buds. And nature is the power implanted in things making like from like. The work of the artificer is the work of man which is done because of need, as clothing against cold. But in everything man does, he imitates nature. . . .
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> A work draws its quality from its maker. For instance, the work of the creator is perpetual, lacking dissolution, for neither the world nor the spirit is dissolved. The work of nature, even if in itself it should cease to be, nevertheless remains in its seed. The work of the artificer imitating nature neither in itself remains nor produces anything of itself.[96]

Gilbert Porreta and John of Salisbury also use this theme to show nature and man as imitating the creative power of God.[97] Like

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[95] Cosmographia, p. 55. For a discussion of the theme in Bernard see Stock, Myth and Science, pp. 188-226. John of Salisbury also continues the analogy both by describing man as possessing something in common with all things (Policraticus 2.17, vol. 1, pp. 97-98) and by his description of the body politic (Policraticus 6.20, vol. 2, p. 20).

[96] Glosae super Platonem, pp. 104-5. The statement by Chalcidius appears in his Commentarius 23, p. 73. For other examples of the use of the theme by William see Glosae super Platonem, pp. 112 and 177; Glosae super Boetium 3. m. 9.4, also ed. Parent, p. 128; and Dragmaticon, pp. 31-32. For discussion of the Chartrians' use of this theme see Gregory, Anima, pp. 178-79; Chenu, "Nature and Man," pp. 37-45; Stock, Myth and Science, pp. 230-37; and Kurt Flasch, "Ars imitatur naturam: Platonischer Naturbegriff und mittlealterliche Philosophie der Kunst," in Parusia, pp. 275-79.

[97] John of Salisbury, Metalogicon 1.11 and 14, pp. 28-29 and 32-33; and Gilbert Porreta, Note super Johannem, ed. E. Rathbone, RTAM 18 (1951):208.

God, nature and man are creators and their creative activities, although obviously inferior to God's, are considerable enough to be compared with his.

These three themes all serve the dual function of enhancing the value and significance of man and nature and of supporting the need for and value of a rational investigation of the universe. Since nature and man are both reflections of God and of each other, the understanding of one includes at least some understanding of the others. By studying nature, man also learns more about himself and God. And since it is man's reason which most links him to God, he most closely approaches God in utilizing this reason.

The Socratic injunction to know yourself, common in classical and Christian writers, plays an especially significant role in twelfth-century writers as diverse as Abelard, Hugh of St. Victor, and Bernard of Clairvaux. William explains that whoever knows himself knows that part of him is mortal, his body, and part immortal, his spirit. Since he realizes the greater value of the immortal, he concerns himself more with the heavenly goods of the soul than with the earthly goods of the body.[98] Such a statement could of course be found in writers of

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[98] Glosae super Boetium 1. pr. 2.13. The Socratic theme of self-knowledge was a very common one throughout medieval writings. See for example Augustine, De Trinitate 9.3.1, p. 295; Boethius, Consolatio 1. pr. 6, p. 43; and Gregory the Great, Moralia in Iob 30.56, PL 76, 555A. For the use and development of the theme throughout the Middle Ages see Gilson, Spirit, pp. 209-228; Ermengildo Bertola, "Il Socratismo christiano nel XII secolo," Rivista de filosofia neo-scolastica 51 (1959): 252-64; and Pierre Courcelle, Connais-toi toi-même de Socrate à saint Bernard, 2 tomes (Paris, 1974-75), esp. 1:231-91.

widely conflicting opinions and reveals nothing in particular about William's own concept of man. William does differ from his monastic contemporaries over the means of seeking self-knowledge, however, and this difference provides insight into his view of the world and man.

While most monastic writers, following the examples of the Church Fathers, seek self-knowledge through inward contemplation, the Chartrians seek it through the investigation of the natural world. How such an investigation of nature can lead to self-knowledge becomes clear in the Chartrian interpretation of Orpheus' descent to the underworld. William, followed by Bernard Silvestris, explains that there are different descents to the underworld. The natural descent occurs when a soul is joined to a body. This does not mean that the soul literally descends from the heavens, but a soul which is joined to a body descends from its proper dignity when it is subjected to the passions of the body. The descent of vice refers either to the art of magic or the other vices, all of which consist in placing one's whole attention on temporal goods. On the contrary, the virtuous descent occurs when a wise man like Orpheus descends to a knowledge of earthly things so that he may become aware of the negligible value they contain and turn his desire away from them.[99] The wise man, by studying the world, sees the transience of earthly things and directs his life accordingly. But there is

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[99] Glosae super Boetium 3. m. 12.16-19. Cf. Bernard Silvestris, Commentary on Vergil 6.1, p. 30; John of Salisbury, Policraticus 2.3, vol. 1, pp. 174-75. For a discussion of this explication of the meanings of a descent to hell see John Block Friedman, Orpheus in the Middle Ages (Cambridge, Mass., 1970), pp. 91-107.

also for the Chartrians a more positive aspect of self-knowledge gathered from the study of the natural world. In studying the universe, man observes the orderliness of nature and becomes aware of a reflection of himself in the heavens. "Because just as the souls are always in motion, so also are the stars, and just as the souls are moved rationally, so are the stars."[100] By observing the heavenly motion, man sees that the firmament governs the planets just as reason should govern the senses. So through a study of nature, man learns about himself.

For the Chartrians, God as well as self is known not through inward contemplation, but by an examination of nature. William says that God created the world as he did so that man, perceiving God's power, wisdom, and goodness in the creation of things, would fear his power, venerate his wisdom, and imitate his goodness. Thierry sees the value of Genesis in its portrayal of knowledge of God drawn from the things he made. Bernard Silvestris repeats this Chartrian theme that, although God is not in his creation, he is known by knowledge of that creation.[101] To the extent that he can learn about God, man must seek that knowledge through an investigation of nature.

William in particular devotes most of his theological

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[100] Glosae super Boetium 3. m. 9.19. Cf. Glosae super Platonem, p. 254; and Glosae super Macrobium (longer redaction) 1.8.2-4.

[101] Philosophia, ed. Maurach, p. 23, PL 172, 51A, and PL 90, 1134B; Thierry of Chartres, De sex dierum operibus 1, p. 555; and Bernard Silvestris, Commentary on Vergil, p. 27.

discussion to tracing the role of God in the creation of visible things. Indeed, he offers three proofs for the existence of God derived from the examination of the natural world. In the first argument, William says, following Boethius, that since it can be seen that the world was created from contrary elements, someone or something had to join together the contrary elements. Man could not have done it, because the creation occurred before the existence of man, nor could nature have done it, because it is the property of nature to flee from contraries. Therefore, the world was made by the Creator, i.e. God.[102]

William develops a second proof from the observation that human bodies, which are naturally heavy, move. Since a body could not move by itself, it must have a spirit joined to it which moves it. But to join such opposites as a soul and body would require the activity of some intelligence. Man's intelligence is incapable of joining such opposites; therefore, reason leads us to knowledge of incorporeals and similarly to knowledge of the creator.[103]

Finally, William develops his proof from the daily disposition of the world. One sees that the world is wisely created and

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[102] Glosae super Boetium 3. pr. 12.1, also ed. Parent, pp. 130-31. Cf. Philosophia, ed. Maurach, p. 11, PL 172, 44B-C, and PL 90, 1129A-B; and Compendium, ed. Ottaviano, pp. 38-39. For further references see Flatten, Wilhelm, pp. 171-72; Parent, pp. 32-33; Gregory, Anima, pp. 42-45; and Moreau, "Opifex," p. 43.

[103] Glosae super Macrobium (longer redaction) 1.5.4. Cf. Glosae super Boetium 5. pr. 4.82; Dragmaticon, pp. 308-9; and Glosae super Platonem, p. 101.

disposed and then seeks whose wisdom could have so created it. Seeing that no creature possesses such wisdom, he confirms that the world was ordered and disposed by divine wisdom.[104] Bernard Silvestris and the Commentum of the School of Thierry of Chartres offer proofs of God's existence from the wise disposition of the world that are similar to William's, and in his commentary on Genesis Clarembald of Arras repeats William's proof from the joining of opposite elements.[105] For the Chartrians the natural world provides proof of the existence of God and more importantly reveals something of God's nature. By observing the images of God in the natural world, the Chartrians believe they see reflections of God's order, beauty, wisdom, and power. From their study of natural philosophy, they can postulate the necessity of a God possessing these attributes. In reaching for an understanding of God, the Chartrians turn not their backs, but their faces, toward the world.

The Chartrians focus their attention firmly on the world and man, which as reflections of God possess an innate goodness. As macrocosm, the world reflects man, the microcosm, and as

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[104] Glosae super Platonem, p. 252. Cf. Philosophia, ed. Maurach, p. 12, PL 172, 44C-D, and PL 90, 1129C-D; Glosae super Boetium 1. pr. 1.11; and ibid., 4. m. 1.1. For further references see Parent, p. 33; and Gregory, Anima, pp. 68-70.

[105] Bernard Silvestris, Commentary on Vergil 6.109, p. 52; School of Thierry of Chartres, Commentum, p. 76; and Clarembald of Arras, Tractatulus super librum Genesis, pp. 229-30. Thierry of Chartres offers a mathematical proof of God's existence in De sex dierum operibus 30-31, pp. 568-69.

creation the world reflects God, the Creator. Composed of body and spirit, man is uniquely able to pursue knowledge of the natural and the spiritual world. Since he is made in the image of God by virtue of his rational capabilities, man has the duty to seek understanding of himself, nature, and God. Nature, operating according to orderly semi-autonomous laws, can be examined and understood by man. And man, as a part of nature, can be understood by direct observation and as a reflection of the natural world. God, of course, exceeds human comprehension, but man can learn much about him by the study of his reflection in his creation. Having gained such understanding, man is better able to conduct his own life and his relationships with others.

Chapter V

SELF AND SOCIETY

Drawing on the ethics they found both in Christian doctrine and in their ancient authorities and on the understanding of man they gained through the study of natural philosophy, some Chartrians turned their attention to man's social and moral life. The Chartrians' ethical thought, however, unlike their natural philosophy, has generally been ignored by modern critics. This lack of interest is due in part to the sparsity of ethical discussion in the Chartrian writings and in part to the absence, even in those Chartrians who offer ethical discussions, of a systematic treatise such as Peter Abelard's Ethics.[1] Only

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[1]Peter Abelard, Ethics, ed. and trans. David E. Luscombe, Oxford Medieval Texts (Oxford, 1971). On Abelard's ethical thought see, in addition to Luscombe's introduction to his edition, Robert Blomme, La doctrine du péché dans les écoles théologiques de la première moitié du XII^e siècle (Louvain, 1958), esp. pp. 118-205; Odon Lottin, "La nature du péché d'ignorance depuis le XII^e siècle jusq'u au temps de saint Thomas d'Aquin," in Psychologie et morale aux XII^e et XIII^e siècles, 5 tomes (Louvain, 1942-58), 3, pt. 1: esp. pp. 18-23; and Richard E. Weingart, The Logic of Divine Love: A Critical Analysis of the Soteriology of Peter Abelard (Oxford, 1970), esp. pp. 51-64. Tullio Gregory, Anima mundi: la filosofia di Guglielmo di Conches e la scuola di Chartres (Florence, 1955), pp. 158-65; and Édouard Jeauneau, "L'usage de la notion d'integumentum à travers les gloses de Guillaume de Conches," AHDLMA 24 (1957):49-52 and 80-84, touch briefly on some of William's moral thought in their discussion of his treatment of Plato's account of the creation of human souls, but they do not present a detailed analysis of his views. Heinrich Flatten, Die Philosophie des Wilhelm von Conches (Coblenz, 1929), pp. 184-86, dismisses William's treatment of ethics as a minor and unimportant

Bernard Silvestris, John of Salisbury, and William of Conches show any significant interest in ethics, and neither Bernard nor John develops a detailed ethical system. William's ethical thought, although scattered throughout his works rather than organized into a separate treatise, is clear and occupies a place of importance second only to his natural philosophy. As we have seen, William offers almost as many moral as cosmological interpretations of the pagan myths and his Moralium dogma philosophorum was written as a guide to moral action.[2] A study of William's ethical thought is vital to any understanding of his view of man.

Following Christian and Platonic tradition, William places a higher value on the contemplative life or theoretical philosophy than on the active life or practical philosophy. For example, he explains that in Boethius' description of Philosophy's robe the

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part of his work. Cf. also Blomme, p. 343. Among the Chartrians, only the ethics of John of Salisbury has attracted the attention of modern critics. See especially Hans Liebschütz, Medieval Humanism in the Life and Writings of John of Salisbury (London, 1951), and Beryl Smalley, The Becket Conflict and the Schools; a Study of Intellectuals in Politics (Totowa, N.J., 1973), pp. 87-108.

[2]On William's interpretation of myth see above, chap. 2. On the attribution to William of Das Moralium dogma philosophorum, ed. John Holmberg (Uppsala, 1929), see above, chap. 1, n. 51. The ethical thought of the Moralium dogma has been examined, but not in relation to William's other writings. See for example Philippe Delhaye, "Une adaptation du De officiis au XII^{e} siècle: 'Le Moralium dogma philosophorum,'" RTAM 16 (1949):227-58 and 17 (1950):5-28; and R. A. Gauthier, "Les deux recensions du Moralium dogma philosophorum," RMAL 9 (1953):171-260 and 11 (1955):51-58. The importance of this work is best pointed out by N. E. Nelson, "Cicero's De officiis in Christian Thought 300-1300," in Essays and Studies in English and Comparative Literature, University of Michigan Publications in Language and Literature, vol. 10 (Ann Arbor, 1933), esp. pp. 91-98; and Klaus-Dieter Nothdurft, Studien zum Einfluss Senecas auf die Philosophie und Theologie des zwölften Jahrhunderts, Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters, Band 7 (Leyden, 1963), pp. 93-111.

Theta, theoretical philosophy, is placed higher than the Pi, practical philosophy, because the theoretical is more worthy than the practical.[3] Even in those passages where he criticizes the active life, however, William avoids its complete condemnation. Practical philosophy remains very much a part of philosophy. Furthermore, William provides a strong defense of the value of the active life in other passages of his works. Life in the world does not mean for William, as it did for many monastic writers, a valueless existence, an alienation, a life of sin.[4]

William's most detailed defense of the active life is found in his criticism of the excessive strictness of Stoic

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[3]Glosae super Boetium 1. pr. 1.18; see chap. 1, n. 47.

[4]See for example Peter Damian, Apologeticus de contemptu saeculi, PL 145, 265A-277A; Anselm of Canterbury, De conceptu virginali 27-28, ed. F. S. Schmitt, in Sancti Anselmi opera omnia, 6 vols. (Rome and Edinburgh, 1938-61), 3:170-71; and Hugh of St. Victor, De arca Noe morali, Prologus, PL 176, 619. On the monastic condemnation of the active life see Robert Bultot, La doctrine du mèpris du monde, en Occident, de S. Ambroise à Innocent III, tome 4, vols. 1 and 2: Le XI^{e} siècle (Louvain, 1963-64), 4.1:31-44 and 4.2:84-102; idem, "La 'dignité de l'homme' selon S. Pierre Damien," SN, 3rd ser., 13 (1972):951-60; Jerome Taylor, Introduction to The Didascalicon of Hugh of St. Victor: A Medieval Guide to the Arts, Records of Civilization: Sources and Studies, no. 64 (New York, 1961), pp. 17-19; and François Vandenbroucke, Pour l'histoire de la théologie morale: la morale monastique du XI^{e} au XVI^{e} siècle, Analecta mediaevalia namurcensia, vol. 20 (Louvain, 1966), pp. 124-50. Walter Ullman argues that before Thomas Aquinas there was no concern at all for man as a part of society with natural attributes and appetites but only for man in his capacity as a Christian. See his "Some Observations on the Medieval Evluation of the 'Homo Naturalis' and the 'Homo Christianus,'" in L'homme et son destin après les penseurs du moyen âge, Actes du premier congrès international de philosophie médiévale, Louvain-Brussels, 1958 (Louvain, 1960), pp. 145-48; and Medieval Foundations of Renaissance Humanism (Ithaca, 1977), pp. 14-29 and 147-60. Whether or not it is accurate for patristic and monastic speculation, this interpreation is certainly a distortion of the Chartrian thought of William, Bernard, and others who do not seem to distinguish between Christian and non-Christian political realms.

philosophy. This criticism appears as an elaboration and expansion of Macrobius' explanation of Cicero's statement that the good leaders of a republic gain beatitude:

> But because the Stoics gave too strict a definition of beatitude, according to which only a very few blessed can be found, so therefore[Macrobius] discussed beatitude first by expounding the opinion of the Stoics, then by proving it false, and finally by giving the opinion of others with whom he agrees. . . . And all philosophers agreed that virtue alone was productive of happiness, but there was disagreement regarding the virtues, to whom virtue is befitting and to whom it is not. And in this the Stoics erred, for they thought virtues were present only in philosophers and not even in all philosophers, but only Stoics. And so according to them, leaders of the republic and practical philosophers were not blessed, but only those philosophers who were devoted to the pursuit of contemplation. And therefore Macrobius gives their view, not because it is true but that he might disprove it and show it to be false. . . . And he disproves it, not in so far as they said wisdom was knowledge of divine things, but in so far as they thought this was the definition of wisdom and this alone was wisdom. For a definition ought to be convertible with the thing defined. However, this defintion is not sufficient. Wisdom consists not only in knowledge of divine things, but also in knowledge and activities of men. From whence it has two species as we have said above, theoretical and practical.[5]

It is, of course, dangerous to infer too precisely someone's own views from his commentary on another writer, but indications can be discerned from what he emphasizes or changes. Here William does not change Macrobius, but he emphasizes and considerably expands the latter's explanation of how leaders of the republic may attain beatitude. The best explanation for the emphasis he places on this passage seems to be his own conviction that wisdom consists not only in knowledge of God, but also in the knowledge

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[5]Glosae super Macrobium (longer redaction) 1.8.2-4; see chap. 1, n. 47. For the passage which William is glossing see Macrobius, Commentarii in Somnium Scipionis, ed. James Willis, Bibliotheca scriptorum graecorum et romanorum (Leipzig, 1970), p. 37.

and actions of men.

William's regard for the active life also appears in his concern for the proper conduct of men in society and his belief that the natural justice (justicia naturalis) of God's creation is reflected in the positive justice (justicia positiva) of human government. He glosses Macrobius' statement that "man is a social animal" by saying, "There is no animal who naturally requires to associate with others as much as man."[6] William's treatment of social conduct appears most fully in his Moralium dogma philosophorum, his only venture into the realms of the mirror of princes literature which became so popular in the next two centuries. William explains that his reason for writing the book lies in the necessity of conducting one's life, both public and private, according to the virtues of prudence, justice, fortitude, and temperance.[7] He emphasizes that leading a virtuous personal life is not sufficient:

> We are not born for ourselves alone; our country of birth and our friends also claim a share. And as the Stoics think everything is created for man's use; and men too are generated for the sake of other men, it is true, so that they may be of help to one another.[8]

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[6]Glosae super Macrobium (longer redaction) 1.8.6. On the analogy of positive and natural justice see ibid., 1.1.2; and Glosae super Platonem, ed. Édouard Jeauneau, Textes philosophiques du moyen âge, vol. 13 (Paris, 1965), pp. 71-73. Cf. John of Salisbury, Policraticus 8.8, ed. Clement C. J. Webb, 2 vols. (Oxford, 1909), 2:274. William's main sources for the theme that positive justice is a reflection of natural justice are Chalcidius, Commentarius 6, ed. J. H. Waszink, in Timaeus a Calcidio translatus commentarioque instructus, Corpus platonicum medii aevi, Plato latinus, vol. 4 (London, 1962), p. 59; and Macrobius, Commentarii 1.4.4, p. 13.

[7]Moralium dogma, p. 6. William draws this passage from Cicero, De officiis 1.2.4, Loeb Classical Library, p. 6.

[8]Moralium dogma, p. 27. William here follows Cicero, De officiis 1.7.22, p. 22. Cf. Seneca, Ad Lucilium epistulae morales

William shows throughout the work that following the active life does not automatically entail losing oneself in temporal concerns. Under the guidance of reason, man may retain a proper perspective on the relative value of things.[9]

William describes justice as the most important virtue for preserving human society and the life of the community. Either inhumanity or negligence can cause the destruction of justice in a community. Injustice arises from inhumanity whenever someone fails to give to each his due and from negligence whenever someone fails to prevent an injury he could have stopped.[10] William stresses the need for each man to work actively for justice. His withdrawal from the school rooms of Chartres to the castle of the Duke of Normandy has traditionally been described as a retreat from the reactionary forces criticizing his teachings. It should perhaps be ascribed at least partly to a desire to lead a more active life by tutoring a king.

95.52, Loeb Classical Library, 3 vols., 3:90.

For William's high regard for the active life see especially Moralium dogma, pp. 7-32. The Stoic doctrines of Cicero and Seneca were probably a source of influence on the Chartrians' view of man's role in society. On the Stoic emphasis on man's duty to others see for example Ludwig Edelstein, The Meaning of Stoicism (Cambridge, Mass., 1966), pp. 71-98; and F. H. Sandbach, The Stoics (New York, 1975), pp. 28-68. On the Chartrians' knowledge of Cicero and Seneca see chap. 1, n. 32 above.

[9]Moralium dogma, passim. Cf. Glosae super Macrobium (longer redaction) 1.8.7.

[10]Moralium dogma, pp. 12 and 28-29. William here draws on Cicero, De inventione rhetorica 2.53.160, Loeb Classical Library, p. 328; and De officiis 1.7.23, p. 24. Cf. Bernard Silvestris, The Commentary on the First Six Books of the "Aeneid" of Vergil Commonly Attributed to Bernardus Silvestris, ed. Julian Ward Jones and Elizabeth Frances Jones (Lincoln, 1977), p. 26.

This concern for the active life does not appear in William's colleagues, Thierry and Gilbert Porreta, but it is prominent in two of his students. Bernard Silvestris echoes William's emphasis on the legitimacy of practical as well as theoretical knowledge. For example, he depicts Theseus as a figure of wisdom and explains that Theseus was called both divine and human because wisdom consists of both theoretical and practical philosophy.[11] In his Cosmographia the new man who is created is one able to participate in an active life, and his Mathematicus is a ruler possessing the attributes which William advocates in his Moralium dogma. The most complete Chartrian statement for the active life appears, of course, in John of Salisbury, whose Policraticus shares many similarities with William's Moralium dogma. In this work John describes the faults which make court life precarious. He does so not to condemn but to correct the pursuit of the active life. John gives a clear statement of the high value which he places on the active life in his Metalogicon:

> Since happiness outside human society and devoid of sharing with others cannot even be imagined, whoever attacks those things which contribute to establishing and supporting justice in human society (which is in a way the unique and singular fraternity among the children of nature) seems to obstruct for all the way leading to happiness. . . . If they were deprived of the gift of eloquence, men would be like brute animals, and cities themselves would seem like enclosures of cattle rather than assemblies of men united by a certain bond of society,

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[11] Bernard Silvestris, Commentary on Vergil 6.393, p. 88.

> so that they might live togehter in the same justice by participating in and taking turns in holding office in the spirit of friendship.[12]

John portrays society not as something which has to be fled to live a proper life, but rather as an essential prerequisite for human life.

In light of this positive interest in the active life, it is not surprising that William, followed by his students John and Bernard, shows considerable interest in the field of ethics. This interest seems to have led, at least in William, to the clear conception of an ethical system in which the individual is morally autonomous. William consistently strives to limit the role of external forces such as fortune, astrological determinism, and grace in his ethical system. Such powers as these forces possess lie outside the area of man's morality. Following Boethius and Chalcidius, the Chartrians describe fate as the working out of God's Providence in temporal affairs and emphasize that its efficacy extends only to temporal goods.[13] They similarly stress

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[12] John of Salisbury, Metalogicon 1.1, ed. Clement C. J. Webb (Oxford, 1929), pp. 6-7.

[13] School of Thierry of Chartres, Lectiones, in Commentaries on Boethius by Thierry of Chartres and His School, ed. Nikolaus M. Häring, Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, Studies and Texts, vol. 20 (Toronto, 1971), p. 156; Clarembald of Arras, Tractatus super librum Boetii "De Trinitate," ed. Nikolaus M. Häring, in Life and Works of Clarembald of Arras, Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, Studies and Texts, vol. 10 (Toronto, 1965), pp. 98-99; Bernard Silvestris, Commentary on Vergil 6.449, p. 95. For the sources of the Chartrians' statements about fate see Boethius, Consolatio philosophiae 4. pr. 6-7, Loeb Classical Library, pp. 338-60; and Chalcidius, Commentarius 91-118 and 139-40, pp. 143-64, 179-80. On attitudes toward fate in late antiquity and the Middle Ages see especially J. den Boeft, Calcidius on Fate: His Doctrine and Sources, Philosophia antiqua, vol. 18 (Leyden, 1970); and Howard Patch, "Fate in Boethius and the Neoplatonists," Speculum 4 (1929):62-72.

that fortune (fortuna), which they sometimes seem to identify with fate (fatum), can at most affect only earthly goods.[14] William and Bernard both offer explanations of why the ancients depicted fortune with a wheel, and William gives a detailed description of the goods of fortune. The lessons William draws from this treatment of fortune are that it is foolish to worry about something beyond one's control and that the faults of the soul, which are beyond fortune, are much more serious than those of the body, which are governed by fortune.[15] William accepts and elaborates on Boethius' dictum that each man makes his own fortune.

> So we can make adverse fortune an exercise or correction, and so good for us, or a punishment, and so bad for us. And thus we can form for ourselves whatever kind of fortune we want.[16]

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[14]For this apparent identification of fatum and fortuna see Bernard Silvestris, Commentary on Vergil 6.45 and 511, pp. 42 and 101. John of Salisbury expresses the opinion that fortuna does not exist at all in Policraticus 3.8, vol. 1, pp. 190-96. The major source for the Chartrians' idea of fortuna is Boethius, Consolatio, esp. 2, pr. 1-3, pp. 172-94. On the tradition of fortuna in the Middle Ages see Howard R. Patch, The Goddess Fortuna in Mediaeval Literature (Cambridge, Mass., 1927), esp. pp. 8-87; and Friedrich von Bezold, Das Fortleben der antiken Götter im mitteralterlichen Humanismus (Bonn, 1922), pp. 79-84.

[15]For the description of fortune with a wheel see William of Conches, Glosae super Boetium 2 pr. 1.59-60. Cf. Bernard Silvestris, Commentary on Vergil 6.16, p. 113. William devotes pp. 55-70 of his Moralium dogma to a description of the "goods" of fortune (wealth, power, and glory) and of the inadequacy of these goods; see especially pp. 32-36 and 55-67.

[16]Glosae super Boetium 4 pr. 7.53-55. The Chartrians drew this Stoic theme that man's response to his fortuna is more important than his fortuna itself from Boethius' Consolatio 2 pr. 1-3, pp. 172-94; and the Pseudo-Seneca, De remediis fortuitorum, ed. and trans. Robert Whyttynton (London, 1557). Cf. also Seneca, De beneficiis 7.2.5, Loeb Classical Library, pp. 460-62.

What is really important is not the gain or loss of temporal goods, controlled by fortune, but one's reaction to that gain or loss. Since that reaction, which is what determines a man's morality, remains in his own hands, each man makes his own fortune.

William and Bernard devote considerably more attention to fate's influence on man through the stars. William at various points refers to the benevolent or harmful effects of the planets and constellations.[17] In all his comments, however, William carefully limits astral influence to such physical effects as increasing or decreasing heat or moisture. This appears most clearly in William's interpretation of the Platonic account of the transporting of the newly created souls across the heavens. William explains that Plato did not mean that each soul was literally assigned to a star, which transported it across the sky, but rather that the stellar arrangement at the time of someone's birth determined the maximum length of his life. William argues that there is nothing heretical in believing that the stars affect the balance of humors in animals or the length of time that the soul will be joined to a body. It would be heretical, however, to believe that the stars conferred offices, kingdoms, riches, or power, for these things pertain to free choice (liberum arbitrium),

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[17] See for example Philosophia mundi, PL 172, 62B-64B, and PL 90, 1144C-1146B; and Glosae super Macrobium (longer redaction) 1.5.2.

chance (casus), or the gift of God.[18] While accepting the influence of the stars on man's physical life, William totally rejects their influence on his moral life. He denies determinism any control over man's character.

John of Salisbury discounts the possibility of stellar influence on human life in even stronger terms than William and describes the practice of astrology as leading to damnation.[19] But Bernard Silvestris shows much greater interest in the effect of the stars on man. As a part of his portrayal of the universe, he offers a description of the heavens which ascribes a major role to astrology.

> For the sky writes with stars, and prefigures all that can arise through decree of fate. It foretells by what means and manner the movement of the stars may determine the course of the ages. The sequence of events

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[18] William of Conches, Glosae super Platonem, pp. 211-12. Cf. Glosae super Boetium 3 m. 9.19, and 5 pr. 2.16-21. For further discussion of William's attitude toward the stars' influence on man see Flatten, Wilhelm, p. 138; Jeauneau, "Integumentum," pp. 80-84; Gregory, Anima, pp. 216-18; and Richard Lemay, Abu Ma'shar and Latin Aristotelianism in the Twelfth Century (Beirut, 1962), esp. pp. 82-85. On the medieval attitude toward astrology see especially Theodore O. Wedel, The Mediaeval Attitude Toward Astrology (New Haven, 1920), esp. pp. 25-41; Franz Boll and Carl Bezold, Sternglaube und Sterndeutung, 4th ed. (Leipzig, 1931), esp. pp. 33-55 and 110-12; Lynn Thorndike, A History of Magic and Experimental Science, 8 vols. (New York, 1923-58), 2:3-121; Eugenio Garin, "Magia e astrologia nella cultura del Rinascimento," in Medioevo e Rinascimento (Bari, 1954), pp. 150-69; Marie-Thérèse d'Alverny, "Astrologues et théologiens au XII^{e} siècle," in Melanges offerts a M.-D. Chenu (Paris, 1967), pp. 31-50; and Chauncey Wood, Chaucer and the Country of the Stars (Princeton, 1970), esp. pp. 3-44. Thorndike and Lemay both tend to overemphasize the role determinism plays in William's thought. A serious weakness in Lemay's theory of the importance of Abu Ma'shar's writings on William is that, unlike Abu, William rejects astral influence on the formation of man's character.

[19] John of Salisbury, Policraticus 2. 19-26 and 28, vol. 1, pp. 107-43 and 161-66.

> which ages to come and the measured course [ordo] of time will unfold, lies already in the stars.[20]

Bernard goes on to give examples of what is foretold in the stars. This includes such things as the wealth of Croesus, the incontinence of Paris, the cleverness of Odysseus, and the strength of Hercules.

These lines in the Cosmographia have traditionally led critics to see Bernard as one of the leading proponents of astrological determinism.[21] More recently critics have become increasingly aware of the ambiguities in Bernard's attitude toward astrological determinism and have seen him as generally in concord with William's opposition to anything but a very limited determinism.[22] In his detailing of what is revealed in the stars, Bernard has in mind patterns of behavior more than individual lives. He believes that individuals as well as nations have predictable characteristics which can shape their destiny, but he by no means expresses belief in complete determinism. He clearly

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[20] Bernard Silvestris, Cosmographia (De mundi universitate) 1.3.33-38, ed. Carl S. Barach and Johann Wrobel (Innsbruck, 1876), p. 16.

[21] See for example Thorndike, Magic, 2: 102-6; Ernst Robert Curtius, European Literature and the Latin Middle Ages, trans. Willard R. Trask (New York, 1953), pp. 108-12; and Richard Lemay, Abu, pp. 258-84.

[22] The best expression of this new interpreation is given by Peter Dronke, Fabula: Explorations into the Uses of Myth in Medieval Platonism, Mittellateinische Studien und Texte, Band 9 (Leyden, 1974), pp. 138-43. Winthrop Wetherbee, Platonism and Poetry in the Twelfth Century (Princeton, 1972), pp. 158-86, also emphasizes the anti-deterministic elements in Bernard's thought. Brian Stock, Myth and Science in the Twelfth Century (Princeton, 1972), esp. pp. 27-30 and 129-32, emphasizes the ambiguity of Bernard's position, but still finds more determinism in his writings than do Dronke and Wetherbee.

states that what is written in the heavens is not what will arise but what can (venire potest) arise through fate.

In Urania's discourse on the creation of man, Bernard offers an even clearer statement that only some things are fated.

> The human mind (mens) must be led by me through all the ethereal realms so that it may better know the laws of the fates, and inexorable destiny, and the vicissitudes of variable fortune; so that it may better know what thing is open to choice, what to necessity, and what falls to uncertain chance. . . .
>
> By the laws of the stars man is assigned at birth the duration of his life and the means of its final sundering.[23]

Chance, destiny, and free choice all have areas which lie under their control. Bernard does not specifically state what is subject to fate and what to free choice, but he does state that the stars foretell the length of a man's life, one of the few things William describes as astrologically determined. In the Cosmographia, Bernard attributes to the stars a larger role in man's life than William and John, but his determinism is still limited rather than complete.

This interpreation of Bernard is strengthened by an examination of his other works. In his Experimentarius, a supposed translation of an Arabic work on geomancy, Bernard gives a description, similar to his remarks in the Cosmographia of how the stars can foretell future events. But he then seriously undercuts the gravity of his description by saying

> I judge these to be trifles, but subtle ones. Although I do not think it completely useless to have and know them so that we might play with them, not believe in them. . . . For:

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[23]Bernard Silvestris, Cosmographia 2.4.31-36 and 47-48, pp. 39-40.

> A bird avoids nets which are more visible. If things are known ahead of time, there is less uncertainty. If the enemy is foreseen, he is less frightening when seen nearby. Things which happen unexpectedly do more harm than those known ahead of time.[24]

The stars can perhaps tell us something about the future, but we should not become too involved in such investigations or take them overly seriously. Furthermore, the effects of future events can perhaps be alleviated or avoided when they are foreseen.

In his Mathematicus Bernard describes just such an avoidance of a fate foretold by the stars. Before Patricida's birth it is predicted that he will be endowed with all beauty, bravery, and wisdom. He will grow in virtue and honor and eventually become king of Rome, but then he will kill his own father. Unaware of the prophecy, Patricida carries it out to the point of becoming king of Rome. But then, on learning of the prophecy, he requests the Roman people to let him commit suicide in order to prevent its fulfillment. When they refuse, he takes firm control of his own destiny:

> If, because I perform the duties of the office you have given me, I, your king, cease to be king over myself,
> Quickly I lay down this robe, quickly I divest your king,
> Free and unentangled to fulfill my own desires.[25]

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[24] Bernard Silvestris, Experimentarius, ed. Mirella Brini-Savorelli, Rivista critica di storia della filosofia 14 (1959): 317. The indented matter appears in poetic form.

[25] Dronke, Fabula, pp. 126-43, offers the most perceptive analysis of the poem, to which I am greatly indebted. Other useful treatments may be found in Wetherbee, Platonism, pp. 153-58. Wolfram von den Steinem, "Les sujets d'inspiration chez le poètes latins du XII^{e} siècle," CCM 9 (1966):373-83; and Bezold, Fortleben, pp. 83-87.

As Dronke has observed, the poem seems throughout to be asking one queston and suddenly ends by answering another. Throughout the poem the question has seemed to be "Can Patricida cheat fate by killing himself to prevent a predestined murder?" At the end the hero establishes not so much his freedom to commit suicide as his freedom to choose his own course of action, regardless of the pressures of the outside world.[26] Patricida, by renouncing his kingship, in effect removes himself from the wheel of fortune and places his actions again under his own control. Man has the freedom to reject the wheel of fortune just as Patricida does and thereby to create his own destiny. Bernard seems to agree with William in strictly limiting the force of astrological determinism in man's life.

Just as he limits the influence of fortune and the stars, so William seems to limit the influence of grace on morality. Since William rarely mentions grace and never devotes himself to a detailed discussion of its workings, any analysis of his views on grace must be drawn from indirect statements. These statements, nonetheless, seem to indicate that while William views grace as a gift of God enabling all men to live virtuously, he never sees it as an irresistible force. William's most detailed discussion of the role of grace appears in conjunction with his explanation of Plato's theory of the transmigration of the soul. Plato had explained that each soul would appear as a man in its first incarnation. If that man lived virtuously, he would return

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[26]Dronke, Fabula, pp. 136-38.

to his spiritual home and live a happy life. But if he lived wickedly, he would be reincarnated first as a woman and, if he persisted in his wrong doing, then as a beast.[27] William naturally considers this account an integumentum and gives it a lengthy exposition. He explains that God decreed that the first incarnation, which represents the union of the soul and body, would be the same for all. All are born the same, since all that anyone is at birth comes from grace alone without preceding merit. The second incarnation represents reaching the age of accountability, when an individual becomes capable of acting virtuously or sinfully. Since virtues are attained by individual merit, everyone is not the same in the second generation.[28]

William is not content to offer this explanation, which only hints at the mythical implications of the Platonic account. He states clearly Plato's true meaning, covered by the integumentum, of the transmigration of the soul.

> For it ought not to be believed that the same soul is first in a man and afterwards passes into a woman, then into brute animals. . . . Nor should it be believed that the soul itself has in itself any sex, but this mutation holds in regard to morals. While the soul acts virilely, it is regarded as a man. But when it is made effeminate by certain desires, though still retaining some part of reason, it is believed to be a woman. If, losing reason, it becomes habituated to vices, it is said to become irrational according to the nature of these. . . . And this is 'in the time of the second generation,' that is after fifteen years, because before that time, not matter what happens, no fault or virtue should be judged. But then begins the molding either in vice or virtue.[29]

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[27]Plato, Timaeus a Calcidio 41e-42a, pp. 36-37.

[28]Glosae super Platonem, pp. 214-15. In rejecting the preexistence of souls, William is of course following Christian tradition rather than Platonic and Neoplatonic teachings. Cf. Jerome, Epistola 126.1, PL 23, 478C.

[29]Ibid., p. 218.

God's grace gives the same opportunity for virtuous living to all, but men choose differently, and their choices form their moral character.

William makes several similar statements, all of which seem to leave little room for the doctrine of compelling grace or predestination. For example he bases his argument that the soul cannot exist before the body on his belief in the necessity of merit to precede rewards or punishments. "For if the soul existed before [the body] it would be either in misery or blessedness, without preceding merit."[30]

William is almost alone among the Chartrians in implying such a limited role for grace. But one of the commentaries on Boethius' De Trinitate from the School of Thierry of Chartres does strongly insist on the need of man's participation with grace. This writer argues that the need for grace for all good acts does

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[30] Philosophia, PL 172, 98C-D, and PL 90, 1177A. For other examples see Glosae super Platonem, pp. 209 and 232; and Glosae super Boetium 3 pr. 10.89. In contrast to the limitation William places on the role of grace in man's normal life, there was strong Augustinian emphasis on grace and predestination among both his predecessors and his contemporaries. See for example Anselm of Canterbury, De concordia praescientiae et praedestinationis et gratia Dei cum libero arbitrio 3.2-6, ed. F. S. Schmitt, Sancti Anselmi opera omnia, 6 vols. (Rome and Edinburgh, 1938-61), 2: 264-71; and Bernard of Clairvaux, De gratia et libero arbitrio 5-6, ed. Jean Leclercq, C. H. Talbot, and H. M. Rochais, Sancti Bernardi opera, 7 vols. to date (Rome, 1957-), 3:173-77. For a good introduction to Augustine's doctrine of predestination see John M. Rist, "Augustine on Free Will and Predestination," Journal of Theological Studies, n.s., 20 (1969):420-27. For some discussion of the doctrines of grace and predestination in the eleventh and twelfth centuries, see Artur M. Landgraf, Dogmengeschichte der Frühscholastik, Teil 1: Die Gnadenlehre (Regensburg, 1952), esp. pp. 65-114; Jasper Hopkins, A Companion to the Study of St. Anselm (Minneapolis, 1972), pp. 122-86, and Bernard McGinn, Introduction to On Grace and Free Choice by Bernard of Clairvaux, Cistercian Father Series, no. 19 (Kalamazoo, 1977), pp. 6-38.

not annul the need for merit. Some grace, such as faith, is simply given. Other grace, like perseverance or eternal beatitude, must be merited by faith. Only this "first" gift of grace, which is given to all men, occurs without preceding merit. The commentator argues further that he disagrees with those who say God withdraws himself from man so that he does not impart his grace. For God offers himself to all, but each man determines whether or not he comes to God. In the same way the light of the sun is offered to all, but each man decides whether he will withdraw from the sun and be in darkness or draw near the sun and be illuminated.[31]

William thus creates, with at least some support from his fellow Christians, a closed ethical system comparable to his closed natural system. Just as the world, following its creation by God from nothing and God's enacting of natural laws, functions independently of outside forces, so man, infused with God's enabling grace and upon reaching the age of accountability, makes his moral decisions independent of outside pressures.

William further moves to establish the basis of man's moral autonomy with his insistence that man has freedom of choice (libertas arbitrii). Following closely Boethius' discussion, William argues that freedom of choice, without which no rational creature can exist, consists of a man's freedom both to discern

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[31]School of Thierry of Chartres, Commentarius victorinus, ed. Nikolaus M. Häring, in Commentaries on Boethius by Thierry of Chartres and His School, p. 484. For other commentaries of the School of Thierry of Chartres which give a totally different interpretation to the same text see Commentum, ed. Nikolaus M. Häring, in ibid., p. 58; and Lectiones, p. 127.

what he wants and to carry out his desires.[32] William offers one of his fullest statements about man's freedom of choice in his explication of the myth of the judgment of Paris. The three goddesses, Juno, Pallas, and Venus, representing respectively the active, the contemplative, and the voluptuous, each sought to be judged the most worthy by Jupiter. Each of the goddesses strove to win the golden apple, that is beatitude, because each of these ways of life seems to make one blessed. But Jupiter did not want to choose between them because he did not want to seem to remove man's freedom of choice. So the goddesses sought the judgment of Paris, representing every man. Paris chose Venus because the greatest number of mankind choose the life of the senses.[33] Bernard Silvestris repeats a similar interpretation of this myth in his Commentary on Vergil.[34]

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[32] Glosae super Boetium 5 pr. 2.5-7. For the Boethian comments upon which William bases his discussion see Boethius, Consolatio 5 pr. 2-5, pp. 370-96.

[33] Glosae super Boetium 3 m. 12.34. William is here following with some elaboration a traditional interpretation of the myth of the judgment of Paris. Cf. Fulgenius, Mythologies 2.1, ed. R. Helm in Fulgentii Opera (Leipzig, 1898), pp. 36-39. For a discussion of William's explication of this myth see Jeauneau, "Integumentum," pp. 50-52.

[34] Bernard Silvestris, Commentary on Vergil 6.64, p. 46. For another example of the Chartrians' expressing belief in man's freedom of choice see John of Salisbury, Policraticus 2.20-23, vol. 1, pp. 113-33. On the medieval tradition which expressed belief in man's freedom of choice see especially Étienne Gilson, The Spirit of Mediaeval Philosophy, trans. A. H. C. Downes (New York, 1940), pp. 302-23; and Odon Lottin, "Libre arbitre et liberté depuis saint Anselme jusq'à la fin du XIII^{e} siècle," in Psychologie et morale aux XII^{e} et XIII^{e} siècles, 1:11-63.

Such statements regarding man's possession of freedom of choice are traditional medieval writings, but William goes beyond traditional statements in his insistence on limiting one's responsibility to those acts freely and knowingly done. Following Boethius' discussion of the relation of divine foreknowledge and human freedom of choice, William states that "Nothing ought to be called a virtue unless it is brought about from a good spirit (bonus animus) and not coerced--whence coerced actions should not be rewarded; nor should crimes be punished unless they are done with a free and evil spirit."[35] William repeatedly stresses that only those acts which come from a free choice, and not those done under compulsion or in ignorance, lead to the attainment of vices or virtues.[36] He views coercion and ignorance as factors which exclude any moral value from an action. He raises still other factors as legitimate excuses in treating Plato's discussion of the punishment of returning to hell those who neglect learning and instruction. William argues that this

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[35]Glosae super Boetium 5 pr. 3.92.

[36]Glosae super Macrobium (longer redaction) 1.8.2-4. Cf. Philosophia, PL 172, 98C-D, and PL 90, 1177A; and Glosae super Platonem, p. 221. A major source for William's distinction between voluntary and involuntary actions seems to be Nemesius of Emessa, Premnon physicon, trans. into Latin by Alfanus of Salerno, ed. Carolus Burkhard (Leipzig, 1917), pp. 109-17. There is also possible Stoic influence, especially on the concept of voluntas, from Cicero and Seneca. See for example Cicero Tusculanae disputationes 4.6.12, Loeb Classical Library, pp. 20-22. For a discussion of voluntas in Stoic thought see Andre-Jean Voelke, L'idee de volonte dans le stoicisme (Paris, 1972), esp. pp. 56-105 and 161-90. For two opposing interpretations of the Stoic position on the relation between freedom and necessity, see Sandbach, pp. 101-8, who stresses the Stoic emphasis on necessity, and A. A. Long, Freedom and Determinism in the Stoic Theory of Human Actionm" in his Problems in Stoicism (London, 1971), pp. 173-99, who interprets the Stoics as proponents of freedom.

penalty is for neglecting, not for lacking, learning. For there are many people who lack learning because of their living in an unsuitable place, or because of their status as slaves or prisoners, or because of their poverty. But the only ones punished for their lack of learning are those who, despite favorable location, circumstances, and possessions, still fail to seek it.[37]

William makes one of his most forceful statements for excluding some actions from blame or praise in his gloss on Boethius' treatment of the will. This passage also provides the only place in his commentary where William says that Boethius apparently errs. Boethius' statement that no action occurs without will leads to a lengthy denial by William.

> For man does many things which are not from his will (voluntas). For some actions are natural, such as sleep and similar things; some are voluntary (voluntarii); some are involuntary (involuntarii). Some of the involuntary are through coercion, some through ignorance. But of those acts, the natural and involuntary, either through coercion or through ignorance, are without will.[38]

William then gives the arguments of those who agree with Boethius that no action occurs without will. They say that with natural actions there is a natural will. In coerced actions there is more will than coercion, for otherwise the person would kill himself rather than be coerced. And in actions done in ignorance there is a will to do something, even if the final results are

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[37] Glosae super Platonem, p. 232.

[38] Glosae super Boetium 4 pr. 2.14. William's lengthy explanation of his disagreement with Boethius is missing in several of the manuscripts, but the compatability of the statements with William's other writings and the fact that there is an obvious gap in the manuscripts which do not include the passage lead me to consider the statement to be William's rather than a later addition.

unforeseen. William rejects such arguments because "if every act is with the will, every act would be culpable or laudable. But certain acts are neither culpable nor laudable; therefore, every act is not done with the will."[39]

While here rejecting the argument that every action results from a will, William does argue in other parts of his writing that some actions stem from natural will (naturalis voluntas) rather than free choice. In discussing the necessity of a seed from both parents, he rejects the argument that since a seed cannot be emitted without will, if a female seed were necessary, then a raped woman could not become pregnant. William argues there are two wills in man--a natural and a rational. In the case of a raped woman, pregnancy is possible because, although the rational will (rationalis voluntas) is lacking, the natural will is present.[40] But William clearly excludes natural acts occurring with a natural will from the area of moral consideration.

After rejecting the apparent opinion of Boethius that every act results from a will, William offers an interpretation of Boethius' remarks with which he can agree. In this passage Boethius is speaking only about those actions which come from free choice. For some actions are accidental, some coerced, some voluntary. Here Boethius refers only to those actions by which

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[39] Glosae super Boetium 4 pr. 2.14.

[40] Dragmaticon (Dialogus de substantiis physicis), ed. Guilelmus Gratarolus (Strasbourg, 1567), pp. 241-42. Cf. Philosophia, PL 172, 89B-C, and PL 90, 1170B.

man is judged good or bad.[41] William insists that only acts of free choice merit praise or blame. Acts done under compulsion, in ignorance, and through a natural will are all excluded from ethical consideration.

While excluding from the field of ethics everything affected by outside forces, William strongly insists that man has control over a wide area of his life and that within this area he is responsible for his actions. The belief in man's ability to improve himself is central to William's ethical thought. A key element in this belief is that the beginning of understanding comes from instruction, but that the continuation and perfection of the understanding must come from the student himself.[42] Because of the loss of human perfection with original sin, man is no longer able to possess immediate understanding; but, excited by the instruction of his teachers, he can through his diligence achieve that understanding. William insists that man can learn those things of which he is ignorant because, as Virgil says, "Persistent labor overcomes all things."[43]

William's Moralium dogma philosophorum offers testimony of his belief that life affords man the opportunity for perfecting

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[41] Glosae super Boetium 4 pr. 2.14.

[42] Philosophia: Ausgabe des 1. Buchs von Wilhelm von Conches' "Philosophia," ed. Gregor Maurach (Pretoria, 1974), p. 22, PL 172, 50D, and PL 90, 1134A. Cf. Philosophia, PL 172, 99A-B, and PL 90, 1177B-C; and Glosae super Platonem, p. 283. For examples of the Stoic emphasis on the value of education, a probable source for this theme in William, see Cicero, De officiis 2.27, pp. 168-74; and Seneca, Epistulae 76, vol. 2, pp. 146-68.

[43] Glosae super Boetium 3 m. 11.1. Cf. Virgil, Georgics 1.145, Loeb Classical Library, p. 6.

himself, since his purpose in writing the book was to encourage the cultivation of the moral life.[44] The assumption that man can act more virtuously and wisely underlies this work by William as it does the Policraticus of his student, John of Salisbury.[45] John also argues in his Metalogicon that man has a natural ability to act virtuously and wisely, but that he must labor to improve himself. For just as a natural ability easily deteriorates when neglected, so it is strengthened by cultivation.[46] William gives a graphic portrayal of man's choice to improve or to neglect his natural ability in the introduction to Book 4 of his Dragmaticon.

> If the ploughshare is hidden away by the farmer, it wastes away in unused rust; if it is attached to a plough, it produces and shines brightly, and still wastes away. A candle, unless it is lighted, is judged to be useless; lighted, it aids others and consumes itself. "Oh man, why do you laugh? With the change of a word the fable is told about you." If you give yourself up to leisure and inertia, you will perish with disuse; however, if you apply yourself to some honest study, you will aid others and shine with glory, but still your body will be consumed. Whatever you do harms your body; choose from the two courses whether you want to be idle or busy. Idleness is followed by destruction, but industriousness is followed by an untarnished glory.[47]

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[44] Moralium dogma, p. 6 and passim.

[45] John of Salisbury, Policraticus 8.25, vol. 2, pp. 418-25.

[46] John of Salisbury, Metalogicon 1.8, pp. 23-26. For similar statements of belief in man's ability to use his life on earth for self-improvement see Bernard Silvestris, Commentary on Vergil, pp. 60, 62, and 71; and Compendium, ed. Ottaviano, pp. 23-24. This theme, like much of the rest of the Chartrian ethics, seems to indicate Stoic influence. On the role of this theme in Stoic thought see Max Pohlenz, Die Stoa, 4th ed. (Göttingen, 1970), pp. 111-31, 271-74, and 317-20; G. B. Kerford, "Cicero and Stoic Ethics," in Cicero and Virgil, Studies in Honour of Harold Hunt (Amsterdam, 1972), pp. 60-74.

[47] Dragmaticon, pp. 97-98. The quote is from Horace, Sermonum 1.1.69-70, Loeb Classical Library, pp. 8-10.

William argues that life constitutes not only a vale of tears but also a possibility for improving oneself and striving after perfection.

William describes each man as personally responsible for whether or not he takes advantage of the opportunity to increase in wisdom and virtues. God gave man a soul to correct the illicit motions of the body. If the soul is negligent in correcting the body, it is held responsible for the actions of the body, just as a negligent master or teacher is not without blame for the actions of his servant or pupil.[48] In his explanation of why Plato refers to the soul as fenus, William emphasizes that man is responsible for his actions during his earthly life.

> Fenus is a sum of money which is lent for a time so that it might be returned with an increase; this gain (usuria) is called the interest. Whence the soul is appropriately called fenus, for the soul is for a time lent to the body, so that it might be returned to the Creator with an increase of wisdom and virtues, as if with interest (usuria).[49]

William describes man as capable of self-improvement and responsible to the Creator for pursuing those improvements through an increase in wisdom and virtue.

William insists that each man determines his own end and makes of himself what he chooses. Elaborating on passages in Boethius, he argues that man transforms himself into something above or beneath his nature by attaining or failing to attain

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[48]Philosophia, PL 172, 97C-98A, and PL 90, 1176C-D. Cf. Compendium, ed. Rialdi, p. 100. For other statements by William regarding man's responsibility for the use he makes of his life see Glosae super Platonem, pp. 215-232.

[49]Glosae super Platonem, p. 209.

wisdom and virtue. At one point he explains why philosophy appears over the head of Boethius:

> Philosophy makes man ascend above the nature of man, that is, man is deified (deificari). For there are two departures, that is, digressions, from human nature. For man is a mortal rational being. Man goes beyond this when through wisdom and virtue he is rendered immortal, and then he is an immortal rational being. . . . The other departure is when he is rendered irrational through vice, and then he is a mortal irrational being, just like a brute animal.[50]

Though, by nature rational and mortal, men become immortal through the acquisition of knowledge and virtues, and so they are by participation (participatio) like God.[51] But men who neglect knowledge and virtue lose their human nature and become like beasts, spiritually if not physically. Since the soul is more worthy than the body, this spiritual transformation is more serious than a physical transformation.[52]

Several of William's fellow Chartrians offer similar descriptions of how a man transforms himself into a beast by living wickedly. Various writers of the School of Thierry of Chartres explain that Boethius refers to men who do not use reason

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[50] Glosae super Boetium 1 pr. 1.3. The main sources on which William bases this discussion of the transformation of men into beasts or gods are Boethius, Consolation 3 pr. 10 and 4 pr. 3 and m. 3, pp. 266-74 and 314-22; Macrobius, Commentarii 1.13, pp. 51-55; and Nemesius of Emessa, Premnon physicon, esp. pp. 9-12. William's views on the natural state of man are somewhat unclear. Here and in his Dragmaticon, p. 235, he definitely describes man as by nature rationalis mortalis. But in his Glosae super Platonem he describes the soul of man as perpetua, which he defines as "quod incipit in tempore et caret fine," p. 111.

[51] Glosae super Boetium 3 pr. 10.89-90.

[52] Ibid., 4 pr. 3.51-56 and 4 m. 3.1.

as human beasts, for man was created so that he might exercise reason.[53] John of Salisbury refers to the degeneration of man into a beast through wicked deeds.[54] And Bernard Silvestris, in words which recall William, says that a man becomes a beast when he "who is naturally rational and immortal in his soul, by excessive delight in temporal things becomes irrational and mortal."[55] But while these other Chartrians make frequent use of the theme of man's transforming himself into a beast, only William emphasizes that man may likewise transform himself into a god.

William shows much more concern in creating an ethical system than his fellow Chartrians and is much more rigorous than his colleagues in establishing man's control of his own destiny. While William shares many of the tenets of his ethical thought with the other Chartrians, he is alone in extending to its logical conclusion each concept which affects man's sovereignty. Since man is not responsible for what he cannot control, none of those things outside man's control can influence his morality. On the other hand, those actions which man undertakes freely and intentionally are his responsibility, and these actions in fact provide the basis of a man's moral worth. William insists that man has the opportunity to use his life as a time for self-improvement and that through his use or misuse of that opportunity each man makes his own destiny.

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[53]School of Thierry of Chartres, Abbreviatio monacensis, ed. Nikolaus M. Häring, in Commentaries on Boethius by Thierry of Chartres and His School, p. 318; Commentum, p. 60; and Lectiones, p. 130.

[54]John of Salisbury, Policraticus 1.1, vol. 1, p. 19. For a discussion see Lieschütz, esp. 23 and 74-84.

[55]Bernard Silvestris, Commentary on Vergil 3.386, p. 22.

Chapter VI

CONCLUSION

All four of the themes traditionally associated with the Renaissance concept of the dignity of man do appear then in the writings of those twelfth-century masters connected with the cathedral School of Chartres. In fact these themes both form the cornerstone of much of Chartrian speculation and represent the areas in which the Chartrians most differed from their monastic contemporaries and predecessors. While present in all the Chartrian writers, these themes differed greatly in their import among the various Chartrians. Their fullest developments occurred in the writings of William of Conches and to a somewhat lesser extent in John of Salisbury and Bernard Silvestris. These writers, especially William, seem to have carried to its logical conclusion each of the various elements which made up their positive view of man.

All the Chartrians shared a great knowledge of and empathy with ancient pagan philosophy and literature. For the Chartrians the ancients served not only as models of eloquence but also as sources of wisdom. The Chartrians looked upon the ancients as authorities comparable to the Bible and Church Fathers and believed that a proper understanding of both sacred and profane authorities would lead to a true comprehension of the world and

themselves. Against the criticism of their monastic contemporaries that they were deserting their faith for philosophy, the Chartrians strongly denied any such apostasy and insisted that the ancient writings complemented rather than contradicted the Christian revelation. By means of an allegorical reading of their ancient and Christian authorities, the Chartrians brought them in line with one another and at the same time with their own world view.

Likewise all the Chartrians raised reason to the status of a legitimate guide of human activities. They saw reason as complementing their faith rather than conflicting with it. Unlike many of their monastic contemporaries and predecessors, they did not emphasize the debilitating effects of the Fall on man's rational capabilities, but rather stressed that reason remained a viable power. Reason was a gift of God to man and the human ability which most closely linked man to God, but reason also retained its position as a natural power. Man attained comprehension of himself, of the world, and even to some extent of God not by divine illumination but by rational investigation and consideration of data obtained through sense perception. Attacked by many of the monastic writers for their undue reliance on reason and their meddling in the hidden secrets of God, the Chartrians affirmed their confidence in their rational powers and criticized the monks' neglect of this gift of God to man. William especially insisted that it was man's duty to seek rational explanations wherever possible; only in those areas in which no such explanation could be found should man rely on faith alone.

Relying on their knowledge of ancient philosophy and their use of rational inquiry, the Chartrians turned to speculation about God, the world, and man. They showed a willingness to seek a rational comprehension of divine things quite foreign to the mysticism of their monastic contemporaries. Several of the Chartrians, especially William of Conches, Thierry of Chartres, and Bernard Silvestris, applied the bulk of their writings to an investigation of the natural world, thereby revealing a much greater interest in and higher evaluation of the physical world than had been common in their predecessors or contemporaries. In their natural philosophy they developed the concept of the natural world as a closed system originally created by God but which subsequently acted independently according to natural laws discernible to human reason. According to the Chartrians, the study of the natural world provided man not only information about his surroundings but also a deeper understanding of himself and all that he could know about God. The Chartrians turned to the world as an appropriate area of investigation and an authentic source of information.

William, John, and Bernard expanded their consideration of the natural world to include speculation about the moral life of man. Their writings reveal considerable concern for man's life and interaction with his fellow man and indicate, at least with William, the concept of a system of ethics comparable to his system of natural philosophy. In their ethical writings these Chartrians emphasized man's individual autonomy and personal responsibility for his own morality. William insisted that neither grace nor fate nor fortune make a man what he is, rather his

destiny lies in his own hands. By striving for knowledge and virtue a man can improve himself intellectually and morally; indeed each man possesses the capability of raising himself to the level of a god or lowering himself to the level of a beast.

While sharing much in common, the Chartrians showed considerable diversity in their treatment of the various themes we have examined. All agreed in their high valuation of the ancient writings and human reason, but even in this area William seems to have offered a less inhibited praise than his colleagues. In the realm of natural philosophy, William, Thierry, and Bernard obviously expended greater energies than the other Chartrians, and again William was alone in following his speculation about the natural world to its logical conclusion with his demythologizing of the story of Eve's creation, his closed system of natural law, and his praise of the natural world. Only William, Bernard, and John showed a major interest in ethics, and only William developed what may accurately be called an ethical system.

Neither the general Chartrian synthesis of a concept of man nor William's more radicalized version of it was able to survive intact the death of those Chartrians we have examined. Various causes contributed to the dissolution of the Chartrian synthesis. The monastic opposition to the ideas and attitudes of the Chartrians and other like-minded cathedral scholars certainly had its effect. Whether it resulted in the attempted wedding of Chartrian and Cistercian thought, as in Alan of Lille and Isaac of Stella,[1] or the escape into frequently obtuse

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[1]Alan of Lille had close connections with the School of Chartres and is frequently referred to as a Chartrian. As stated

poetical allegories, as in John of Hauvilla,[2] the monastic criticism clearly led to an abandonment of the brash temerity and open rationalism so common in a number of the Chartrians.

Another force preventing the continuation of the Chartrian vision in its entirely was the growing concern for relevancy in the late twelfth century. John of Salisbury's Cornificians had no time for the long and thorough study of the classics which had made the School of Chartres possible.[3] More concerned with

above in chapt. 1, I have not included him in the present analysis because he wrote later than the general period under discussion and Bernard Silvestris rather than William of Conches seems to have provided his link to Chartres. The Chartrian influence on his thought and his blending of Chartrian with Cistercian and Victorine ideas has been frequently noted. See especially Marie-Thérèse d'Alverny, "Alain de Lille et la theologia," in L'homme devant Dieu: Melanges offerts au Père Henri de Lubac, 3 vols. (Paris, 1964), 2:111-28; idem, "Maître Alain--'nova et vetera,'" in Entretiens sur la renaissance du 12e siècle, ed. Maurice de Gandillac and Édouard Jeauneau (Paris, 1968), pp. 117-35; idem, ed., Alain de Lille. Textes inedites (Paris, 1965), pp. 295-306; Winthrop Wetherbee, Platonism and Poetry in the Twelfth Century: The Literary Influence of the School of Chartres (Princeton, 1972), pp. 187-219; George Economou, The Goddess Natura in Medieval Literature (Cambridge, Mass., 1972), pp. 72-101; and Paul Piehler, The Visionary Landscape: A Study in Medieval Allegory (London, 1971), pp. 46-68.

Isaac of Stella approached the same traditions from a Cistercian background and, like Alan, shows influence from Chartrian, Victorine, and Cistercian writings. See Bernard McGinn, The Golden Chain: A Study in the Theological Anthropology of Isaac of Stella, Cistercian Studies Series, vol. 15 (Washington, 1972), pp. 86-102 and 230-31.

[2]On the Chartrian influence on John of Hauvilla's Architrenius see Piehler, pp. 85-94; Wetherbee, Platonism, pp. 242-55; and Paul Gerhard Schmidt, ed., Architrenius by Johannes de Hauvilla (Munich, 1974), pp. 77-80.

[3]For twelfth-century criticism of those students uninterested in any thorough study of the liberal arts see John of Salisbury, Metalogicon 1.4-5, ed. Clement C. J. Webb (Oxford, 1929), pp. 12-15; and Gerald of Wales, Gemma ecclesiastica 2.37, ed. J. S. Brewer, Rerum Britannicarum medii aevi scriptores, vol. 21, pt. 2 (London, 1862), pp. 348-57.

obtaining a position in a royal court or the papal curia than with gaining a true liberal arts training, they demanded short cuts to the classics without any indepth study.

Finally, by their search for a better understanding of the natural world and their willingness to listen to the voices of ancient philosophy and of human reason, the Chartrians encouraged the search for new knowledge and new texts and thereby contributed to their own demise. With the incursion of all the new translations of Aristotle, the assimilation of these new works gained the highest priority.[4] As with the Cornificians, though for a different reason, there was no time or inclination for the thorough study of the Timaeus and the Neoplatonic works so well known at Chartres.

This does not mean that there was no continuation of the Chartrians ideas or no influence on the following centuries. This influence is most clearly seen in and thoroughly documented for the cosmological poets of the late twelfth century like Alan of Lille and John of Hauvilla, and thirteenth-century encyclopedists like Vincent of Beauvais.[5] Scholars have only recently attempted

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[4]The literature on the early development of scholasticism and the incorporation of the new Aristotelian works into the plan of study is of course enormous, but see especially Étienne Gilson, History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages (New York, 1955), pp. 235-50; Fernand van Steenberghen, Aristotle in the West: The Origins of Latin Aristotelianism, trans. Leonard Johnston (Louvain, 1955), esp. pp. 23-88; Pierre Duhem, Le système du monde, 10 vols. (Paris, 1913-59), 5:233-580; Marie-Thérèse d'Alverny, "Les traductions d'Aristote et de ses commentateurs," XII congrès international d'histoire des sciences, Revue de synthèse, 3rd ser., nos. 49-52, 89 (1968): 125-44; and Edward Grant, Physical Science in the Middle Ages (New York, 1971), esp. pp. 13-35.

[5]On Chartrian influence on Alan of Lille see n. 1 above,

to describe the influence of Chartrian thought on the development of medieval romances in the twelfth century and on such later writers as Jean de Meung and Geoffrey Chaucer.[6] Scholars have suggested the possibility of Chartrian influence on thirteenth-century scholasticism, but we still lack any detailed demonstrations of such an influence.[7] Many of the works of the Chartrian masters were found in the libraries of those Renaissance writers in whom the importance of the theme of the dignity of man has long been noted.[8] There was then at School of Chartres a strong sense of the dignity of man which influenced medieval thought for the next two centuries.

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and on John of Hauvilla see n. 2 above. On Chartrian influence on Vincent of Beauvais and the encyclopedists see Édouard Jeauneau, "Note sur l'École de Chartres," SM, 3rd ser., 5 (1964):839; Simone Viarre, "Le commentaire ordonné du monde dans quelques sommes scientifiques des XII^{e} et XIII^{e} siècles," in Classical Influences on European Culture, A.D. 500-1500, ed. R. R. Bolgar (Cambridge, Eng., 1971), pp. 34-38; and Astrik L. Gabriel, The Educational Ideas of Vincent of Beauvais, Texts and Studies in the History of Mediaeval Education, no. 4 (Notre Dame, 1956), p. 12.

[6]See for example Wetherbee, pp. 220-41 and 255-66; Leo Poleman, Das Epos in den romanischen Literaturen (Stuttgart, 1966), pp. 64-67 and 78-88; Claude Luttrell, The Creation of the First Arthurian Romance: A Quest (Evanston, 1974), esp. pp. 5-78; and Terrance Arnold Hipolito, "Chaucer and the School of Chartres" (Ph. D. dissertation, UCLA, 1970).

[7]See the suggestions by Tullio Gregory, Anima mundi: la filosofia di Guglielmo di Conches e la scuola di Chartres (Florence, 1955), p. 263; Édouard Jeauneau, "Gloses sur le Timée du manuscrit Digby 217 de la Bodléienne à Oxford," Sacris erudiri 17 (1966):365-66; and R. W. Southern, "Medieval Humanism," in Medieval Humanism and Other Studies (New York, 1970), pp. 29-60.

[8]On the possible knowledge of the Chartrians among Renaissance writers see Pierre Duhem, "Thierry de Chartres et Nicolas de Cues," Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques 3 (1909):525-30; Raymond Klibansky, The Continuity of the Platonic Tradition during the Middle Ages (London, 1939), pp. 35-36; Paul Oskar Kristeller, "The Scholastic Background of Marsilio Ficino," in Studies in Renaissance Thought and Letters (Rome, 1956), p. 40; and Édouard Jeauneau, ed., Glosae super Platonem by William of Conches, Textes philosophiques du moyen âge, vol. 13 (Paris, 1965), pp. 29-31.

APPENDICES

INTRODUCTION

The following appendices contain the Latin texts for the passages from William of Conches' unedited works referred to in this dissertation. The tentative editions which I offer here were obtained by comparing several of the older, more reliable manuscripts. These are not final texts. I have been working on a collation of these passages with a description of the variant readings, but have decided at this time simply to present my tentative reading of the texts without a critical apparatus. Appendix A contains passages from William's Glosae super Boetium obtained by comparing four of the older manuscripts: Leipzig, Univ. Bibl. cod. lat. 1253, fols. 40v-82v (13th C.); Munich, Bayer. Staatsbibl. Clm 4603, fols. 156r-176v (13th C.); Troyes, Bibl. mun. 1101, fols. 1r-19v (12th C.); and Troyes, Bibl. mun. 1381, fols. 34v-95v (13th C.). Appendix B contains passages from the longer redaction of William's Glosae super Macrobium. The readings provided here were obtained by comparing the two manuscripts representing William's version of the gloss: Munich, Staatsbibl. Clm 14557, fols. 100r-150v (12th C.); and Vatican, Urb. lat. 1140, fols. 2r-153v (15th C.). Appendix C contains a few passages from William's

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Philosophia mundi in which the discrepancies between the two printed versions of the texts, PL 172, 39-102, and PL 90, 1127-78, presented difficulties. My readings were obtained by comparing among the many surviving manuscripts five of the older ones in Munich, Bayer. Staatsbibl.: Clm 18918, fols. 1r-35r (12th C.); Clm 16103, fols. 68r-83v (13th C.); Clm 16103, fols. 84r-99v (13th C.); Clm 564, fols. 2r-31v (12th C.); and Clm 2594, fols. 24r-42r (13th C.).

APPENDIX A

GLOSAE SUPER BOETIUM

MSS: L (Leipzig, Univ. Bibl. cod. lat. 1253, fols. 40v-82v)
M (Munich, Bayer. Staatsbibl. Clm 4603, fols. 156r-176v)
T (Troyes, Bibl. mun. 1101, fols. 1r-19v)
J (Troyes, Bibl. mun. 1381, fols. 34v-95v)

Glosae super Boetium 1 pr. 1.3. MSS: L fols. 42rb-vb, M fol. 157ra, T fol. 2ra-b, J fols. 36v-37r.

Visa est mihi supra verticem astitisse. Philosophia supra verticem Boetio videtur astare quia omnis sapientia a deo habet esse vel quia in vertice, id est in capite, est sedes sapientie, quod quale sit videamus. Tria sunt que faciunt perfecte sapientem: ingenium, id est naturalis vis ad aliquid cito intelligendum, ratio, id est discretio intellectorum, memoria preteritorum. Nisi sciat aliquis intelligere, discernere, memoria retinere, non est perfecte sapiens. Et si ista sciat, sapiens est. Ista vero tria que perfecte sapientem faciunt in capite habent sedem. . . .

Vel aliter philosophia a Boetio supra verticem videtur quia philosophia facit hominem supra naturam hominis ascendere, id est hominem deificari. Sunt enim due extases, id est excessus, humane nature. Est enim homo rationalis mortalis. Hoc modo excedit homo cum per sapientiam et virtutem fit immortalis

Ingenium, id est naturalis vis ad aliquid alte
rius generis, ratio, id est discretio intellectorum, memoria
praeteritorum. [illegible] intellectum, [illegible]
centia pertinere, non est perfecte sapiens. Et si ista solet,
veniunt sed. Ista vero tria quae perfecte sapientem faciunt in
quibus habent eadem. . . .

Vel aliter quidquid a Deo in nostra [illegible]
mala patientibus facit nostram supra naturam homini accedere,
[illegible] deificari. Sunt enim duae extremae, id est ex-
trema, humana natura. Est enim homo rationalis mortalis. Hoc
[illegible]

et tunc est rationalis immortalis. Et hoc est quod invenitur sapientes homines deificari cum ad hoc quod dei est ascendunt scilicet quod sunt rationales immortales. Est alia extasis cum fit per vitium irrationalis, et tunc est irrationalis mortalis, quemadmodum brutum animal. Et hoc est quod veteres dixerunt vitiosos transformari in beluas, non corpore sed morum similitudine. Quia ergo per philosophiam ascendit homo supra naturam hominis recte philosophia a Boetio visa est supra verticem astitisse. Vel aliter vertex hominis est ratio et intellectus quia illis excedit homo alia animalia. Cum sensu et imaginatione illis sit inferior. Multa enim sunt animalia que melius audiunt et vident et sentiunt homine que solo sensu et imaginatione illo non sunt inferiora. Supra rationem vero et intellectum astat philosophia, quia ratione et intellectu percipit homo ea in quibus constat philosophia et ideo supra verticem Boetio visa est astitisse.

Glosae super Boetium 1 pr. 1.11. MSS: L fol. 43ra-b, M fol. 157rb, T fol. 2va, J fols. 37v-38r.

Que cum altius et cetera. Philosophia caput altius extollit quando ad cognitionem creatoris rationem et intellectum dirigit. Et tunc ipsum celum penetrat quia ratio et intellectus docent nullum eorum que in celo sunt esse creatorem. Immo super omnem creaturam esse creatorem, non loco quia nullo loco clauditur, sed potentia scilicet quia omnia ab ipso habent esse et disponi, ipse vero a nullo.

Glosae super Boetium 1 pr. 1.18. MSS: L fols. 43vb-44ra, M fol. 157a-b, T fols. 2vb-3ra, J fols. 38v-39r.

Harum in extremo [extrema: Boetii codices] margine. Ostendit vestes philosophie modo vult ostendere quod in eis pictum esset dicens quod in supremo margine Theta legebatur in textum, in extremo Pi grecum. Querendum est cur iste littere ibi picte sunt et quare Theta in superiori margine, Pi in inferiori. Pictura vestium philosophie nichil aliud est nisi id quod in philosophicis libris continetur, quod ut melius intelligatur a genere ipsius id est a scientia incipiamus. Scientie sunt due species: sapientia et eloquentia. Et est sapientia vera cognitio rerum. Eloquentia est scientia proferendi cognita cum ornatu verborum et sententiarum. Et dicuntur species scientie quia in istis duobus est omnis scientia scilicet in cognoscendo res et ornate proferendo cognita. Eloquentie tres sunt partes: grammatica, rethorica, dialectica. Sapientia vero et philosophia idem sunt, unum nomen grecum, aliud latinum. Unde potest videri quod eloquentia nec aliqua pars illius est de philosophia. Quod auctoritate Tulii probari potest qui in prologo Rethorice dicit, "Sapientia sine eloquentia prodest sed parum. Eloquentia vero sine sapientia non tantum non prodest sed etiam nocet." . . . Sed quia theorica dignior est practica, idcirco dicit in superiori margine esse intextum Theta et Pi in inferiori. Ita habemus quare iste littere in vestibus philosophie sint intexte et quare una superior altera inferior. Sed ne aliquis putaret istas artes quocumque ordine esse dicendas, addit, atque inter utrasque litteras (l. 19).

Glosae super Boetium 1 m. 2.2. MSS: L fol. 46rb, M fol. 158vb, T fol. 4ra, J fol. 42r.

Relicta propria luce, id est ratione et intellectu que dicuntur lux quia illuminant hominem ad cognitionem creatoris et creature. Propria lux dicitur ad differentiam corporalis lucis oculorum que non est propria lux hominis quia in multis aliis est communis. Sed ista propria lux est hominis quia soli homini in terrenis convenit.

Glosae super Boetium 1 pr. 2.13-14. MSS: L fol. 48vb, M fol. 160ra-b, T fol. 5ra, J fol. 45r.

Sui paulisper oblitus. Inter philosophos erat certum perfectam sapientiam esse se nosse. Unde Iuvenalis: de celo descendit Gnocis elitos, id est cognoscere te ipsum. Si enim aliquis se cognoscit, scit se esse ex parte, id est secundum corpus, mortalem, ex parte, id est secundum animam, immortalem. Et ita plus diligit id quod in se immortale est, id est animam, quam quod mortale est. Et ita non ponet totam curam in temporalibus quia in his non sunt bona anime, sed in celestibus. Ex contrario se ignorare stulticia est quia qui se ignorat nescit se esse nisi corpus, et ideo non querit nisi bona corporis. Quare extollitur eorum prosperitate et deprimitur adversitate. Quia ergo Boetius depressus erat adversitate temporali sui oblitus erat, cum in eis bonum summum esse putabat. Sed ne aliquis putaret omnino eum oblitum sui et ita vel non posse vel graviter posse consolari, dicit paulisper et subiungit recordabitur facile. Sed tali modo si quidem nos ante cognoverit quia non potest se aliquis nosse nisi per philosophiam. Ideo ante oportet eum nosse philosophiam et per philosophiam se nosse.

communis. Sed iste proprie lux est homînis cuius

Glosae super Boetium 1 m. 3.3-5. MSS: L fol. 49ra-b, M fol. 160rb, T fol. 5rb, J fol. 45v.

Notandum est convenientem esse comparationem solis et rationis et intellectus; quia sicut sol illuminat mundum, ita et illa hominem. Et quamadmodum sol latet Choro [Coro: Boetii codices] inducente nubem, ita ratio et intellectus latent adversitate inducente dolorem. Et quemadmodum sole deficiente tali modo nox non naturalis super terram funditur, ita deficiente ratione et intellectu aliquo casu ignorantia non naturalis sed viciosa fit in homine.

Glosae super Boetium 1 pr. 6.24, 40. MSS: L fol. 53ra, M fol. 162rb, T fol. 7rb, J fols. 51r-v.

Sed dic michi. Hec est secunda questio quibus gubernaculis mundus a deo regatur. Sed hoc dicit Boetius se ignorare quia miser homo non potest sentire quod deus omnia bonitate sola ad bonum dirigat quia credit quedam esse mala et ideo dolet cum illa sibi contingunt et hec est una causa quare Boetius doleat.

Quid ipse sis, nosse desisti. Boetius confessus erat se non esse aliud quam animal rationale mortale. Ideo dicit philosophia eum oblitum esse quid sit et hoc dolore quia philosophia vult quod homo ex parte, id est ex anima, sit immortalis et ita debet querere bona immortalia et eterna. Sed quia miseri hoc nesciunt, non querunt alia quam transitoria bona et ideo cum ea amittunt, dolent.

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Glosae super Boetium 1 m. 7.1. MSS: L fol. 53rb, M fol. 162rb, T fol. 7rb, J fol. 51v.

Nubibus atris et cetera. Dixerat removendam esse turbationem animi ut posset Boetius verum cernere quia dum illa inest nullum verum potest perspicere. Hoc probat in istis versibus tribus similitudinibus, scilicet nubium et siderum, et unde vitree et turbate ceno, et amnis de monte fluentis et saxi obiecti. Et est conveniens comparatio siderum ad rationem et intellectum nubium ad turbationem doloris quia sicut sidera illuminant subdita et lucent naturaliter nisi nubes interponantur, ita ratio et intellectus illuminant hominem et lucent ex natura nisi aliquis affectus temporalium interponatur. Similiter unde modo vitree modo sordide et visus quia sicut in unda vitrea videtur aliquid sed non perfecte, cum vero est turbida nichil videtur. Ita ratio humana, cum non est turbata aliquo affectu, videt rerum naturas sed non perfecte secundum illud videmus nunc per speculum in enigmate. Cum vero aliquo affectu est turbata, nichil cognoscit. Eodem modo est conveniens comparatio amnis defluentis de monte et rationis, et saxi obiecti et doloris quia ratio de monte, id est de creatore, descendit, sed obstinatione doloris pervenientis de temporalibus ut saxo de rupe soluto resistit.

Glosae super Boetium 2 pr. 1.59-60. MSS: L fol. 54va, M fol. 162va, T fol. 7va, J fol. 52r.

Tu vero volventis. Fortuna depingebatur ab antiquis cum rota hac ratione. In rota quatuor sunt diversitates. Est enim una pars rote summa, est una infima, est una que de summa descendit ad imum, est alia que de imo ascendit ad summum. Similiter est in temporalibus. Sunt quidam in summa prosperitate, sunt quidam in infima adversitate. Sunt alii qui de prosperitate descendunt in adversitatem, et alii qui de adversitate tendunt ad prosperitatem.

Glosae super Boetium 3 m. 9.5. MSS: L fols. 60vb-61ra, M lacks the passage, T fol. 10vb, J fol. 61v.

Et ita facta sunt corpora stellarum, que statim ex quo fuerunt moveri ceperunt, et ex motu suo subditum aerem calefacere et aere mediante aquam. Sed ex aqua calefacta creata sunt duo genera animalium: volatilia scilicet et aquatilia. Unde Prudentius in libro ymnorum, "Magne deus potentie qui ex aquis ortum genus partim remittis gurgiti partim levas in aera." Sed cum ita ex aqua fierent illa desiccata est per loca et apparuit terra limosa. In quibusdam locis tenuior fuerat, que calore solis calefacta diversa genera animalium produxit, scilicet reptilia et hominem. Et hoc est quod in divina pagina invenitur, hominem factum esse de limo terre. Si vero aliquis eadem ratione dicat omnia singulis annis debere creari et ipsum hominem, dicemus non, quia cum rerum natura oportet quod sit divina voluntas. Sed modo non est divina voluntas hominem sic nasci cum sit masculus et femina ex quibus homo esse potest. Quemadmodum vult aves ex germine nasci modo non ex calore et

Ita vero, ut fol. 3 fin.

Si vero [illegible]. [illegible] una [illegible] rota summa, est una linea, est una de summa [illegible] ad imum, est alia cum de imo ascendit ad summum. [illegible] est in temporalibus. Sunt autem in summa prosperitate, [illegible] in ultima adversitate. Sunt alii qui de prosperi- [illegible] prosperitatem.

[illegible] super poetum 3 m. c.4. Mss: L fol. 94b-95ra, [illegible] fol. 1[illegible]. [illegible].

[illegible] in [illegible], ut [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

humore ut in prima creatione. Sed cum moderni divini hoc audiunt, quia in libris suis ita scriptum non inveniunt, obstrepunt statim, hoc ignorantes quod auctores divinitatis philosophiam rerum tacuerunt, non quia contra fidem esset sed quia ad edificationem fidei de qua laborant non pertinet. Nec volunt quod aliquid supra id, quod scriptum est, inquiramus, sed ut rustici simpliciter credamus. Et ita impletum est quod dixit propheta, "Erit plebs sicut sacerdos," quod vero effectu, id est calore celestium, factus sit homo ex limo terre. Per hoc potest probari quod vivere non posset sine calore. Sed limus est naturaliter frigidus. Non ergo ex se habuit naturaliter calorem, nec erat ex quo haberet calorem nisi ex superioribus quia inferiora naturaliter sunt frigida et ita limo calefacto ex superioribus homo factus est. Si dicat deum ex nichilo vel ex alio illum potuisse calefacere, respondeo quod non pono terminum in divina potentia. Sed convenientius est dicere cum esset ex quo calefaceret ex illo calefactum esse quam ex nichilo. Si iterum dicat hoc est divine potentie et miraculis detrahere, sic nature rerum ascribere, dicam non. Immo est divinam potentiam et miraculum comprobare que talem naturam rebus tribuit et ita eas creavit.

et its area created.

Glosae super Boetium 3 m. 9.13. MSS: L fol. 62ra-b, M fol. 166ra, T fol. 11rb, J fol. 63v. Also ed. Jourdain, p. 60.

Anima mundi est naturalis vigor quo quedam res tantum habent moveri, quedam crescere, quedam sentire, quedam discernere. Sed quid sit ille vigor naturalis queritur? Sed, ut mihi videtur, ille vigor naturalis est spiritus sanctus, divina et benigna concordia, quia divino amore et concordia habent omnia esse moveri, vivere, crescere, sentire, discernere. Qui bene dicitur naturalis vigor, quia divino amore omnia nascuntur et vigent. Dicitur bene anima mundi, quia solo divino amore et caritate omnia que in mundo vivunt, habent vivere. Viso quid sit anima mundi, vidende sunt eius proprietates iuxta corpora, que tales sunt, vegetatio, sensualitas, ratio. Quedam enim corpora vegetat, id est facit crescere, ut herbas et arbores; quedam facit sentire ut bruta animalia, quedam discernere, ut homines, una et eadem manens anima; sed non in omnibus exercet eamdem potentiam, et hoc tarditate et natura corporum faciente. Unde Virgilius, "Quantum non noxia corpora tardant." At diceret aliquis, "Anima mundi exercet rationem in homine, ergo non anima hominis." Quod aperte falsum est; quia, et anima mundi, id est divinus amor; et anima hominis bene possunt in eodem uti ratione et quod anima hominis utitur hoc habet ex anima mundi, id est ex divino amore.

Glosae super Boetium 3 m. 9.19. MSS: L fol. 62va-b, M fol. 166rb, T fol. 11va, J fol. 64v.

Et aptans. In hoc loco quidam damnant Boetium de hoc quod dicit deum aptasse animas sublimibus curribus putantes quod dicat deum simul creasse omnes animas et posuisse unamquamque super comparem stellam et inde venire ad corpus. Sed quia videtur Plato hoc dicere, videamus quid intellexerit Plato, quid Boetius sequendo Platonem. Istud nusquam videtur in Platone quod simul omnes anime create sint. Sed quod anime a deo sint posite super stellas hoc in eo invenitur. Quod sic intelligendum est, anima posita est super stellas quia per rationem anime transcendit homo stellas et super eas reperit creatorem. Hoc habent anime a deo et idcirco dicit Plato, deum posuisse animas super stellas. Quod vero dicuntur stelle compares animabus ideo dicitur quia quemadmodum anime semper sunt in motum ita et stelle et quemadmodum anima rationabiliter movetur et sic stelle. Vel aliter deus posuit animas super stellas id est huius nature fecit animas quod effectu stellarum habent esse in corporibus. Ex stellis enim est calor sine quo nec vita nec anima esse potest. Non quod omnia dicantur que contingunt ex stellis venire homini, sed quedam ut calores, frigora, quedam infirmitates et similia. Si vero aliquis dicat, nonne ista a deo fiunt, respondeo, fiunt sed per effectum stellarum. Viso quid intellexit Plato, videamus quid dicat Boetius secundum utramque sententiam. Aptans animas levibus curribus id est rationi et intellectui qui dicuntur currus anime.

Glosae super Boetium 3 pr. 10.89-90. MSS: L fol. 64ra, M fol. 166vb, T fol. 11vb, J fol. 66r.

Sed natura, quia dixerat quod omnis beatus est deus et credendum est unum deum esse, ne aliquis hoc prave intelligeret, ait sed natura unus est deus, participatione nichil prohibet quam plurimos esse. Ideo videndum est quid sit esse deum et qualiter unus sit natura participatione plures. Esse deum est esse rationale et immortale. Sed rationale et immortale ex sui natura sine alterius collatione est ipse creator et non alius. Ergo ex sui natura est unus deus sed participatione plures id est collatione alterius. Et gratia creatoris et acquisitione alicuius scientie et virtutis fiunt homines immortales qui ex natura sunt rationales et mortales et ita participatione sunt homines rationales et immortales.

Glosae super Boetium 3 m. 11.1-16. MSS: L fols. 64vb-65va, M fols. 167rb-va, T fol. 12ra-b, J fols. 67v-68r.

Quisquis profunda (l. 1). Quia professus erat Boetius se modo cognoscere quod superius ignorabat, ostendit philosophia in istis versibus qualiter que nobis incerta sunt certa poterunt esse proprio scilicet labore et alterius doctrina quia ut ait Virgilius, "Labor improbus omnia vincit." Et hoc est quisquis vestigat id est inquirit verum profunda mente id est subtili et qui non cupit falli (l. 2) id est opinionibus falsis que faciunt animos deviare revolvat intime lucem visus (l. 3) id est rationem et intellectum quod qualiter fiat videamus. Cum vult aliquis iudicare de aliquo dirigit rationem usque ad ipsam rem ut consideret eius proprietates. Sed si sibi aliquid inde

et unum deum esse, de quibus hoc prave intelligere

et immortale. Sed rationale et immortale est

eternus. Et media creatoris et secundum

et virtutis finut homines immortales et

et immortales.

videatur non debet statim iudicare sic esse sed in se reverti et diu deliberare an ita sit quia sepe videtur homini esse quod non est vel non esse quod est de aliquo. Sed istud eliminatur deliberatione quia non est iudicandum quod non erit longa deliberatione probatum. Et dieo dicit revolvat in se deliberando diu antequam iudicet lucem intimi visus id est rationem et intellectum.

Longosque (l. 4). Hic est effexegesis, id est expositio predictorum. Et hoc est inflectens cogat motus in orbem. Orbis est linea circumducta rediens ad idem punctum. Inflectere ergo est longos motus in orbem, cum vis anime ab anima usque ad ipsam rem dirigitur, quod ad eamdem revertitur ut deliberet utrum ita sit vel non sit ut videtur. Et doceat animum (l. 5) id est consideret hoc in anima; quid molitur extra id est quicquid molitur de exterioribus querendo.

Possidere retrusum suis thesauris (l. 6). Thesaurus dicitur theca auri, id est positio auri quia aurum ibi ponitur; thesis enim positio est. Thesaurus vero anime dicitur naturalis potentia intelligendi vel memoria cognitorum quia per istam scientia servatur quasi aurum in terra. In istis vero thesauris possidet anima quod circa aliquid querit quia vel cognovit et retinet in memoria vel habet naturalem potentiam intelligendi si se studio et doctrina exerceat. Hoc ideo dicit ne aliquis dissidat si aliquid est sibi incertum quia exercitatione poterit sibi certum esse. Non omne namque (l. 9) probat quod homo habet naturalem potentiam intelligendi et cognoscendi que sibi incerta sunt quia corpus potest intellectum turbare; sed naturalem potentiam intelligendi si exerceatur non potest auferre. Et

notandum quod anima huius nature est quod natura gravitas carnis esset cui coniuncta est ex quo esse inciperet. Omnia que humanitas posset percipere, cognosceret, sed ita corpore gravatur quod non potest aliquid percipere nisi fuerat instructa doctrina et exercitatione. Continuatio. Vere habet hanc naturalem potentiam intelligendi. Namque corpus invehens molem (ll. 9-10) id est inferens gravitatem qua fit homo obliviosus. Non depulit omne lumen (l. 9). A mente depellere est omne lumen et intellectum et potentiam intelligendi auferre. Sed quamvis corpus, ut prediximus, intellectum turbet, tamen potentiam intelligendi non aufert et ita non depellit omne lumen a mente; quia heret introrsum (l. 11) id est inest naturaliter; semen veri id est potentiam intelligendi. Se ne aliquis putaret illud non posse vel sine alio posse excitari, subiungit quod scilicet semen excitatur ventilante doctrina (l. 12) id est exercitante doctrina quia ingenium non valet sine doctrina nec doctrina sine ingenio. Unde Horatius, "Ergo nec studium sine divite vena, nec rude quid possit ingenium video." Nam cur rogati (l. 13). Probat quod habet naturalem potentiam intelligendi per hoc quod sepe rogatus de aliquo indicat quod non faceret si sic facere non posset. Et hoc est nam cur rogati viveret. Fomes (l. 14) id est potentiam intelligendi; mersus id est naturalis; viveret id est perseveraret in alto corde.

Quod quisque discit (l. 16). Hic quidam volunt dampnare Platonem et Boetium eius sequacem imponentes Platoni quod voluit antequam fuissent anime in corporibus omnia eas scisse, sed adiunctas carni omnia oblivioni tradidisse, sed post studio recuperare. Et hoc voluit probare per hoc quod dicit quod

quisque discit immemor recordatur, quia non est recordatio nisi rei prius cognite, sed hoc quod discit aliquis non cognovit postquam incepit esse, ergo antequam anima esset in corpore, nescientes modum Platonis loquendi de philosophia per integumenta. Et ideo dicit quod quisque discit immemor recordatur que quia recordari notando oblivionem. Intellectus gravedine carnis amissionem recordationem vero eiusdem recuperationem et ita dicit quod quisque discit immemor recordatur quia cum aliquid discimus intellectum quem gravedine carnis amiseramus recuperamus.

Glosae super Boetium 3 m. 12.5. MSS: L fol. 66ra-b, M fol. 167vb, T fol. 12va, J fol. 69r. Also ed. Jeauneau, "Integumentum," pp. 137-38.

Quondam. Probat quod dum est intentio in temporalibus nec cognosci nec diligi possit summum bonum per Orpheum, qui apologus primum videndus est deinde quid sapientes voluerunt tali integumento intelligere. Neque enim credendum est a tam perfecto philosopho, scilicet Boetio, aliquid superfluum vel pro nichilo posuisse in tam perfecto opere. Sed nostri gartiones, garrulitati intenti et nichil philosophie cognoscentes et ideo significationes ignorantes integumentorum erubescentes dicere, "nescio," querentes solacium sue imperitie, aiunt hoc exponere trutannicum esse. Tamen ne eis consentiendo similes simus, quod nobis videbitur, inde exponemus integumentum.

Glosae super Boetium 3 m. 12.16-19. MSS: L fols. 66vb-67ra, M fol. 168ra, T fol. 12vb, J fols. 70r-v.

Nec modi qui subegerant cuncta mulcerent (ll. 16-17), id est cum se non posset sapientia et eloquentia qua alios correxerat corrigere quia sepe aliquis bene corrigit alium qui nescit consolari se ipsum quia ut ait quidam, gravius est se vincere quam castellum expugnare. Gravis est enim pugna ubi idem est qui vincit et qui vincitur. Querens superos inmites (l. 18). Orpheus queritur superos inmites et crudeles quia sine magno labore et abstinentia que hominis nature sunt inimica ad superna non pervenitur quia arta est via que ducit ad vitam. Adiit infernas domos (l. 19). Videndum est quid sit inferna domus et quot modis ad illam descendatur. Infernum vocaverunt philosophi hanc sublunarem regionem quia inferior pars mundi est et plena miserie et doloris. Ad hanc sunt diversi descensus. Naturalis scilicet cum anima corpori coniungitur non quod de celestibus ubi ante esset descendat, sed quia sunt cause quare corpori adiungatur; vel descensus anime dicatur coniunctio eiusdem cum corpore quia tunc scilicet a propria dignitate descendit dum est subdita passionibus corporis. Alius descensus vitiosus est qui bipertitus est. Alter enim sit per magicam artem, alter per alia vitia. Per magicam artem cum aliquis sacrificando demonibus cum eis loquitur. Unde Eneas antequam ad inferos descenderet Misenum sepelivit quia ut magica arte ventura cognosceret eum demonibus sacrificavit. Per alia vitia sit dum aliquis totam intentionem in temporalibus ponit. Est alius descensus virtuosus cum scilicet aliquis sapiens ad cognitionem temporalium descendit, ut cum parum vel nichil boni in eis viderit ab eorum amore concupiscentiam extrahat. Hoc modo ad

inferna descendere virtus est. Sed duobus predictis modis per vitia, quarto modo natura. Unde in fabulis legitur quosdam descendisse et exisse ut Hercules quia si sapiens ad hoc descendat, ut temporalia cognoscat, inde exit concupiscentiam inde extrahendo. Quosdam intrasse et non exisse ut Theseus et Pirithous qui pro uxore Plutonis rapienda descenderunt quia qui victus libidine vel alio vitio temporalibus se subdit, vix aut numquam inde emergit.

Glosae super Boetium 3 m. 12.34-35. MSS: L fol. 67va-b, M fol. 168va, T fol. 13ra-b, J fols. 71r-v.

Non Ixionium. Ad huc ostendit quid operetur Orpheus in inferis, scilicet quod velox rota non precipitat Ixionium caput. Fabula Ixionis talis est quod Ixion voluit concumbere cum Iunone. Sed interposuit Iuno nubem et cecidit semen in terram et nati sunt inde gigantes. Unde in inferis subditus rote volvitur. Cuius rei veritas talis est: Iuno ponitur pro activa vita. Unde in fabulis invenitur quod tres dee Iuno, Pallas, et Venus iudicium Paridis que dignior esset aureo pomo quesiverunt. Quia Iupiter diffinire noluit quod non fuit aliud nisi quod tres vite sunt: theorica id est contemplative, practica id est activa philargiria id est voluptuaria. Et ponitur Pallas pro contemplativa, Iuno pro activa, Venus pro voluptuaria quod potest probari per premia que promittuntur Paridi. Pallas namque promittit sapientiam quia ex contemplatione sit aliquis sapiens. Iuno divitias quia per activam vitam acquiruntur divitie. Venus promittit feminam quia in ea est maxima voluptas. Iste tres dee pro pomo certant id est pro beatitudine quia unaquamque videtur facere beatam. Sed Iupiter noluit hoc diffinire ne

libertatem arbitrii homini auferre videretur. Unde querunt iudicium Paridis id est cuiuslibet hominis. Sed Paris acquiescit Veneri quia maxima pars hominum consentit voluptati. Iuno igitur pro activa vita ponitur; unde dicitur sceptrum portare quia per talem vitam sceptrum acquiritur. Dicitur in tutela sua pavonem habere propter varietatem vestium que talem vitam comitantur. Dicitur noverca Herculis quia talis vita est noverca et inimica sapienti. Huic Iunoni aliquis ut Ixion vult violenter concumbere quoniam laborando tali vita vult beatitudinem acquirere. Sed Iuno interponit nubem et semen cadit in terram de quo nascuntur gigantes quia talis vita obscuritatem rationis homini confert et totam intentionem in temporalibus ponere facit. Unde nascuntur gigantes id est cure temporalium. Ge enim est terra; inde dicitur Ixion in inferis rota volvi quia qui tali vite subditur, modo extollitur prosperitate, modo deprimitur adversitate. Sed audito Orpheo velox rota non precipitat Ixionium caput quia sapiens et eloquens docet quare rote et mutabilitati talis vite nullus submittere se debeat.

Glosae super Boetium 4 m. 1.1. MSS: L fol. 68va, M fol. 168vb, T fol. 13rb, J fol. 72v.

Sunt etenim penne in istis versibus ostendit philosophia Boetio qualiter ad patriam id est ad cognitionem creatoris perveniat scilicet per cognitionem creature quia ut diximus in creaturis perpenditur divina sapientia cum videmus eas sapienter factas et dispositas. Nec hoc posset fieri sapientia humana. Ad hoc continuatur quod dicit se infigere menti Boetio pennas. Ac si diceret, "Possit bene menti tue infigere pennas." Etenim id est quia volucres penne sunt mihi. Penne quas confert

philosophia alicui sunt sapientia et virtus per quas ascendit homo ad cognitionem creatoris. Per sapientiam enim cognoscit qualiter ad ipsum perveniatur, per virtutem ut cognovit perveniendum quod perveniat elaborat.

Glosae super Boetium 4 pr. 2.14. MSS: J fols. 73r-v. L lacks this passage; I omit M.

Deficiente. Videtur hic falsum dicere cum dicit deficiente voluntate nullum aggredi aliquid. Quia multa facit non sua voluntate. Actionum enim alii sunt naturales ut dormire et similia, alii voluntarii, alii involuntarii. Involuntariorum alii sunt per coactionem, alii per ignorantiam. Sed istorum naturales et involuntarii, sive per coactionem sive per ignorantiam, sunt sine voluntate. Ut dormit homo sepe contra voluntatem suam, coactus agit sepe quod nollet, ignorans agit quod dolet. Falsum est ergo nullum esse actum sine voluntate. Et hoc probatur ita quod in naturalibus est

Glosae super Boetium 4 pr. 2.14. MS: T fol. 13va.

Deficiente. Videtur hic falsum dicere cum dicit deficiente voluntate nullum aggredi aliquid. Contingit enim quandoque quod aliquis volens aliquem interficere, ipsum non interficit, sed alium. Unde deficit voluntas, et tamen non verum videtur esse quod non aggrediatur quod non vult. Immo aggreditur etsi voluntas deficiat. Sed solvunt quidam [quedam MS] hoc modo. Verum est quod quamvis alium interficiat quam illum quem aggredi voluit, voluntatem tamen eius non deficere, quia etsi quem voluit interficere non interficiat, voluntatem tamen interficiendi ipsam non amittit. Et ideo dicunt verum esse quod

naturalis voluntas. In coactione voluntas magis quam coacta quia si vellet et posset non facere et pateretur ante se occidi quam faceret. Que vero fiunt per ignorantiam etsi non fuit cura illud faciendi tamen altius quod fuit causa istius. Ut si proiciens lapidem occidat quod nollet ibi fuit voluntas et si non illum occiendi tamen lapidem proiciendo et ideo dicunt sine voluntate nullum esse actum. Sed istud non placet mihi quia naturalis voluntas non est voluntas nec coacte. Nec tercia est voluntas illius quod agitur. Similiter possent dicere quod nullus qui habeat rationem faciat aliquid sine ratione quia etiam cum aliquid malum facit, habet suam rationem qua scit illud esse malum. Iterum si omnis actus est cum voluntate, omnis actus esset culpabilis vel laudabilis. Sed quidam Boetius dicit. Sed hec solutio nulla est quia hac ratione etsi aliquis aliquid voluntate facere proposuisset, etsi non patraret nunquam voluntas deficeret; quam falsum est quia deficit cum non agit quod vult. Sed melius dicendum est Boetium hoc non dixisse de casuali voluntate. Ubi enim tria sunt genera actionum, et tria similiter sunt genera voluntatum. Est enim naturalis actio; est casualis; est actio ex libero arbitrio veniens. Similiter est voluntas naturalis, voluntas ex libero arbitrio, voluntas casualis, de qua voluntate hoc non dictum est sed de proveniente ex libero arbitrio.

actus sunt nec culpabiles nec laudabiles, falsum est ergo omine esse cum voluntate. Dicamus ergo quod quidam actus sunt sine voluntate. Sed cum Boetius hic dicit deficiente animo et cum non loquitur nisi de actionibus que fiunt ex libero arbitrio. Actionum quedam sunt causales, quedam coacte, quedam voluntarie. Sed Boetius hic non loquitur nisi de illis actionibus per quas homo iudicatus bonus vel malus. Et hoc potest perpendi ex verbis suis et ex causa quare hoc iuduxit. Ex verbis quando deficiente voluntate non aggreditur quisquam quod non vult. Non enim dicit non facit sed non aggreditur ut per aggressum notaret ea que fiunt ex libero arbitrio. Est causa quare quidem iuduxit potest hoc probari iterum quia hoc iuduxit ad ostendendum bonos semper potentes esse malos vero impotentes qui ipso solo actu qui sit ex libero arbitrio fiunt boni vel mali, potentes vel impotentes, premio vel pena.

Glosae super Boetium 4 pr. 3. 51-52. MSS: J fol. 74v, L and T lack this passage.

Item mali qui a bono deficiunt amittunt, scilicet humanam naturam excedunt, et hoc non ut superius, scilicet ut transeant in divinam naturam, sed inferius, quia transeunt in beluas, si non corpore tamen animo. Sed cum ultra. Cum bonitas facit homines deos, quasi ultra homines extollit, improbitas autem infra hominis meritum detrahit eos ut more beluarum agentes bestie sunt.

Glosae super Boetium 4 pr. 3 51-52. MS: M fol. 169rb-va.

Sed cum et cetera. Superius exaggeravit premium bonorum si quod dii efficerentur; similiter vult exaggerare penam malorum. Scilicet quod homines desinunt esse et fiunt belue. Probatum est quod mali homines desinunt esse. Diceret aliquis quod igitur erunt. Respondeo infra homines erunt quando in beluas rediguntur.

sed cum et cetera. Suscepius exasperavit praemium bonorum si esse et fiunt belua. Problemum est quod mali homines desiunt esse. Diceret aliquis quod inter erunt. Reasoneon infra homines erunt quando in beluas redigumtur.

Glosae super Boetium 4 m. 3.1. MSS: L fol. 69ra, M fol. 169va, T fol. 13vb, J fols. 74v-75r.

Vela naritii [neritii: Boetii codices] ducis. Dixerat Boetius homines mutari in beluas morum qualitate non corporum specie. Sed ne aliquis putaret hanc mutationem non esse timendam, probat in istis versibus illam esse timendam quia maior est corporali mutatione. Unde videndum est quod metamorphosis id est transmutatio alia est naturalis ut aqua mutatur in glaciem, alia magica cum videtur id esse quod non est, alia moralis scilicet cum homo proprietates belue sibi conformat. Sed moralis maior est naturali quia quanto dignior est anima corpore tanto illius in peius maior est mutatio. Corporali id est naturali mutatione. Et hoc scilicet probat per Circem que quamvis homines mutaret corporaliter animos tamen non potuit mutare.

Glosae super Boetium 4 pr. 6.199. MSS: L fol. 73rb, M fol. 171va, T fol. 15va, J fol. 81r.

Hoc tantum; ac si diceret quamvis causas divine operationis non possim ostendere, hoc tamen credendum est quod cum cuncta a deo disponantur ad aliquid bonum diriguntur.

Glosae super Boetium 4 pr. 7.53-55. MSS: L fol. 74rb, M fols. 171vb-172ra, T fol. 15vb, J fol. 82v.

Situm est in vestra manu, id est potestate qualem fortunam velitis [malitis: Boetii codices] vobis formare quia si bono et equo animo eam recipiatis bona erit, sin autem malo mala erit. Omnis enim. Potestis omnem fortunam qualem vultis vobis formare quia adversam de qua minus videretur, et hoc est omnis enim et nisi aut exercet aut corrigit ac si diceret, nisi eam accipiatis pro exercitio et correptione, punit, id est nobis

pena erit. Ita possumus adversam fortunam nobis facere exercitium, aut correptionem et ita nobis bonam, vel penam et ita nobis malam et sic possumus nobis fortunam formare qualem voluerimus.

Glosae super Boetium 5 pr. 2.5-7. MSS: L fol. 77ra, M fol. 173ra, T fol. 16vb, J fols. 85v-86r.

Est inquit (l. 5). Libertas arbitrii et non tantum dico illam esse, sed etiam nullam rationabilem creaturam sine ea existere neque hominem neque angelum et hoc est neque enim et cetera. Nam quod ratione (l. 7) vere omni rationabili creature inest libertas arbitrii quia omni inest diffinitio liberi arbitrii. Sed cuicumque convenit diffinitio et diffinitum; que diffinitio talis est. Liberum arbitrium est libertas iudicandi res et exequendi. Si enim habet libertatem discernendi res et non exequendi, non est libertas. Unde in istis duobus est libertas arbitrii, in libertate iudicandi et perficiendi. Sed utrumque omni rationali creature inest, libertas iudicandi et perficiendi, si non in omnibus tamen in quibusdam. Unde dicimus quedam esse sub libero arbitrio, scilicet que potest homo facere et dimittere, quedam non esse ut ea que homo non potest facere vel ea que non potest fugere.

Glosae super Boetium 5 pr. 2.16-21. MSS: L fols. 77rb-va, M fol. 173rb, T fol. 17ra, J fol. 86v.

Sed extrema id est pessima servitus est cum dedite vitiis ceciderunt possessione (ll. 20-21) id est cum subdite vitiis amittunt rationem, quia ut ait Augustinus non tantum unius domini sed quod peius est, quot vitiorum tot dominorum ancille sunt. Quidam sunt qui prave exponunt istum versum quorum ex-

Ita possumus adversum torquem modis facere exerci-

positionem ponemus non ut teneatur sed ut cognita fugiatur, quia ut ait idem Boetius in Topicis "vitari vitium nisi cognitum non potest." Illorum sententia talis est: Platonem et alios philosophos voluisse omnes animas simul creatas a creatore et super stellas positas ubi divinam mentem aspiciebant et libere ab omni contagione erant. Deinde per planetas descendere usque ad corpora et coniungi corporibus in quibus quedam bene quedam male se habebant. Inde Boetium dixisse in hoc loco humanas animas esse liberiores cum se in divine mentis (ll. 16-17) id est dum existunt in compari stella; minus cum dilabuntur ad corpora (ll. 18-19) per planetas quia iam incipiunt hominari desiderio incorporandi; minus cum terrenis artubus et cetera (ll. 18-19) coniuncte sunt corpori. Extrema vero (l. 20) istud non mutatur. Sed quod Plato voluisset omnes animas simul esse creatas nusquam invenitur. Sed impositas esse stellis et descendere per planetas, hoc invenitur sed dictum est per integumentum ut ostendimus superius in O qui perpetua (3 m. 9.1) et ostendemus deo annuente vitam super Platonem.

Glosae super Boetium 5 pr. 3.92. MSS: L fol. 78vb, M fol. 174ra, T fol. 17va, J fol. 88r.

Nec vitia. Tercium inconveniens quod nec vitia nec virtutes erunt quia nichil debet dici virtus nisi bono animo et non coacto fiat. Unde coacte actiones non solent remunerari nec vitium nisi malo animo et libero fiat puniri. Quare enim vituperaretur aliquis ex hoc quod non potuit vitare.

Glosae super Boetium 5 pr. 4.82. MSS: L fols. 80rb-va, M fol. 175ra, T fol. 18rb, J fols. 90v-91r.

Ipsum vero [quoque: Boetii codices] hominem. Alio exemplo probat quod res percipitur iuxta possibilitatem percipientis quia ipsum hominem aliter percipit sensus, aliter imaginatio, aliter ratio, aliter intellectus et ideo videndum est quod sit unumquodque istorum et quod percipiat et a quo principium habeat. Sensus est quedam vis anime qua videt homo vel tangit vel olfacit vel gustat vel audit. Hoc est percipere figuram rei in subiecta materia id est percipit corpus constans ex materia et figura. Neque aliud habet principium nisi ex aliqua passione que sit circa corporeum instrumentum ut cum lux ferit oculos excitat ipsam animam ad videndum aliquam rem. Imaginatio est quedam vis anime qua percipit homo figuram rei absentis et habet principium a sensu quia aliquid imaginamur sicut illud ante vidimus vel ad similitudinem alterius rei eiusdem generis quam vidimus, ut rusticus ille Virgilianus qui nunquam viderat Romam ad similitudinem sue civitatis quam videbat imaginabatur illam. Unde ait urbem quam dicunt Romam Melibee putavi stultus huic nostre similem. Ratio vero est quedam vis anime qua percipit homo unumquodque quid sit et in quo differat ab aliis et in quo conveniat. Hoc habet principium a sensu et imaginatione quia ante videmus rem et figuram ipsius et colorem et proprietates inde discernimus quid sit et in quo differat et in quo conveniat cum aliis. Intelligentia est quedam vis anime qua percipit homo incorporalia cum certa ratione quare ita sint. Et ideo hec addimus quia si perciperet aliquid casu et non haberet certam rationem quare ita esset non esset intellectus sed opinio. Hec habet principium a ratione quia per rationem cognoscit homo

naturam rerum et proprietates. Et cognoscit quedam corpora gravia naturaliter moveri ut humanum corpus et cognoscit quod aliud est quam corpus quod ita movet corpus quia cum corpus naturaliter sit grave ex se non habet quod movetur. Ergo ex alio et ita ratione ducente pervenit homo ad cognitionem incorporeorum. Similiter ad cognitionem creatoris.

Glosae super Boetium 5 m. 5.1. MSS: L fol. 81vb, M fol. 176ra, T fol. 19ra, J fol. 93r.

Quam variis et cetera. In istis versibus hortatur nos philosophia ad considerationem divine sapientie et hoc facit per humanam compositionem scilicet quod homo elatum caput habet cum cetera animalia habeant prona capita. Que dispositio signum est quod ad superiora tendere debemus.

APPENDIX B

GLOSAE SUPER MACROBIUM (LONGER REDACTION)

MSS: S (Munich, Bayer. Staatsbibl. Clm 14557, fols. 100r-150v)
V (Vatican, Urb. lat. 1140, fols. 2r-153v)

Glosae super Macrobium Prologue. MSS: S fols. 100r-v, V fols. 2r-v.

Plato omnium philosophorum doctissimus X volumina composuit de re publica in quibus hec tota fuit eius intentio, scilicet amorem iusticie hominum mentibus intimare quia sine ea nec minimus hominum cetus nec familia nedum res publica stare potest. Sed quia inde quod homines non facile conscenderent ad iusticie conservationem que equat summos imis potentes inpotentibus; ideo de premio conservatorum ipsius iusticie et de pena contemptorum in eisdem tractavit voluminibus. Si autem parvum premium conservatoribus vel parva pena contemptoribus proponeretur propter assecutionem talis premii vel timorem talis pene ad iusticiam minime flecti possent. Et ideo de quantitate et qualitate premii et pene ibidem disseruit ostenditque conservatoribus iusticie remunerationem futuram esse immortalem scilicet et beatem vitam in celo, contemptoribus vero penam in inferis et eternam mortem. Quoniam autem homines non crederent quod aliquis immortalitatem habere posset et habitare in celo cum homo cotidie videatur mori et proprius ipsi sit locus in terra, et ideo ibi

APPENDIX B

GLOSSAE SUPER MACROBIUM (ECLOGAE RADICUM)

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] Macrobium [illegible]. Vols: 3 fols. 10½-v, V fols.

[illegible]

Trado omnium philosophorum doctissima X volumina com-
[illegible] re publica in quibus hec tota fuit eius intentio,
[illegible]
[illegible] conservationem one equat animos inis potentes impeter-
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]

ostendit etiam quod homo in digniori parte sua id est in anima est immortalis et secundum hoc eternam vitam habere potest et quod in eadem parte etiam est spiritus. Unde quantum ad eam partem in celo habitare potest qui locus proprius scilicet celum est spirituum et probavit quod quemadmodum anima ex adiuncto corporis ad tempus in naturali loco corporum id est terra habitat. Eodem modo potest contingere quod corpus post separationem anime ipsius iterum ipsi anime coniungeretur et ex eius coniunctione in naturali loco spirituum id est in celo poterit habitare. Quia autem forsitan non bene crederetur de premiis conservatorum iusticie Platoni, utpote qui adhuc vivus erat nunquamque conservatores iusticie in celo eorumque videret premia, ideo introduxit quemdam redivivum, Er nomine pamphilium natione militem officio, qui cum pro re publica interfectus esset XII die cum ultimo igne honorandus esset vivus inter ceteros una peremptos [peremptus MSS] repertus est. Et tunc denunciavit hominibus qualiter conservatores iusticie in celo et que et quanta eorum premia ibi videret. Postea autem Tullius imitator Platonis VI volumina de eadem materia id est de re publica composuit et eadem intentione ut amorem iusticie hominibus intimaret. Similiter etiam propter intimationem iusticie de premio conservatorum et de pena contemptorum et de qualitate et quantitate premii et pene ibi tractavit. . . .

Hoc ergo somnium Scipionis Tullius in ultima parte VI voluminis de re publica imposuit in qua parte ultima ut testatur ipse Macrobius summa totius philosophie est comprehensio. Unde quia difficilis erat ad intelligendum per se ad eius expositionem et intelligentiam, Macrobius rogatu Eustachii filii

sui hunc librum composuit et hoc est causa compositionis huius libri.

Glosae super Macrobium 1.1.1. MSS: S fol. 102v, V fol. 4v.

Ne alicui videretur ideo libros illos [scilicet Platonis et Ciceronis] nulla esse differentia, differentiam inter illos ostendit dirigendo sermonem ad Eustachium filium suum vel natura vel doctrina. Antiqui enim solebant discipulos appellare filios magistros vero patres, quia perfectus magister discipulo confert plus esse quam etiam verus pater. Ille enim rude esse ei offert, iste vero esse formatum sapientia et morum instructione. Quocumque autem modo filius ipsius sit per hoc quod istud opus mittit id opus commendat. Pater enim ad filios non misi honesta et utilia mittere solet et hoc est O Eustachii fili mii per hoc captat eius benevolentiam dulcior mihi vita per naturam scilicet et gloria per sapientiam. Quilibet pater in quolibet filio suo sive bono sive malo naturaliter delectatur. Si vero sapiens est in eo gloriatur secundum proverbium sapiens filius gloria est patris.

Glosae super Macrobium 1.1.2. MSS: S fol. 103v, V fol. 5r.

Intentio Platonis et Tulii in predictis voluminibus esset tractare de iusticia que in terra inter homines versatur. Quare in eis mentionem aliquam de celestibus circulis et huiusmodi que ad positivam iusticiam nichil pertinere videntur fecerint.

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Glosae super Macrobium 1.1.7. MSS: S fol. 104v, V fols. 6r-v.

Principatum iusticie id est quod iusticia plus dominatur in re publica quam alie virtutes. Principatum iusticie id est principalem virtutem ostendit esse iusticiam. Virtus est habitus animi tendens in bonam partem.

Glosae super Macrobium 1.2.10-11. MSS: S fol. 107r, V fol. 10r. Also ed. in part Dronke, Fabula, pp. 70-71.

Ergo ex hac secunda. Velut Iuppiter patri suo abscidit virilia et proiecit in mare, unde nata est Venus. Quod non est aliud, nisi quia per virilia fructus terre intelliguntur, per quos scilicet semen a visceribus terre per temporis successionem magis magisque diffunditur. Iuppiter virilia eius abscidit, et hoc nichil aliud est nisi quod superioris elementi calor fructus ad maturitatem perducit et aptitudinem ut abscidi possint et colligi. Hec autem virilia in mare, id est in lacunam et ingluviem humani ventris proiciuntur et inde Venus, id est luxuria nascitur.

Sensa referuntur mistica, que scilicet exprimebantur per verba, non re certa in propria significatione et dicitur mistica a misti, qui est secretum, unde a mistes id est secretarius. Sed Pythagorei dicebantur qui octonarius erat, iustitia septenarius vero Virgo, quia nullum generat in denarium nec ab aliquo generatur.

Sequens, scilicet que sub fictis verbis aliquam veritatem continet. Dividitur et cetera. Aliquando huiusmodi narratio fit per turpia et inhonesta, aliquando per pulchra et honesta, ut dii adulterii. Hec verba sunt turpia, tamen per illud adulterium aliquod honestum et verum habet significari, utpote

de adulterio Iovis legitur cum Cybele, Semele, et huiusmodi aliis que in loco suo exponentur.

Glosae super Macrobium 1.2.17. MSS: S fol. 109r, V fol. 12r.

Sed quia sciunt et cetera. Sed quasi enim diceret rusticis quid re varia sit Ceres et alie quedam dee, scilicet quid Ceres nichil est aliud quam quedam naturalis vis vel potentia terre producendi segetes. Hoc eis nullum incuteret terrorem. Nunc vero, quia putant eam esse deam et rem per se existentem et preesse segetibus, ideo timent. Ne peccent vel male agant in aliquo, segetes suas eis auferre, et ideo a multis peccatis se abstinent. Apertam patentem omnibus et nudam, scilicet sine integumento. Que sicut vulgaribus. Expositio aperta inimica est nature deorum, ita dico, si imperitis et vulgo veritas aperiatur; a sapientibus, tunc huiusmodi expositio si satis placet.

Glosae super Macrobium 1.5.2. MSS: S fol. 113r, V fol. 18r.

Fatalem id est mortem. Est enim quedam mors casualis cum quis scilicet casu aliquo moritur. Est autem quedam naturalis quando ex constellatione contrahitur causa mortis, utpote quod nimius calor habundat in homine vel nimia frigiditas et alie huiusmodi qualitatum distemperantie. Hic tamen fatalem ponit pro casuali casu enim videlicet interfectione obiturus erat.

.xnuoqmoo ue ni oco sue

.

.tneserc tes tiruc ,tes ,leuq

.mis mulli ,tnemom mulli ,mulli

.mulli ,mulli

.mulli ,mulli

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Glosae super Macrobium 1.5.4. MSS: S fol. 113v, V fols. 19r-v.

Hec est igitur ostendit omnium numerorum plenitudinem. Prima perfectio incorporalitas notat quod incorporeum quandoque non appellatur nisi sydera incorporea, quandoque autem largius accipitur pro omni eo quod non est et est corpus et ita in hoc loco accipit incorporeitatem. Est autem quedam incorporeitas imperfecta, quedam perfecta, quedam perfectior, quedam perfectissima. Imperfecta est que nunquam de corporibus separatur nec sine eis existere possit ut sunt accidentia corporum et termini eorumdem. Perfecta vero est que sine eis esse potest sive semper sint in eis ut numeri sive ad tempus ut anime. Ubicumque enim numerus in corporibus invenitur extra eadem etiam invenire potest in ipsis videlicet speciebus et earum potentiis. Perfectior vero incorporeitas est que nunquam corpori adiungitur ut sunt angeli. Perfectissimus vero est ipse creator. Cognitionem autem nostram meare ab una re ad aliam non est aliud nisi nos venire a cognitione unius rei ad cognitionem alterius. Cognitio ergo nostra a nobis id est a corporibus ad superos id est ad incorporea meat dum primitus scilicet corpora cognoscit [cognoscere: S, cognoscunt: V] ex eis etiam cognitis ad incorporeorum cognitionem producitur. Predictas etiam species incorporeitatis invenit Boetius enim in quodam ordine ita ut per quosdam gradus unam scilicet post aliam et ex alterius cognitione cognoscere habet. Primo enim visu corpoream rem percipimus, qualitates etiam et colores et terminos ipsius et naturam determinamus et considerat ratio quod quamvis ista aliud sint quam ipsum corpus ex eo tamen esse suum habent. Et ideo asseritur quod quamvis incorporea sint non

tamen in eis est perfecta incorporeitas et ita iam unum gradum ascendit. Postea vero ex eis ad numerum tali modo procedit considerando scilicet dispositiones partium ipsius corporis, id est utrum triangulum sit vel quadrangulum vel cuius modi et inde perpendit quot ibi sint anguli, quot linee, quot puncta et huiusmodi. Et sic iam alium gradum ascendit ad numeri scilicet cognitionem pervenit iam. Postea vero illius numeri naturam quam invenit investigat et videt quod quamvis in isto non sit corpore nec in alio etiam tantum existere posset. Et ideo iudicat eius incorporeitatem perfectam esse, deinde ex istorum cognitione ad perfectionem incorporei id est ipsius anime venit intellectus noster. Est enim corpus quod naturaliter grave est, moveri videmus, tunc cogitat ratio quod ex se motum habere non potest. Et inde percipit quod quidam spiritus ei coniunctus est ad tempus ex quo movetur eodem autem a corpore separato moveri desinit et ita iam altiorem gradum ascendit. Iterum autem ratio considerans quod corpus et anima quodammodo sunt contraria cum anima sit levis, corpus vero grave, et quod anima spiritus est naturalis quia locus spirituum est celum et dinoscit quod corpori quod sibi a deo est contrarium etiam in hac inferiori regione minime coniungi posset nisi ab aliquo sapiente et per alicuius sapientis ministerium, rursus autem videt quod humana sapientia nec ad coniunctionem tam repugnantium nec ad tale ministerium sufficere posset. Unde innuit unam esse substantiam maxime potentie maxime sapientie que ea coniunxit. Et quod per ministerium quorumdam spirituum qui diversi [divini: S, diverse: V] sunt ab ipsis animabus hoc fecit. Et ita intellectus iam altiorem gradum et altissimum etiam ascendit perfectius videlicet incorporeum id

est angelum et perfectissimum scilicet ipsum Creatorem percipiendo. Ita ergo cognitio nostra primitus rem subiectam sensu percipit id est terminos et naturas ipsorum corporum, deinde vero gradatim ascendit primitus videlicet ad non pure incorporeum, deinde ad purum id est ad numerum, deinde ad purius id est angelum, ad ultimum autem purissimum id est ad Creatorem ipsum.

Glosae super Macrobium 1.6.8. MSS: S fols. 119v-120r, V fol. 27r. Also ed. Lemay, "Doctrine of the Trinity," pp. 172-76.

Et sequestrat, id est dividit, intellectum eius, id est ipsius dei, a numero sequentium rerum id est creaturarum que dicuntur sequi ipsum creatorem in hoc quod ab eo contrahunt existentiam et ei etiam in aliquo sunt consimiles. Nulla enim est creatura que cum ipso non obtineat similitudinem, sive maximam, sive minimam, sive inter utrumque. Maximam ut angeli qui rationalitate et immortalitate ei sunt consimiles. Minima ut ea que sola existentia cum eo conveniunt, utpote sunt corpora inanimata. Mediam vero ut homines qui etiam rationalitate sunt ei affines, et bruta animalia que etsi cum eo non tantam habent similitudinem, maiorem tamen corporibus inanimatis, in hoc videlicet quod vivunt. Cum autem ita omnia in aliquo conveniant cum creatore, per unitatem tamen creator ab eis sequestratur, in hoc scilicet quod ipse solus vera est unitas. Nichil vero aliud proprie unum appellari potest ut iam ostendemus.

Glosae super Macrobium 1.8.2-4. MSS: S fols. 144r-145r, V fols. 58v-59v.

Maiestate promisse beatitudinis quam promiserat ei scilicet avus. Sed de beatitate continuato, hoc capitulo precedenti id est ostenso quare ei coniungatur incipit exponere que invenit ibi difficilia et digna expositione. Duo autem ibi talia continentur, quod dixit scilicet ubi beati fruuntur evo sempiterno, et quod ait hinc provecto huc reducuntur idem ergo quod prius est positum ibi prius exponit de beatitudine scilicet rectorum rei publice. Rectores rei publice si sint boni beatos esse. Sed quia stoici nimis strictam diffinitionem de beatitudine dederant et secundum quam paucissimi beati inveniri possunt, sic ergo tractavit de beatitudine quod primitus exponit sententiam stoicorum de ea, postea eam improbavit, deinde ponit sententiam aliorum quibus consentiat. Sole vero virtutes, quia omnes constituebant inefficientem causam ipsius beatitudinis, ideo prius illam ostendit. Et hoc est sole faciunt virtutes. Virtus est habitus mentis bene constitute tamen nature rationi consentaneus. Sed ut aperte et breviter dicamus, virtus est equalitas in his tribus id est in cognitionibus, dictis et factis. Et nota quod bene dicit virtutes pluraliter, ad effectum enim beatitudinis non una sola virtus sufficit, immo oportet quod multe simul in eodem cumulentur. Sole autem dicit quia considerate quelibet et alia preter virtutes, nichil invenietis nec divitias nec gloriam temporalem nec aliud ut ostendit Boetius quod beatum efficere possit. Homo enim que promeretur ex his adipiscitur beatitudinem. Sed non ex quibuslibet actionibus promeretur et dignus est remuneratione, nec ex his etiam que agit invitus sive ex ignorantia, immo ex illis solis actionibus

Utilitate primitus beatitudinis cum proposuerat et
[illegible] sua. Sed de perfecta continuato, hoc casibus praece-
[illegible] est ostendo quare et continuatur incipit exponere qu-
[illegible] dat difficilia et aliqua expositione. Duo autem ibi facit
[illegible]r, quod dixit sufficet ubi beati fruuntur suo sempi-
[illegible], ab quod sit hinc proveeto huc reducendum item ergo quod
[illegible] rei publice. Reditus rei publice si sint bene
[illegible]. Sed [illegible] [illegible] secundum quam pacificari beati invenit
[illegible] praetexit de beatitudine quod primitus exponit consequ-
[illegible] [illegible]. [illegible] [illegible]
[illegible] [illegible] dicens consentiat. Sole vero virtutes, quia
[illegible] [illegible] situdinem causam [illegible] beatitudinis,
[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]
[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] habitus mentis bene consistunte tamen naturae rationi
[illegible] [illegible]. Sed ut aperte et breviter dicamus, virtus est
[illegible] [illegible] in die tribus id est in contentionibus, fructu et facta.
[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] quod bene dicit virtutes glorificat, ad effectum enim
[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [

que ex libero veniunt arbitrio iterum non ex his omnibus, immo ex bonis tantum quod bone scilicet actiones virtutes sunt et faciunt beatum et sic sole virtutes quod apparet etiam ex predicta virtutis diffinitione, nisi aliquis ita mentem habeat constitutam beatus esse non potest. Est enim ille beatus cuius animus non mutatur secundum mutabilitatem temporalium. Nulla alia neque scilicet per dignitates neque per gloriam sive copiam auri et argenti et huiusmodo. Adipiscitur hic quod possit scilicet beatus esse, et in hoc concordabant omnes philosophi quod sola virtus est efficax beatitudinis. De virtutibus vero, quibus convenit esse et quibus non, erat dissensio. Et in hoc errabant stoici, volebant enim quod virtutes solis philosophis inessent et non omnibus sed stoicis tantum. Et sic secundum eos rectores rei publice et practici non essent beati sed illi tantummodo philosophi qui dediti sunt studio contemplationis. Et ideo istorum ponit sententiam non quia vera sit, sed ut eam improbet et ut appareat eam esse falsam. Et secundum etiam eos quod sit officium uniuscuiusque virtutis cardinalium scilicet IIII ostendit. Postea vero improbata hac sententia, dividit virtutes et diffinit secundum Plotinum et Plotini sententiam conprobat. Continuatio. Quia sole virtutes faciunt beatum ideo isti qui putant solis philosophis inesse virtutes volunt quod illi sint tantum beati, effectus enim sine causa esse non potest. Et hoc est Unde pronunciant per consequentiam scilicet agnitionem ponit illorum sententiam qui volebant solos philosophos esse beatos et non improbat eam in hoc quod dicebant sapientiam esse agnitionem rerum divinarum sed in hoc quod volebant hanc diffinitionem esse sapientie, et hoc solummodo sapientiam esse scilicet

huiusmodi. Diffinitio enim debet convertibilis esse cum suo diffinito. Ista autem non est sufficiens. Sapientia non solum in agnitione divinarum sed et in agnitione et actionibus hominum consistit. Unde etiam duas habet species ut supradiximus, theoreticam et practicam. Secundum istos autem sapientia idem et theoretica et non universaliter nec philosophi vel etiam sapientes alii sunt quam theorici et sic solos theoricos dicunt esse beatos. Et hoc est vocantes sapientiam debent tantum esse sapientes. Et sic virtuosos qui requirunt superna scilicet celestia et divina. Acie id est ratione et intellectu sagaci diligentia id est diligenter quantum ad studium, sagaciter quantum ad ingenium querendum. Sed quia iterum non sufficit querere et comprehendere nisi adhibeatur etiam intentio ideo subiungit: et imitantur etc. Celestia non debemus imitari ut enim firmamentum fert secum et refert planetas et habet in motu divinum id est in humanibus actibus debet dominari ratio et intellectus firmamentum retorquet creticos motus planetarum ita ratio et intellectus in nobis. Nostros errores est ergo ordo querere et quesita comprehendere et comprehensa mutari. Ita ergo secundum istos illi tantum sunt sapientes qui investigant divina et investigando inveniunt, inventa imitantur recte et honesta vivendo. Et in hoc solo, inquisitione scilicet divinitatis comprehensione et immitatione dicunt esse sapientia solummodo et ideo falsa est eorum sententia. Aiunt esse exercitia virtutum virtutes exerceri. Sic igitur a virtutibus omnes practicarum actiones, conservationem rei publice, dilectionem proximi, et huiusmodi excludunt. Quarum officia sic dispensant posita sententia stoicorum secundum eosdem, dispensat officia

virtutum, id est secundum hoc quod solis contemplativis eas debent inesse. Et ostendit quod sit officium uniuscuiusque illorum, id est quis effectus. Effectus autem virtutis cuiuslibet id esse dicere quod homo secundum eam efficit et indo quod sibi inest. Et nota quod haec dispensatio non est inconveniens quia stoici in ea aliquid falsi dicerent, sed quia nimis pauca dicerent.

Glosae super Macrobium 1.8.4. MSS: S fol. 145v, V fol. 60r.

Temperantie. Ostenso quod sit officium prudentie, subiungit quod sit officium alterius virtutis, id est temperantie omnia relinquere que corporis usus. Sed quia corpus multis indiget sine quibus etiam nec homo existere posset utpote vestimentis contra aeris intemperiem, cibo contra famem, potu contra sitm, ideo subdit in quantum natura patitur. Quod quamvis scilicet homo eis utatur non tamen superflue immo secundum hec non plus quam natura exigit cui nature minimum sufficit. Hec autem diffinitio nimis angusta est. Bene enim possumus retinere aliquid quod exigit corpus et sine quo natura posset esse et tamen temperantiam non idcirco amittimus, sed ita quod non ad superfluitatem neque superbam utamur. Nature enim satis esset panis siliginis et aqua vilis. Si quando tamen melioribus cibis fruimur, non tamen excedit temperantiam, secundum hoc enim tunc nullus inveniri posset cui inesset temperantia.

Super Macrobium I.8.4. 888: 8 fol. 1859, V fol. 60r.

Temperantie. Catenus quod ait officium prudentie, subquod ait officium alterius virtutis, id est temperantie

sollicet bene ala utatur non tamen suscepta iuxta secundum hoc

esse difficilius minus augmenta est. Bene enim possumus retinere

tamen temperantiam non laudare possimus. Hoc

significatur nocte suscepam utamur. Natura enim satis easet

prius plurima et aqua vilia. Si quando tamen melioribus cibis

primum, hoc tamen excedit temperantiam, secundum hoc enim tunc

melius inventi posset qui incasset temperantia.

Glosae super Macrobium 1.8.6. MSS: S fols. 146r-v, V fol. 61r.

Sociale est animal nullum est enim animal quod in tantum exigat naturaliter sociari quemadmodum homo. Civitas autem non est aliud quam societas hominum ad vivendum sub uno iure et eisdem institutis congregatorum et ideo huiusmodi virtutes solis hominibus inesse possunt.

Glosae super Macrobium 1.8.7. MSS: S fol. 146v, V fol. 61v.

Et est politici ostenso generaliter que sint officia politicarum virtutum specialiter agit de unaquaque et prius de prudencia politica, ostendendo scilicet quod sit eius officium. Ad normam et ad regulam rationis. Ratio enim debet esse quasi quedam regula, ut enim cementarius regulam adiungit et adequat materiei et inde perpendit utrum recta sit materies nec non. Ita si quis velit esse bonus civis et politicus ante dicat vel agat aliquid in civilibus scilicet rei publice, dicendi vel agendi prius debet rationem adiungere ut ex ratione scilicet discernat utrum honeste dici possit vel agi necne. Cogitat. Nihil enim contra rationem excogitare vel agere debet. Et postea sequitur effexegesis id est explanatio precedentium vel superiorum quantum praeter rectum ad rationem velle quantum ad actum. Et ita redduntur singula singulis humanis actibus tamquam divinis arbitris quod tantum non debet divina curare sed etiam res humanas et actus hominum disponere.

Glosae super Macrobium 1.14.7. MS: V fol. 81r. Also ed. Lemay, "Doctrine of the Trinity," pp.217-18.

Logistikon id est rationem, logos enim est ratio; ex mente ut est [es: MS] expositum; recedunt a divinis quia non habentur a deo ita quod [qui: MS] in eis similes simus deo. Homo ergo qui est quasi mixtus omnium creaturarum omnes istas tres potentias habet simul et sic cum creatore habet aliquid commune et cum qualibet etiam creatura. In ratione enim consimilis est deo, in sensibilitate brutis animalibus, aliquid commune habet in vegetatione herbis et arboribus, inanimatis corporibus in existentia saltem. Unde etiam in divina pagina homo omnis creatura appellatur quasi omnis creature aliquam proprietatem in se continet. Dicitur etiam a philosophis "microcosmus," id est minor mundus, eadem ratione.

[illegible] pp. 21-25.

[illegible] id est rationem, locus enim est ratio; ex [illegible] es: MS excusetur; recedunt a divinis quia non [illegible] ita quod dicit: Mg in eis similes simus deo. Sola [illegible] mixtura omnium creaturarum omnia istae tres [illegible] simul et sic cum creatore habet altitud communa [illegible]. [illegible] assubtilitate brutis animalibus, altitud communa hab[illegible] herbis et arboribus, inanimatis corporibus in [illegible] esse. Unde etiam in divina pagina homo omnia [illegible] dicitur quasi omnia creatura aliquam proprietatem in [illegible]. Dicitur etiam a philosophis "microcosmus," id est [illegible] eadem ratione.

APPENDIX C

PHILOSOPHIA MUNDI

Printed texts: PL 172, 39-102, and PL 90, 1127-78.

MSS: A (Munich, Bayer. Staatsbibl. Clm 18918, fols. 1r-35r)

B (Munich, Bayer. Staatsbibl. Clm 16103, fols. 68r-83v)

C (Munich, Bayer. Staatsbibl. Clm 16103, fols. 84r-99v)

D (Munich, Bayer. Staatsbibl. Clm 564, fols. 2r-31v)

E (Munich, Bayer. Staatsbibl. Clm 2594, fols. 24r-42r)

Philosophia mundi. Texts: PL 172, 58C-D, and PL 90, 1139D-1140C. MSS: A fol. 11v, B fols. 71v-72r, C fol. 91v, D fols. 11r-v, E fol. 32r.

Sed scio quid dicent, "Nos nescimus qualiter hoc sit, sed scimus deum posse hoc facere." Miseri! Quid miserius quam dicere istud est quia deus illud facere potest, nec videre sic esse, nec rationem habere quare hoc sit, nec utilitatem ostendere ad quam hoc sit? Non enim quidquid potest Deus facere, facit. Ut autem verbis rustici utar: "Potens est deus facere de trunco vitulum. Fecitne umquam?" Vel igitur ostendant rationem quare hoc sit vel utilitatem ad quam hoc sit vel sic esse iudicare desinant.

Cum autem divina pagina dicat, "Divisit aquas que sunt sub firmamento ab his que sunt super firmamentum (Gen. 1:7)," aera firmamentum vocavit quia firmat et temperat terrena. Super hunc sunt aque vaporaliter in nubibus suspense, ut in sequentibus

posse hoc facere." Visne! quid mirabilius quam
ntia sint quia deus illud facere potest, nec videre sic
, non videmur habere quare hoc sit, nec utilitatem ostendere
ne sit? Non enim quidquid potest Deus facere, facit.
i esse debita mutui utar: Potens est deus facere de trunco
ulum. Vestine umquam?" Vel iuitur ostendant rationem quare
hoc sit vel utilitatem ad quam hoc sit vel sic esse iudicare
ntiant.

[illegible] ab his cue sunt super firmamentum (Gen. 1:7),"
sunt "firmamentum vocavit coelum firmat et temperat terrena. Inter
[illegible]

ostendetur, que divise sunt ab his que sunt sub aere. Similiter exponatur, "Posuit firmamentum in medio aquarum," quamvis hoc plus allegorice quam ad litteram dictum esse credamus. Iterum dicent, "Quid est ergo quod ibi videmus spissum et aquei coloris? Ignis enim non est. Si enim aer ex nimia sua subtilitate videri non potest, multo minus ignis qui subtilior est. Deinde talis color igneorum non est." Ad quod dicimus, nichil ibi videri sed visum ibi deficere et ex defectu visus quoddam spissum ibi confingeri.

Philosophia mundi. Texts: PL 172, 66B-C, and PL 90, 1149B. MSS: A fol. 16r, B fol. 74r, C fols. 95r-v, D fol. 14v, E fol. 35r.

Cum firmamentum ab ortu in occasum volvitur, si planete similiter moverentur esset tantus impetus quod in terra nichil stare vel vivere posset. Ut ergo rapido motui firmamenti obviarent et ut impetum illius temperarent, in contrarietatem motus retorti sunt. Sed quamvis contra firmamentum deferantur, firmamentum tamen defert eos secum ad occasum et inde ad ortum. Ut si aliquis in navi contra quam navis currat, se moveat, tamen a navi quorumque vadit defertur, non ideo a contrario motu quiescens.

[illegible]

[illegible] "Possit firmamentum in medio aquarum," quamvis hoc [illegible] allegorice quam ad litteram dictum esse credamus. Iterum [illegible], "Sicut per eum [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

Philosophia mundi. Texts: PL 172, 97B-C, and PL 90, 1176A-B. MSS: A fols. 33r-v, B fol. 83r, D fol. 29v.

Anima est quidam spiritus coniunctus corpori idonietatem discernendi et intelligendi conferens. Quod enim ex anima sit discernere et intelligere sic probatur quod crescente cura corporis, minuuntur ille virtutes, decrescente illa et crescente cura anime crescunt ille. Si enim ex natura corporis essent, crescente cura corporis crescerent. Augmentata namque cura, augmentatur effectus. Iterum cum omnis creatura corpus vel spiritus sit, conveniens fuit ut homo ex spiritu et corpore constaret ut cum utroque aliquam affinitatem haberet. Habet ergo cum corporibus vita carentibus commune existere, cum arboribus vivere, cum brutis animalibus sentire, cum spiritibus discernere. Inde est quod in divina pagina homo dicitur omnis creatura.

Cum ergo ex anima et corpore constet homo, dominante tamen anima quippe in qua est similis creatori, inconveniens esset si corpus suas haberet actiones anima vero non. Sed dicet aliquis, "Quomodo discernam que actiones debent in homine iudicari anime et que corporis?" Dicimus, ille actiones que communes sunt homini cum bruto animali vel cum corporibus vita carentibus etsi anima illas in homine operatur non debent dici anime sed corporis. Que vero inveniuntur in homine et in nullo alio corpore esse possunt anime sunt. Discernere ergo et intelligere anime est, sentire vero et similia corporis. Sed dicet aliquis, "Si anime actiones non sunt, debetne dici vel virtutes vel vitia anime et quare propter illa dampnatur anima vel remuneratur?" Nos vero dicimus etsi illius non actiones, eius esse possunt virtutes vel vitia. Cum enim ad hoc sit anima homini data sit

illicitos motus corporis corrigat, ignorantia illius vel neglegentia contingit. Sicut ergo si discipulus doctoris vel servus neglegentia doctoris vel domini peccet, magister vel dominus extra culpam non est, sic nec anima illi contingentibus. Non ergo extra culpam est, etsi illius non sint actiones.

Philosophia mundi. Texts: PL 172, 100A-B, and PL 90, 1178B. MSS: A fol. 35r, B fol. 83v, D fol. 31r, E fol. 42r.

Ut doceatur vero talis eligendus est qui non sit doctrine obstrepens nec superbus, nec videatur aliquid esse cum nichil sit, qui magistrum ut patrem diligat et plus quam patrem. A quo enim maiora et digniora accipimus magis diligere debemus. A patre autem rudes esse accipimus, a magistro esse sapientes, quod maius et dignus est. Plus vero diligendi sunt boni doctores quam parentes. Nec tantum iustum est ut plus diligantur doctores, sed utile ut sententie illorum [illius: MSS] et verba nobis placeant; quia in eo quod non diligimus, sepe etiam bona verba displicent, illaque fugimus dum studemus non imitari illos, quos non diligimus. Quamvis vero sanguinea complexio sit habilis ad doctrinam quippe in omnibus temperata, tamen in omni aliquis perfectus cum labore esse potest quia labor improbus omnia vincit.

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BIOGRAPHY

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